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 Abstract 
 
The Thesis investigates the interface between State aid law and public procurement law with an 
emphasis on analysing when the award of public contracts by contracting authorities constitutes 
State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. Article 107(1) TFEU prohibits any aid 
granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or 
threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain 
goods, in so far as it affects trade between Member States. Award of public contracts is 
governed by procedural rules laid down in the public procurement Directives which lay out 
specific rules and procedures for the award of public contracts. Furthermore, public contracts 
can – under specific circumstances – be awarded directly without the conduct of a tender 
procedure. These situations are referred to as legal direct award of contract. A contract can be 
legally awarded without the conduct of a tender procedure, e.g. when the value of the contract is 
below the thresholds set out in the Directives. Finally, situations might occur where the award of 
a contract directly to an economic operator falls under the scope of the procurement Directives 
and thus should have happened through a tender procedure. Such situations are referred to as 
illegal direct award of contracts. This Thesis analyses the extent to which State aid rules apply in 
the abovementioned situations.  
Chapter 1 introduces the scope and perspectives of this Thesis and accounts for the 
methodological approach taken. The analyses in the Thesis are legal dogmatic in the sense that 
the research question asked leads to an answer that seeks to find out what law is, rather than 
asking what the law should be (a normative approach). The Thesis thereby aims at concluding 
when the award of public contracts constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) 
TFEU. 
Chapter 2 seeks to analyse the aims and objectives of public procurement rules and State aid 
rules, respectively. The understanding of the objectives behind the two sets of rules is important 
in order to answer the research question. It is found that public procurement rules and State aid 
rules share the common objective of supporting the Internal Market by increasing and protecting 
competition. The two sets of rules support this goal in different ways, but it is concluded that the 
different means are not mutually exclusive. 
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Chapters 3 and 4 analyse the personal scope of the procurement rules and State aid rules. This 
is done in order to conclude whether contracting authorities fall under the scope of the State aid 
rules. It is found in chapter 3 that the concept of ‘contracting authority’ under the procurement 
rules coincides with the concept of ‘State’ under the State aid rules. Furthermore, it is concluded 
in chapter 4 that the concept of ‘economic operator’ under the procurement rules coincides with 
the concept of ‘undertaking’ under the State aid rules. Thereby, it is concluded that contracting 
authorities are capable of transferring State aid to economic operators when they award public 
contracts.  
Chapter 5 looks at the interface between the two sets of rules with regard to assessing whether 
public contracts are able to satisfy the cumulative criteria set out in Article 107(1) TFEU with 
regard to measures which ‘distort or threaten to distort competition’, measures which ‘favour 
certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’ and measures which ‘affect trade 
between Member States’. With regard to measures which distort or threaten to distort 
competition, it is argued that the obligation for the contracting authority to ensure that 
competition is not distorted is embedded in the public procurement Directives by way of an 
obligation for the contracting authority to ensure that competition is not artificially narrowed 
when public contracts are awarded. Then, the chapter analyses measures which favour certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods (the concept of selectivity). It is unsettled in the 
case law from the CJEU how the concept of selectivity applies to procurement measures. It is 
argued that the requirement of selectivity cannot be determined a priori, and thus whether the 
award of public contracts are selective must be determined on a case-by-case basis. In relation to 
the three award situations, it is argued that the principles of equal treatment and non-
discrimination, as embedded in the procurement rules, resemble the concept of selectivity under 
State aid law. It is found that no selectivity occurs in relation to legal direct award of contracts in 
so far as the general principles of the Treaty are adhered to. However, the same conclusion does 
not apply for illegal direct award of contracts, especially in situations where the general 
principles of the Treaty are not adhered to.      
Chapter 6 accounts for the concept of ‘advantage’ under State aid law. It is argued that when 
assessing whether an advantage has been conferred to the recipient, it is relevant to conclude 
whether the measure in question represents normal market conditions, and thus whether market 
price has been paid. Then, the presumptions for the requirement of market price are deduced. It 
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is found that when State intervention is not given according to market conditions, market price 
is not paid, and hence an advantage is conferred within Article 107(1) TFEU. Finally, it is 
argued that in cases where the State purchases goods and services, there will be aid only if the 
price paid exceeds the market price.  
Chapter 7 contains an analysis of the concept of ‘advantage’ in relation to the award of public 
contracts and discusses how and when an advantage occurs when public contracts are awarded. 
It is emphasised that the CJ has not yet taken the opportunity to conclude whether the award of a 
public contract constitutes State aid within the framework of Article 107(1) TFEU. For this 
reason, the analysis is based on judgments from the GC as well as decisions from the 
Commission. It is concluded that the benchmark for obtaining market price when public 
contracts are awarded is not unambiguous. Hence, it is necessary to take the concrete 
circumstances of the case into consideration when it is decided whether the award confers an 
advantage on the winning tenderer. Accordingly, the benchmark for assessment of whether State 
aid is granted when public contracts are awarded relies on a number of factors which are 
indicative for whether market price has been obtained.  
Chapter 8 introduces and explains the Market Economy Investor Principle (MEIP), which is the 
benchmark applied under State aid law for assessment of whether a transaction from the State 
involves an advantage for the recipient. It is concluded that the MEIP is not applicable to 
contacting authorities when they purchase goods or services. Based on this conclusion, it is 
discussed which other benchmark, if not the MEIP, is used when assessing whether the 
contracting authorities confer an advantage on the recipient when they purchase goods or 
services. It is found that the Market Economy Purchaser Principle (MEPP) is the benchmark 
used by the CJ to conclude whether an advantage has been conferred to the recipient, and it is 
discussed what the MEPP contains.    
Chapter 9 is the conclusions of the Thesis. The contributions of this Thesis are numerous: They 
all contribute to conclude that contracting authorities are capable of transferring State aid when 
public contracts are awarded and that the benchmark for assessment of whether State aid is 
granted when public contracts are awarded relies on a number of factors which are indicative for 
whether market price has been obtained. Finally, it is concluded that the benchmark used by the 
CJ to conclude whether an advantage has been conferred by contracting authorities to economic 
operators is the Market Economy Purchaser Principle (MEPP).  
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Resumé: 
Afhandlingen undersøger grænsefladen mellem statsstøtteretten og udbudsretten med henblik på 
at analysere, hvornår tildeling af offentlige kontrakter tildelt af ordregivende myndigheder udgør 
statsstøtte i henhold til artikel 107, stk. 1, TEUF. Artikel 107, stk. 1, TEUF forbyder enhver 
støtte ydet af en medlemsstat eller gennem statsmidler i enhver form, som fordrejer eller truer 
med at fordreje konkurrencen ved at begunstige visse virksomheder eller visse produktioner, for 
så vidt som den påvirker samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne. Tildeling af offentlige 
kontrakter er underlagt procedureregler i udbudsdirektiverne, hvori der er fastsat særlige regler 
og procedurer for indgåelse af offentlige kontrakter. Desuden kan offentlige kontrakter under 
særlige omstændigheder tildeles direkte uden udbudsprocedure. Disse situationer refereres der 
til i afhandlingen som lovlig direkte tildeling af kontrakt. Tildelingen kan være lovlig uden 
udførelse af en udbudsprocedure, f.eks. fordi kontraktens værdi ligger under de grænser, der er 
fastsat i direktiverne. Endelig kan der opstå situationer, hvor tildeling af en kontrakt direkte til 
den økonomiske aktør falder ind under udbudsdirektivernes anvendelsesområde og derfor skulle 
have været gennem en udbudsprocedure. Sådanne situationer betegnes i afhandlingen som 
ulovlig direkte tildeling af kontrakter. Denne afhandling analyserer, i hvilket omfang 
statsstøtteregler finder anvendelse i ovennævnte situationer. 
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1. Introduction and Methodology 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In recent years, it has been debated whether a procurement procedure can be used as a tool to 
eliminate or reduce the presence of State aid.
1
 The answer to this question is essential for public 
authorities who risk breaching the State aid rules when they award public contracts, but it is also 
crucial for economic operators who risk having to pay back illegal State aid.
2
 
Article 107(1) TFEU prohibits any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in 
any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods, in so far as it affects trade between Member 
States. Accordingly, the rules on State aid are concerned with eliminating or preventing possible 
distortive effects of aid granted by the Member States, since such effects are perceived as 
harmful for the Internal Market.  
Award of public contracts is governed by procedural rules laid down in the public procurement 
Directives which lay out specific rules and procedures for the award of public contracts. The 
                                                          
1
 The contributions on this topic include, but are not limited to: P. Nicolaides and S. Schoenmaekers, ‘The Concept 
of ‘Advantage’ in State aid and Public Procurement and the Application of Public Procurement Rules to Minimise 
Advantage in the New GBER’, (2015), 14 (1), EStAL, 143-156; A.S. Graells, ‘Public procurement and state aid: 
reopening the debate?’ (2012) 6, P.P.L.R, 205-212; P. Nicolaides and I.E. Rusu, ‘Competitive Selection of 
Undertakings and State Aid: Why and When Does It Not Eliminate Advantage?’, (2012), 7, (1), E.P.P.P.L, 5-29; 
G.S. Ølykke, ‘The Legal Basis Which Will (Probably) Never Be Used: Enforcement of State Aid Law in a Public 
Procurement Context’ 2011(3), EStAL, 457-462; G.S. Ølykke ‘How does the Court of Justice of the European 
Union pursue competition concerns in a public procurement context?’ P.P.L.R, 2011 (6), 179-192; N. Tosics and N. 
Gaál, ‘Public procurement and State aid control – the issue of economic advantage’ 2007(3), Competition Policy 
Newsletter, 15-18; A. Doern, ‘The interaction between EC rules on public procurement and State aid’, 2004(3) 
P.P.L.R, 97-129; J. Hillger, ‘The award of a public contract as state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC’, 
(2003), 3, P.P.L.R, 109-130; P.A. Baistrocchi, ‘Can the award of a public contract be deemed to constitute state 
aid?’(2003) 24(10), E.C.L.R, 510-517; M. Stempowski and M. Dischendorfer, ‘The interplay between the E.C 
Rules on public procurement and state aid’,(2002) 3, P.P.L.R, 47-52; A. Bartosch, ‘The Relationship between 
Public Procurement and State Aid Surveillance – The Toughest Standard Applies?’ 2002, 39, Common Market Law 
Review, 551-576; G.S. Ølykke, ‘Commission Notice on the notion of state aid as referred to in article 107(1) TFEU 
– is the conduct of a public procurement procedure sufficient to eliminate the risk of granting of state aid?’, (2016), 
5, P.P.L.R, 197-212; G.S. Ølykke, ‘The Notice on the Notion of State Aid and Public Procurement Law’ (2016), 
15, (4), EStAL,508-526; P.E. Hasselgård, ‘The Use of Tender Procedures to Exclude State Aid: The Situation under 
the EU 2014 Public Procurement Directives’ (2017), 12, (1), EPPPL, 16-28. 
2
 In this respect the Commission has the power to order recovery of the unlawful aid, cf. Article 108 TFEU. See 
also Commission Regulation (EC) No 794/2004 of 21 April 2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No. 
659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, OJ L 140. 
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aim of setting up procedural rules for the award of public contracts is to ensure that public 
procurement is opened up to competition, to the benefit of undertakings across the EU. As 
emphasised in the preamble in the public procurement Directive:
3
 
“The award of public contracts by or on behalf of Member States’ authorities has to comply 
with the principles of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and in 
particular the free movement of goods, freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide 
services, as well as the principles deriving therefrom, such as equal treatment, non-
discrimination, mutual recognition, proportionality and transparency. However, for public 
contracts above a certain value, provisions should be drawn up coordinating national 
procurement procedures so as to ensure that those principles are given practical effect and 
public procurement is opened up to competition.”4 
 
The rules on public procurement and State aid have arguably been seen as completely 
independent areas of law
5
 and this means that contracting authorities might not be aware of the 
risk of granting State aid through the award of public contracts. However, in recent years, a 
growing interaction between the two sets of rules can be detected in case law as well as in the 
Commission’s State aid practice.  
The link between public procurement law and State aid law became relevant with the landmark 
Altmark
6
 judgment delivered on 24 July 2003 where the CJ used a public procurement 
procedure as a possible tool to eliminate State aid relating to the delivery of public service 
obligations (PSOs).
7
  
The Altmark judgment concerned the balance between Member States’ rights to provide public 
services against protecting the Internal Market from potential distortive effects caused by 
                                                          
3
 Directive 2014/24/EU of The European Parliament and of The Council of 26 February 2014 on public 
procurement (henceforth “the public procurement Directive”), repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, recital 1. 
4
 Emphasis added. 
5
 A. Bartosch, ‘The Relationship between Public Procurement and State Aid Surveillance – The Toughest Standard 
Applies?’ 2002, 39, Common Market Law Review, 551-576, 551. 
6
 Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH, and 
Oberbundesanwalt beim Bundesverwaltungsgericht., C-280/00, EU:C:2003:415. 
7
 The CJEU has connected the concept of Services of General Economic Interest (SGEI) to the concept of PSO, e.g. 
in Enirisorse SpA v Ministero delle Finanze, Joined cases C-34/01 to C-38/01, EU:C:2003:640, para 33 and 
European Commission v Deutsche Post AG, C-399/08 P, EU:C:2010:481, para 41. See also G.S. Ølykke and P. 
Møllgaard, ‘What is a Service of General Economic Interest?’ (2016) 41(1) European Journal of Law and 
Economics 205-241, 210. 
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subsidies granted to specific undertakings. In the case, the CJ was asked whether the financial 
compensation for the delivery of a PSO granted by a Member State to an undertaking 
constituted State aid.
8
 In its reply, the CJ formulated a number of criteria which must be met 
when determining whether the compensation for delivery of a PSO amounts to State aid.
9
 If the 
criteria set out are not fulfilled, the compensation is considered State aid. According to the CJ, 
the criteria which must be fulfilled in order for compensation for the delivery of PSOs not to 
amount to State aid are: i) the PSO must be clearly defined; ii) the calculation of the 
compensation must be laid down in advance in an objective and transparent manner, and iii) no 
overcompensation may occur.
10
 In the fourth criterion, the CJEU stated that if the choice of the 
provider of the PSO is not made pursuant to a public procurement procedure, the public 
authority is obliged to make a benchmarking exercise to make sure that no State aid is granted.
11
 
This means that when a public contract for PSOs is awarded subsequent to a public procurement 
procedure, the compensation (payment) does not constitute State aid.  
Thus, Altmark established a link between public procurement law and State aid law in the area 
of PSOs.
 12
 However, the Altmark, judgment only concerns compensation for PSOs, and 
therefore, does not concern the rather important question, whether the direct award of public 
contracts for other contract subjects constitutes State aid. This question is of great importance to 
the contracting authorities. 
So far, the CJ has not taken the opportunity to conclude whether (or to what extent) a tender 
procedure is capable of eliminating (or reducing) the presence of State aid. However, this does 
not mean that the question of whether the contracting authority falls under the scope of Article 
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107(1) TFEU is unsolved in case law. However, what has not been concluded in case law is to 
which extent the procedural rules of the public procurement Directives work as a safeguard 
against granting State aid.  
 
1.1.1 A competitive, transparent, non-discriminatory and unconditional tender procedure 
as a means of avoiding State aid?  
Central to the discussion of whether the conduct of a tender procedure is capable of eliminating 
State aid is the way in which the public contract has been awarded. In this respect, the conduct 
of a competitive, transparent, non-discriminatory and unconditional tender procedure has been 
mentioned by the Commission as one possible way to avoid the risk of granting State aid:
13
 
“If the sale and purchase of assets, goods and services (or other comparable transactions) are 
carried out following a competitive, transparent, non-discriminatory and unconditional tender 
procedure in line with the principles of the TFEU on public procurement, it can be presumed 
that those transactions are in line with market conditions, provided that the appropriate 
criteria for selecting the buyer or seller […] have been used […].”14 
It has to be noted however, that the choice of procedure is not sufficient to rule out State aid:
15
 
“Using and complying with the procedures provided for in the Public Procurement Directives 
can be considered sufficient to meet the requirements above provided that all the conditions 
for the use of the respective procedure are fulfilled. This does not apply in specific 
circumstances that make it impossible to establish a market price, such as the use of the 
negotiated procedure without publication of a contract notice. If only one bid is submitted, the 
procedure would not normally be sufficient to ensure a market price, unless either (i) there are 
particularly strong safeguards in the design of the procedure ensuring genuine and effective 
competition and it is not apparent that only one operator is realistically able to submit a credible 
bid or (ii) the public authorities verify through additional means that the outcome corresponds to 
the market price.”16 
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Accordingly, the conduct of a tender procedure is used as a presumption against State aid. As 
stressed by the Commission, if the chosen procedure for the award is not suitable to establish 
market price, State aid cannot be ruled out.  
Arguably, the procedure itself cannot be used to rule out the presence of State aid when public 
contracts are awarded, and this means that contracting authorities have to be aware of the State 
aid rules when they award public contracts.  
 
1.1.2 Interaction between public procurement law and State aid law 
The public procurement rules consist of Directives which lay down procedural rules for the 
award of public contracts by contracting authorities above a certain threshold. The rules on 
public procurement are set out in four Directives, namely the public procurement Directive; the 
utilities Directive
17
; the concession Directive
18
; and the defence Directive
19
. The procedural 
rules in the procurement Directives concern situations where the contracting authority act as 
purchaser, and one of the main aims of the procurement rules is to ensure equal access to public 
contracts for economic operators across Member States.
20
 
Furthermore, public contracts can – under specific circumstances – be awarded directly without 
the conduct of a tender procedure. These situations are referred to as legal direct award of 
contract. A contract can be legally awarded without the conduct of a tender procedure, e.g. when 
the value of the contract is below the thresholds set out in the Directives. Finally, situations 
might occur where the award of a contract directly to an economic operator falls under the scope 
of the procurement Directives and thus should have happened through a tender procedure. Such 
situations are referred to as illegal direct award of contracts.  
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The rules on State aid are laid down in Articles 107-109 TFEU as well as in secondary 
legislation consisting of decisions, regulations, guidelines, notices and frameworks, and concern 
the States’ use of public funding to private or semi-private undertakings. The point of departure 
is a total prohibition against State aid to undertakings, which is laid down in Article 107(1) 
TFEU and supported by several exemptions in Articles 107(2) TFEU et seq. The State aid rules 
aim at preventing aid which favours certain undertakings by conferring an advantage which in 
turn can result in distortions to the Internal Market. The State aid rules are arguably concerned 
with preventing existing competition from being distorted, where the procurement rules aim at 
increasing the level of competition by ensuring equal access to public contracts.
21
  
This Thesis will address the situations explained above by analysing to which extent the 
procedural safeguards
22
 of the procurement Directive reduce or even eliminate the presence of 
State aid.  
 
1.2 Problem statement  
As mentioned above, so far, the CJ has not directly dealt with any cases concerning whether 
State aid occurs when public contracts are awarded. There could be numerous explanations for 
this. Perhaps the CJ has refrained from ruling directly on this matter due to political reasons
23
, 
e.g. because the subject is controversial for the Member States. Another explanation could be 
that there has not yet been an opportunity for the CJ to deliver a judgment which concludes 
whether the award of public contracts constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) 
TFEU.  
However, arguably, unsuccessful tenderers are starting to realise that there might be reasons to 
argue that an award of a public contract results in State aid. An example of this situation can be 
found in the case of SNCM
24
 which was a case before the GC. In this case, one of the 
unsuccessful tenderers (Corsica Ferries) lodged a complaint before the Commission concerning 
unlawful State aid incompatible with the Internal Market to the winning tenderer (SNCM and 
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CMN) as a result of the awarded contract.
25
 This case serves to show that unsuccessful tenderers 
use the State aid rules as the choice of rule to prevent the award of contract to the winning 
tenderer. Thus, if the argument above is correct, State aid rules could be argued to represent an 
opportunity for the tenderers to prevent the winning tenderer from receiving the contract.  
Arguably, the choice of rules depends largely on two factors which will be discussed separately. 
Firstly, the choice of rules can depend on the result wished for. Secondly, the choice of rules 
could be seen as a strategic choice by the parties. The following will discuss these situations in 
turn. 
First of all, it should be stressed that the fact that a case has been decided under one set of rules 
does not mean that the same case cannot be decided under another set of rules at a later stage. 
This means that in situations where a case has been decided under the procurement rules there is 
nothing to prevent the Commission from taking up the case under the State aid rules at a later 
point.  
Regarding the first argument that the choice of rules depends on the result wished for, it should 
be stressed that if a case is decided under the State aid rules, there is no possibility to have the 
contract deemed void. Consequently, if a case is decided under the State aid rules, the 
unsuccessful tenderer will not have the possibility to get the procurement process annulled, and 
the winning tenderer will thus enjoy the immediate benefit of getting the contract.  
Secondly, the choice of rules is a strategic choice by the parties. Arguably, if the contracting 
authority wishes to get out of a contract, they can use the State aid rules to ‘threaten’ the 
winning tenderer with the possibility that the contract entails State aid. 
On the basis of the above, the thesis will answer the overall research question: 
“When does the award of public contracts constitute State aid within Article 107(1) TFEU?” 
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1.2.1 Analytical framework  
In order to answer the main research question, I set up an analytical framework to be applied in 
the analyses. Consequently, I assess the overall research question in relation to three different 
award situations, namely i) award by public tender ii) award by concession and iii) direct award. 
These three situations represent the analytical framework of this Thesis. 
The first situation refers to award of contracts which fall inside the scope of the public 
procurement Directive. The second award situation refers to award under the concession 
Directive. The third situation refers to two different award situations which are legal direct 
award and illegal direct award. Regarding the first situation, this could be award of contracts 
below the threshold as set out in the procurement Directive
26
. The latter situation entails illegal 
direct award to an undertaking, i.e. where the procurement rules apply, but are not adhered to.  
It is important to analyse the three situations separately as the rules on State aid might apply 
differently depending on whether the award falls within the procurement regime or not. 
However, it is not appropriate to apply the analytical framework in all situations, i.e. analyse all 
three award situations in all situations. For this reason, the different award situations are 
analysed uniformly in some situations. Thus, I apply the analytical framework in the Thesis, 
with respect to analysing the different award situations separately, where it is appropriate for the 
analysis.  
 
1.3 Purpose of the study  
The purpose of this study is to provide a legal dogmatic (de lege lata) analysis of the interface 
between State aid law and public procurement law with an emphasis on analysing when the 
award of public contracts awarded by contracting authorities constitutes State aid within the 
meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.  
The analyses in the study are theoretical in the sense that they are focused on discussing how 
existing legal sources apply in general. However, I wish to address a broad audience, and I 
consider the conclusions of this Thesis useful for academics as well as contracting authorities, 
economic operators (tenderers) and others with an interest in this subject.  
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1.4 Law and method 
This section will introduce and explain how the main research question introduced above is 
answered. The research question asked in this Thesis is dogmatic in the sense that the aim of the 
Thesis is to find out what valid law is,
27
 and essentially the answers will be de lege lata (an 
account for the current status of law through an examination of the jurisprudence from The 
General Court as well as the CJEU in their application of the public procurement rules and State 
aid rules).  
 
1.4.1 Legal philosophy 
The legal research in this Thesis is methodologically founded on legal positivism. The main 
argument behind the choice of legal positivism as foundation for the Thesis is that legal 
positivism has been the prevailing legal philosophy in Europe since the 19
th
 century and is used 
today by most EU legal scholars.
28
  
Legal positivism sees law as an observable phenomenon of legislation, custom, adjudication by 
Courts and other legal institutions.
29
 One of the core tenets of legal positivism is that law is 
created by humans and obtains validity through the formal legal status of a rule.
30,31 
Modern 
legal positivism has been highly influenced by Hans Kelsen who developed the pure theory of 
law (Reine Rechtslehre)
32
. The pure theory of law builds on legal positivism but distinguishes 
itself by being free of ‘foreign elements’ such as morality or matters of facts.33 Kelsen sees a 
legal system as a hierarchy of legal norms from which the highest-ranking norm, (Grundnorm), 
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springs. Thus, the validity of a norm depends on whether or not it can be transferred back to (has 
been adopted in accordance with) the highest-ranking norm from which all other norms derive 
their validity. This means that each norm itself derives validity from a hierarchically superior 
norm until eventually an originating ultimate norm or Grundnorm can be posited. Accordingly, 
the Grundnorm is a norm whose validity is not created from any other (higher-ranking) norm.
34
 
This phenomenon has been referred to as a ‘Chain of Creation’.35  
Legal positivism is a useful methodological approach to systematising legal norms, which is 
exactly what this Thesis seeks to accomplish by asking the overall research question of when the 
award of public contracts constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. The 
choice to apply legal positivism in the Thesis has implications for my research question. Legal 
positivism sees the law as it is and not how it should be,
36
 and this implicitly entails that the 
research question I ask cannot be normative.  
1.4.2 Method 
This Thesis has as its field of enquiry EU law in the broad sense, and more specifically the rules 
on State aid as set out in Articles 107-109 TFEU, and the rules on public procurement as set out 
in the public procurement Directive; the utilities Directive; the concession Directive and the 
defence Directive.  
State aid law and public procurement law represent two separate legal disciplines, which have 
historically been interpreted separately, and with their own sets of EU regulated sanctions.
37
 As 
the public procurement rules are highly technical and specialised, the development has arguably 
been isolated from the other areas of EU law.
38
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A similar development has taken place within State aid law. Further, State aid law and public 
procurement law have from the outset two different legal bases which mean that the rules on 
State aid are part of the Treaty rules on competition, where the public procurement rules are 
founded on the free movement rules in the Treaty.
39
  
 
1.4.3 Legal dogmatic method 
The legal dogmatic (doctrinal) method will be applied in this Thesis, whereby relevant sources 
of law will be identified and balanced against each other in accordance with the doctrine of the 
sources of the law and finally interpreted.
40
 As the Thesis has EU law as its field of enquiry in a 
broad sense as described above, the legal dogmatic method will therefore be applied with regard 
to EU law. 
This section will now account for the method used to interpret the relevant sources of law 
(section 1.5) as well as the doctrine of the sources of law (section 1.4.3.2). The relevant sources 
of law will be identified according to the chosen philosophy of law, as described above in 
section 1.4.1. The sources of law will be described in section 1.5.1.  
 
1.4.3.1 Interpretation of EU sources of law 
Four methods of interpretation
41
 can be used to interpret sources of law, namely the wording of 
the law (grammatical interpretation), the context of the law (systematic interpretation), the 
object and purpose of the law (teleological interpretation) and the legislative history of the law 
and the intentions of the legislator (historical interpretation).  
In a legal analysis, the four methods will often influence each other, and it will therefore not 
always be possible to adhere to one specific method of interpretation, nor is it always possible to 
detect which method of interpretation is used.  
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An example of the usage of several methods of interpretation is the judgment in Italy v 
Commission
42
 where the CJEU applied both grammatical and teleological interpretation to 
conclude that the Commission was right in applying guidelines on aid to employment in a 
decision:
43
  
“in the light of that case-law, the Commission's assessment [..] is not contrary to the letter or 
spirit of Article 87(3)(a) EC [now 107(3) TFEU] and thus does not err in law.”44  
In Teleaustria
45
 the CJEU used historical interpretation to consider whether the direct award of a 
contract fell within the scope of the procurement rules. The CJEU emphasised that:
46
 
“Since Telekom Austria, the Member States which have submitted observations and the 
Commission dispute that interpretation, it is necessary to assess its merits in the light of the 
history of the relevant directives, in particular in the field of public service contracts.”47  
Grammatical interpretation seek to derive the meaning of a norm from its literal expression in 
the legal text. The multilingual aspect of the EU sometimes makes grammatical interpretation 
difficult, as legal sources can be interpreted differently depending on which linguistic version is 
used. In cases of such conflicts between various language versions, systemic and teleological 
arguments will prevail.
48
 Systematic interpretation puts the interpreted legal provisions into a 
wider context and seeks to establish an interpretation which coheres with the rest of the legal 
system
49
. This includes interpretation by analogy. 
In CILFIT,
50
 the CJEU emphasised that the context in which the legal source is placed is 
important:
51
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“[…] every provision of community law must be placed in its context and interpreted in the 
light of the provisions of community law as a whole, regard being had to the objectives thereof 
and to its state of evolution at the date on which the provision in question is to be applied.”52 
Teleological interpretation refers to the purpose of the legal norm, its function in the overall 
legal scheme and the consequences of the selected interpretation.
53
 The purpose of a legal act 
can be detected from the act itself, in the preparatory work or recitals to the act, or in EU case 
law. The method of interpretation applied by the CJEU is teleological interpretation, but other 
legal arguments are used as well.
54
 Teleological interpretation is understood as a systemic 
understanding of the EU legal order, and more specifically, the case law from the CJEU. 
Maduro states that:
55
 
“Teleological interpretation in EU law does not, therefore, refer exclusively to a purpose driven 
interpretation of the relevant legal rules. It refers to a particular systemic understanding of the 
EU legal order that permeates the interpretation of all its rules.” 
The effet utile is a specific aspect of teleological interpretation and is used by the CJEU as a 
method of interpretation.
56
 The effet utile requires a provision of EU law to be interpreted so as 
to support the general aim of EU law.
57
 Finally, historical interpretation refers to situations 
where the intention of the legislator is examined, e.g by taking preparatory works for a legal text 
into consideration. Historical interpretation is closely related to systematic and teleological 
interpretation.
58
  
 
1.4.3.2 The EU doctrine of the sources of law 
The doctrine of the sources of law concerns how a legal source should be placed in the legal 
hierarchy, and accordingly how it can be used to answer the question what is valid law? The EU 
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doctrine of sources of law means that lower-ranking sources of law, such as secondary sources 
of law, must respect the higher-ranking sources of law, such as the Treaties.
59
 In the EU, the 
hierarchy of norms implies that there is a vertical order of legal acts, and norms lower in the 
hierarchy are thus subject to legal acts of a higher status.
60
 From an EU perspective, the doctrine 
of sources of law has to deal with and acknowledge the national sources of law in the Member 
States. Mainly two principles influence the relationship between EU law and the national laws 
of the Member States, namely the doctrine of supremacy and the doctrine of direct effect. 
Firstly, the doctrine of supremacy means that primary and secondary EU law takes precedence 
over national laws of the Member States.
61
 Secondly, the doctrine of direct effect entails that EU 
Treaty provisions can have direct effect in the Member States, and further, that they can be 
relied on by individuals.
62
 The principles of supremacy and direct effect play a vital role in the 
relationship between EU and the Member States and has allowed for uniformity of EU law.  
 
1.5 Sources of law 
This section introduces the legal sources mainly used in this Thesis. The legal sources relied on 
are EU sources of law. As described above, the legal philosophy applied in the Thesis is legal 
positivism, and valid law is thus identified as sources of law adopted by recognised law-making 
bodies. In this respect, the term ‘source of law’ is used in a broad sense which implies that every 
legal norm which creates a legal obligation or right is considered a source of law for the purpose 
of this Thesis.
63
  
 
 1.5.1 EU Sources of law 
The legal sources used and interpreted in this Thesis include in particular EU judicial and legal 
practice. The overall research question seeks to understand the current and future case law of the 
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CJEU, and this is done through EU primary sources of law (the TEU and TFEU) and EU 
secondary sources of law listed in article 288 TFEU (Regulations, Directives and Decisions). 
Furthermore, case law from the CJEU, general principles of EU law, EU soft law and 
preparatory works will be highly relied on as interpretative aids. Finally, academic literature will 
be included where necessary.  
These sources will be elaborated below, but first a brief history of the EU as well as the law-
making process in the EU will be explained.  
  
1.5.1.1 The history and law-making process of the EU 
The idea of a European Union leads far back, and as early as in 1925 the French Prime Minister, 
Herriot, spoke publicly about the wish to establish a United European Union.
64
 Not until the 
1950s, however, in the aftermath of World War II, did this idea (partly) come to live. The 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was thus established with the aim to prevent 
further war in Europe (namely between France and Germany). In 1951, the Treaty of Paris
65
 was 
signed between Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Luxembourg with 
the intention of creating a Common Market for coal and steel. Today (2017), the EU consists of 
28 Member States which have conferred power to the EU to various degrees depending on 
which area of law is at stake.
 66
  
There are seven principal institutions listed in Article 13 TEU which carry out the tasks of the 
Union, namely the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the Commission, 
the CJEU, the European Central Bank and the Court of Auditors.
67
 The Council, the 
Commission and the Parliament adopt and enact EU legislation. When the EU wishes to 
exercise the competences conferred upon it by the Treaties, the principles set out in Article 5 
TEU are relevant. Hence, the principle of conferral, the principle of proportionality and the 
principle of subsidiarity should be respected when the EU legislator acts. The principle of 
conferral means that the EU only has the powers conferred on it by the Treaties. Further, the 
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principle of proportionality means that the exercise of EU competence may not exceed what is 
necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties. Finally, the principle of subsidiarity implies 
that in situations where the EU and the Member States have shared competences, the EU may 
only intervene if it is capable of acting more effectively than the Member States.  
 
1.5.1.2 Competences 
The Union shares competences with the Member States in the area of Internal Market, cf. 
Article 4 TFEU, and therefore they share competences on the rules on public procurement. 
Shared competences imply that the EU and the Member States act jointly in a specific area. 
Firstly, shared competence gives the Member States a right to legislate and adopt legally binding 
acts. Furthermore, it obliges the Member States to exercise their competence to the extent that 
the Union has not exercised its competence. Article 2(2) TFEU states that: 
“When the Treaties confer on the Union a competence shared with the Member States in a 
specific area, the Union and the Member States may legislate and adopt legally binding acts in 
that area. The Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has 
not exercised its competence. The Member States shall again exercise their competence to the 
extent that the Union has decided to cease exercising its competence.”68 
On the contrary, the EU has exclusive competence over the competition rules, including the 
rules on State aid.
69
 According to Article 3(1)(b) TFEU, the establishment of the competition 
rules necessary for the functioning of the Internal Market fall within the area of exclusive 
competence. Exclusive competence means that the Member States do not have competence to 
legislate, unless specifically empowered by the Union to do so. Article 2(1) states that: 
“When the Treaties confer on the Union exclusive competence in a specific area, only the Union 
may legislate and adopt legally binding acts, the Member States being able to do so themselves 
only if so empowered by the Union or for the implementation of Union acts.”70 
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As outlined above, different competences exist for the procurement rules and the State aid rules 
when it comes to adopting legislation and legally binding acts. Hence, the Member States do not 
enjoy any autonomous legislative competence over the State aid rules, and they cannot adopt 
any legally binding acts, whereas the opposite applies for the public procurement rules. This 
situation could be problematic in situations where a Member State wishes to adopt legislation or 
establish enhanced cooperation in order to address issues that arise out of situations where both 
the State aid rules and the procurement rules plays a role. In such situations it would not 
necessarily be possible for the Member State to establish enhanced cooperation as this is not 
possible when there is exclusive competence. An issue of this sort arose in Spain and Italy v 
Council
71
. In this case, a number of Member States wished to establish enhanced cooperation 
with the aim of creating unitary patent protection. The CJEU had to consider whether enhanced 
cooperation for creating unitary patent protection ultimately falls within the area of shared or 
exclusive competence.  
Furthermore, the different competences could also be problematic in the sense that the fact that 
State aid rules and procurement rules are not coordinated implies that the two areas of law 
develop as separate lines of legislation.  
The above is relevant to the research question asked in this Thesis e.g. in relation to the Member 
States’ possibilities of establishing enhanced cooperation. Hence, actions taken by the Member 
States in the area of public procurement rules are not necessarily coordinated with the 
Commission’s policy on the State aid area.  
 
1.5.1.3 Primary sources of law 
The main legal sources in the EU legal system are the Treaties, i.e. the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which form the 
cornerstone of EU regulation and provide the framework for the Member States’ cooperation 
with each other. As mentioned above, the main legal sources to be relied on in this Thesis are 
Articles 107-109 TFEU. Furthermore, the means and objectives of the Internal Market are 
deduced from the Treaty, e.g in Article 3 TEU.  
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In France v High Authority,
72
 the CJEU established teleological interpretation of the Treaty 
provisions by stating that the fundamental provisions of the Treaty (in this case Articles 2-5 
ECSC) are directly applicable, which means that other articles must be interpreted in accordance 
with these principles. In this Thesis, the statement put forward in France v High Authority 
applies in so far as the State aid rules should be interpreted in the light of the fundamental 
principles of the Treaty.  
 
1.5.1.4 Secondary sources of law  
As required by the principle of legality, every legislative act should have legal basis.  
In this Thesis, I rely mainly on two types of secondary sources of law, namely Directives and 
Decisions from the Commission. Directives are secondary sources of EU law which means that 
they must respect (and not conflict with) provisions and principles set out in higher-ranking 
sources of law, e.g. the Treaties. In this Thesis, Directives are highly relied on as legal source as 
the public procurement rules are laid down in Directives.
73
 
A Decision from the Commission is binding on those to whom the Decision is addressed, cf. 
Article 288 TFEU:  
“To exercise the Union’s competences, the institutions shall adopt regulations, directives, 
decisions, recommendations and opinions. 
A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly 
applicable in all Member States. 
A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it 
is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods. 
A decision shall be binding in its entirety. A decision which specifies those to whom it is 
addressed shall be binding only on them. 
Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force.” 
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In this Thesis, Decisions from the Commission play an important role in relation to the rules on 
State aid,
74
 and therefore they are highly relied on as a legal source.  
1.5.1.5. Case law 
The case law from the CJEU is included in the Thesis. It can be discussed whether case law 
from the CJEU should be regarded as a source of EU law as such, as there is no system of 
binding precedent for the CJEU’s judgments (no stare decisis). There could, however, be 
modifications to this view that I find should be taken into account.
75
 First of all, the judgments 
from the CJEU have wide effects and are often and usually followed by the CJEU itself as well 
as by the national courts of the Member States. Further, the CJ has, in landmark cases, created 
general principles through case law, which it has followed consistently over a long period of 
time. One example of such a case is Costa/Enel where the CJEU established the primacy of 
Union law over domestic law. In this case, an Italian court had asked the Court of Justice 
whether the Italian law on nationalisation of the production and distribution of electrical energy 
was compatible with certain rules in the EEC Treaty. The Court thus introduced the doctrine of 
the primacy of Union law, basing it on the specific nature of the EU legal order, which is to be 
uniformly applied in all the Member States.  
Finally, in a more recent case, the CJEU seemed to establish the legal basis of a concrete case by 
interpreting earlier case law. In Belgacom, the CJEU deduced a legal consequence directly from 
previous case law by interpreting two paragraphs of an earlier judgment in combined reading.
76
 
On the basis of the Belgacom case, it could be argued that we see a tendency from the CJEU to 
use case law as precedent to a greater extent than before, and this could arguably mean that case 
law can be used as a source of law.  
On the basis of the above, I intend to use case law with some weight in the analysis.  
Composition of the CJEU  
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is the judicial institution of the European 
Union. The CJEU is divided into two courts: the Court of Justice (CJ), which deals with requests 
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for preliminary rulings from national courts, certain actions for annulment and appeals,, and the 
General Court (GC) (former Court of First Instance), which deals with rules on actions for 
annulment brought by individuals, companies and, in some cases, EU governments. In practice, 
this means that the General Court deals mainly with competition law, including State aid law. In 
this Thesis I use the term CJEU or ‘Court of Justice of the European Union’ when referring to 
the Union Courts
77
 or I use the specific terms or acronyms, Court of Justice (CJ) or General 
Court (GC), where necessary. The CJEU’s jurisdiction is specified in the Treaties, where Article 
19(1) TEU states that: 
“The Court of Justice of the European Union shall include the Court of Justice, the General Court 
and specialised courts. It shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the 
law is observed.” 
For the purpose of this Thesis, judgments from the GC and the CJ are used as legal sources.  
 
1.5.1.6 General principles of law 
General principles of law are used by the CJEU to interpret legal acts. They are ranged below 
the constituent Treaties and are used when interpreting particular Treaty Articles.
78
 The General 
principles are thus important interpretative tools for the CJEU and provide for considerable 
power over the interpretation of Treaty Articles.
79
  
In this respect, general principles of law such as proportionality,
80
 legal certainty and legitimate 
expectations are important for the interpretation of EU law. 
For the purpose of this Thesis, general principles such as transparency and equal treatment play 
a vital role in the interpretation of the procurement Directives.
81
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1.5.1.7 Soft law instruments 
Soft law may be defined as “rules of conduct that are laid down in instruments which have not 
been attributed legally binding force as such, but nevertheless may have certain (indirect) legal 
effects, and that are aimed at and may produce practical effects”.82 Soft law instruments include 
for example recommendations, notices, communications, codes and guidelines.  
Soft law is not binding on the Member States, cf. Article. 288 TEUF, but the legal positioning of 
soft law instruments is debated in the literature. Some authors argue that soft law is not law at 
all, and that the only rules that can have legal effect are hard law,
83
 while others argue that the 
positioning of soft law instruments in the EU system of sources of law depends on a further 
analysis of the legal system in question.
84
 The degree to which legal effects are attributed to soft 
law instruments affects legal doctrine. In this Thesis, soft law instruments from the Commission, 
such as communications and notices, are used to help answer the main research question. Thus, 
soft law instruments from the Commission are given some weight, although they are used as an 
interpretative aid. However, arguably, the Commission enjoys a rather significant role in the 
field of State aid, and therefore the Commission’s soft law instruments in this area of law are 
given quite some weight. In this respect, soft law instruments from the Commission are to a 
certain degree seen as ‘hybrid’ legal sources in so far as soft law from the Commission in the 
State aid area, in some cases, can be a stepping-stone to hard law.
85
 However, the soft law 
instruments issued by the Commission are subject to judicial review from the CJEU and 
accordingly used in this Thesis as an interpretative aid with some weight.    
 
1.5.1.8 Preparatory works  
Preparatory works are included in the analysis in situations where it is found necessary in order 
to understand the meaning or wording of EU legislation. Preparatory acts are not binding under 
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EU law, cf. Article 288 TFEU, and therefore it can be discussed how much weight can be put on 
them.  
However, for the purpose of this Thesis, preparatory acts play different roles according to which 
area of law is discussed. Arguably, preparatory acts should not be taken into consideration when 
analysing the Treaties since the preparatory acts are generally not available.
86
 For this reason, 
since the State aid rules are founded on Treaty provisions, preparatory acts are not taken into 
account when analysing the State aid rules.  
For the purpose of the public procurement rules, preparatory acts can be argued to play a more 
prominent role. During the adoption of the 2014 procurement Directives,
87
 a negotiation phase 
was carried out,
88
 and this arguably leads to a more transparent phase for the observers. In this 
Thesis, preparatory works are used as an interpretative aid in order to understand the intention 
behind the procurement directives.   
 
1.5.1.9 Academic literature  
I use academic literature in the Thesis to discuss and criticise the analyses and the 
argumentations set out. The main research question of the Thesis has been discussed rather 
intensely in academic literature in spite of (or perhaps because of) the fact that so far, the CJ has 
not taken the opportunity to rule directly on the question of when the award of public contracts 
constitutes State aid within Article 107(1) TFEU. For this reason, academic literature is included 
as an interpretative aid – and as counter arguments to the conclusions and discussions set out.  
 
1.6 Methods of interpretation in cases of conflicts of norms 
The research question asked in this Thesis concerning when the award of public contracts 
constitutes State aid within Article 107(1) TFEU could possibly entail a situation where the 
application of two sets of rules will lead to incompatible legal outcomes, or where the award is 
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legal under one set of rules, but in breach of the other. Prior to the determination of whether 
there is a conflict, however, there must be an interpretation of each situation in order to 
determine its content and thus to determine whether conflict of norms exists.  
The de lege lata part of the Thesis examines when State aid is present when the contracting 
authority awards public contracts. In this respect, so far, the CJ has not taken the opportunity to 
decide whether the conduct of a tender procedure eliminates the presence of State aid. However, 
as indicated, the mere fact that a tender procedure has been conducted does not always eliminate 
the risk of granting aid. Accordingly, in such a situation, a conflict between norms exists, and it 
is thus necessary to apply methods of interpretation to solve this conflict to establish which set 
of rules applies.  
Contradiction between two sets of rules can occur in two instances.
89
 Firstly, situations can 
occur where two sets of rules conflict with each other and thereby make the application of both 
sets of rules impossible. Secondly, partial
90
 conflict can occur when one rule set of rules is 
special compared to the other and thereby leads to different/incompatible outcomes. Situations 
which lead to incompatible outcomes are solved by three principles of interpretation, namely 
Lex superior, Lex specialis and Lex posterior.
91
  
Firstly, according to the Lex superior principle, a higher-ranking rule takes precedence over a 
lower-ranking one. This means that in situations of conflict between two rules, one has a higher 
status and thus applies. Secondly, the principle of Lex specialis entails that specific rules take 
precedence over general rules. The principle requires the more specific rule to be applied over 
and above the more general rule. Finally, a Lex posterior rule is characterised by giving priority 
to the most recent law. It can be argued that the later law represents the most recent will of the 
law-maker and should therefore apply.  
In cases of conflict between the three mentioned principles of interpretation, it is necessary to 
establish priority between them. In this respect it is necessary to establish how the principles of 
interpretation relate to the rules on State aid and the rules of public procurement, respectively. 
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Firstly, it should be discussed whether State aid law can be considered superior compared to 
procurement law. As stated above, the Lex superior principle entails that higher-ranking rules 
take precedence over lower-ranking ones. In this regard, it could be argued that since the 
procurement Directives are based on Treaty provisions, they have the same legal base as the 
rules on State aid. Further, State aid rules and procurement rules share the same main objectives, 
i.e. both sets of rules seek to strengthen the Internal Market.
92
 According to this argument, State 
aid rules and procurement rules should be considered laws at the same level of legal hierarchy, 
and the principle of Lex superior would therefore not be applicable as a conflict-solving method 
of interpretation. However, the rules on State aid are directly based on the Treaty, whereas 
procurement rules are laid down in Directives, albeit based on Treaty provisions. This means 
that compared to the procurement rules, State aid rules could be seen as superior.  
The second method of interpretation used to solve conflicts between norms is Lex specialis. As 
noted above, there is a presumption that the specific rule is applied over and above the more 
general rule. The rules on State aid are generally aimed at preventing the State from making 
harmful interventions in the market by granting incompatible aid to undertakings. This means 
that the rules on State aid have a wide scope in so far as they generally address the behaviour of 
the State. The public procurement rules specifically address the behaviour of the contracting 
authority when they award public contracts and aim to ensure that undertakings get access to 
public contracts across Member States. Accordingly, procurement rules should be considered 
special rules compared to the rules on State aid in the specific situation where contracting 
authorities award public contracts. Lex specialis points to a narrow interpretation of a norm in 
the sense that it should be understood as specifically as possible, and this argument could mean 
that Lex specialis is therefore not applicable as method of interpretation if cases of conflict 
between the State aid rules and the procurement rules. However, in cases where only part of the 
norms are in contradiction, it could be argued that Lex specialis could be applied as method of 
interpretation.  
Finally, the Lex posterior principle implies that priority should be given to the later law. If the 
Lex posterior principle is taken literally, this would imply that the public procurement 
Directives would take precedence over the State aid rules, since the procurement Directives 
were adopted later than the State aid rules. However, as emphasised above, both the 
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procurement rules and the State aid rules are based on Treaty rules, and this could imply that the 
Lex posterior principle is not suitable as method of interpretation.  
Conclusively, it could be argued that where a conflict of norms exists, the applicable method of 
interpretation is the Lex superior principle. However, it has been argued that in situations where 
only part of the norms are in contradiction, Lex specialis could be applied as method of 
interpretation.  
 
1.7 Delimitations 
This Thesis sets out to determine when the award of public contracts constitutes State aid within 
Article 107(1) TFEU.  
The research question seeks to analyse whether purchases made by contracting authorities fall 
within the scope of the State aid rules. Thus, this Thesis does not analyse other situations of 
competitive selection, such as the award of licences.
93
   
The thesis does not analyse the research question in relation to Article 107(2) and (3) TFEU. In 
this connection, it is important to distinguish between existence and compatibility: The fact that 
aid exists does not mean that it cannot be compatible. In this respect, Articles 107-109 TFEU are 
introduced in chapter 2 in order to ensure completeness. However, Articles 107(2) and (3) and 
Articles 108-109 TFEU will not be subject to further analysis. This means that one major 
limitation to the conclusions of this Thesis is the discussion of whether the transfer of alleged 
aid satisfies one of the possible exemptions laid down in Articles 107(2) or (3) TFEU. This 
means that the conclusions of this Thesis could be different if one of the possible exemptions in 
Articles 107(2) or (3) TFEU applies.  
Furthermore, I do not discuss how the alleged existence of aid is or should be treated by the 
Member States, including the contracting authorities. In this respect, it would be relevant to 
discuss whether a specific framework should be put in place to provide a quick possibility for 
the contracting authorities to ensure that they do not risk granting State aid when they award 
public contracts. Arguably, the process of ensuring that aid is not granted or that possible aid is 
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deemed compatible is very time consuming for the contracting authority in need of a specific 
good or service.  
I only discuss the research question in relation to EU law. Possible solutions at national level are 
therefore not included.   
As indicated in the introduction, a link between procurement law and State aid law was 
established in the Altmark case. Altmark considered the possible State aid concerning 
compensation for PSOs. It is not an aim of this Thesis to further discuss or develop this field of 
research. Rather, the Altmark case is used as an example to stress the fact that so far, the CJ has 
not ruled on the link between public procurement law and State aid law when the award of 
public contracts is made for purchases that do not relate to PSOs. Consequently, this Thesis will 
not analyse whether State aid occurs when undertakings are chosen to perform public service 
obligations. 
I do not include the defence or utilities Directives in the study. Defence and utilities 
procurement purchases are considered rather distinct from the purchases made under the public 
procurement Directive and the concession Directive. Accordingly, State aid issues arising from 
defence and utilities procurement differ from the problems identified in this Thesis. For this 
reason, I have chosen to leave out defence and utilities procurement from the analysis.  
This Thesis does not include and analysis of the State aid issues relating to the in-house 
provision in Article 12 of the public procurement Directive. Article 12 is a codification of the in-
house case law from the CJEU, which in some ways deviates from prior case law by being more 
permissive.
94
 In this respect, it could have been analysed whether the in-house provision in 
Article 12 gives rise to State aid. This discussion would have been relevant in chapter 7 of this 
Thesis and would have built on the conclusions in this chapter.
95
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 1.8 Structure 
The Thesis is divided into three parts which both seek to answer the research question when 
does the award of public contracts constitute State aid within Article 107(1) TFEU. 
Part I – The first part comprises chapters 2-5. This part seeks to investigate whether the 
conditions for the classification of State aid for the purpose of Article 107(1) TFEU are fulfilled. 
In chapter 2, the objectives of State aid law and procurement law are examined with respect to 
whether the two areas of law coincide in respect to aims and objectives and personal scope of 
the rules. It is discussed to what extent the two areas of law share common objectives and where 
conflicts of law might arise. Chapters 3-4 analyse the personal scope for the two sets of rules 
and seek to conclude whether the personal scope for the procurement rules coincide with the 
personal scope for the State aid rules. 
Part II – chapters 6-7 analyse to what extent the award of public contracts constitute State aid. 
Chapter 6 accounts for the concept of ‘advantage’ within Article 107(1) TFEU and seeks to 
derive the decisive benchmark for assessment of advantage in a procurement perspective. 
Chapter 7 analyses when the specific award of public contracts constitutes State aid.  
Part III comprises chapter 8. This chapter introduces and explains the Market Economy Investor 
Principle (MEIP), which is the benchmark applied under State aid law for assessment of whether 
a transaction from the State involves an advantage for the recipient. This chapter further present 
and discuss the Market Economy Purchaser Principle (MEPP) which is the benchmark used to 
consider whether an advantage is conferred when public contracts are awarded.  
Finally, chapter 9 presents the final conclusions of this Thesis.  
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PART I 
Foundations 
 
In this part of the Thesis I lay the basic foundations for the rest of the analyses. Thus, this part of 
the Thesis will analyse whether contracting authorities fulfil the cumulative criteria set out in 
Article 107(1) TFEU with an emphasis on discussing whether contracting authorities are, in 
theory, capable of transferring State aid when they award public contracts. I also analyse, 
whether the aims of objectives underlying the two sets of rules coincide.  
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CHAPTER 2 
2. Objectives and scope of application for the public procurement rules and 
State aid rules 
This chapter analyses the scope and objectives for the procurement rules and State aid rules, 
respectively. The analysis seeks to shed light on the two areas of law in order to find out 
whether differences exist with regard to what aims and objectives the areas of law seek to 
ensure.  
In section 2.1 the aims and objectives of the procurement rules are analysed. This section seeks 
to establish what aims can be detected from the procurement directives as well as the case law 
from the CJEU. Subsequently, section 2.2 analyses the aims and objectives for the State aid 
rules. Section 2.2 resembles section 2.1 in structure, although the content is different. In section 
2.3 the common objectives of the two sets of rules are detected in order to establish a common 
reference between the two sets of rules with respect to what common goals the two sets of rules 
seek to achieve.  
2.1 Public procurement law and the objectives it pursues  
When contracting authorities carry out public purchases of goods, works and services above a 
certain threshold, EU public procurement rules apply. EU law sets out a minimum of 
harmonised rules that organise the way public authorities purchase goods, works, and services. 
This section focuses on what the procurement rules seek to achieve – and how.  
The rules on public procurement are based on Article 53(1) TFEU; Article 62 TFEU and Article 
114 TFEU, and also the free movement rules of the Treaty, in particular the provisions which 
guarantee free movement of goods (Article 34 TFEU), freedom of establishment (Article 49 
TFEU)as well as the freedom to provide services (Article 56 TFEU). Moreover, as will be 
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accounted for below, the principles derived from the general principles of the Treaty,
96
 such as 
equal treatment, non-discrimination, mutual recognition, proportionality, and transparency play 
an essential role.
 
 
 
The EU directives on public procurement rules consist of three directives, which lay down the 
procedures for public purchases above a certain threshold. Firstly, the public procurement 
Directive regulates the acquisition by means of public contracts of works, supplies, or services 
from economic operators.
97
 Secondly, the utilities Directive
,
 regulates procurement in the water, 
energy, transport, and postal services sectors, and finally, the concession Directive regulates the 
award of concession contracts. 
The first procurement directives were adopted during the 1970’s: The first directive for public 
works contracts
98
 was adopted in 1971.Six years later, a directive on supplies contracts
99
 was 
adopted.  The evolution of EU procurement policy can best be described as an iterative process, 
meaning that public procurement policy has developed step by step, perhaps in order to get the 
Member States to accept coordinated regulation on public procurement in their public sectors.
100
 
One example of this is the fact that the first co-ordination directives did not regulate state-owned 
industries or the utilities sectors, i.e. the water, transport, energy, and telecommunications 
sector
101
, which consequently meant that in the beginning, public procurement rules had limited 
impact.
102
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 Directive 2014/24/EU, Article 2.  
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2012), 25ff. 
101
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However, in 1985, the Commission published a White Paper on completing the internal 
market
103
 and this changed the life of the public procurement regulation. In the communication, 
the Commission mentioned public procurement as one of the key areas in order to complete the 
Internal Market
104
 and several initiatives were taken in order to improve the existing 
directives.
105
 In the years to follow, two new directives on public works
106
 and public supplies
107
 
were adopted, but these were later amended to consolidate the existing rules into two texts.
108
 In 
2004, a consolidated directive
109
 on works, supplies and services was adopted as well as a 
directive on utilities contracts
110
. Furthermore, in 2007, a remedies directive
111
 was adopted, 
amending the two existing remedies directives.
112
 A few years later, in 2010, the Commission 
announced that it would start working on ‘simplifying and updating’ the existing procurement 
regime,
113
 and in early 2011, a consultation process
114
 was started, which led to the proposals for 
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three new directives.
115
 Following a legislative process with some modifications to the initial 
proposals,
116
 the three current procurement Directives were adopted. 
2.1.1 Classification of a public contract  
The procurement directives are applicable to the award of public contracts between economic 
operators and contracting authorities.
117
 Paragraphs (1) (5) and (6) of Article 2, in the 
procurement Directive defines public contracts in the following way: 
“ (5) ‘public contracts’ means contracts for pecuniary interest concluded in writing between one 
or more economic operators and one or more contracting authorities and having as their object 
the execution of works, the supply of products or the provision of services;  
(6) ‘public works contracts’ means public contracts having as their object one of the following:  
(a) the execution, or both the design and execution, of works related to one of the activities 
within the meaning of Annex II;  
(b) the execution, or both the design and execution, of a work;  
(c) the realisation, by whatever means, of a work corresponding to the requirements specified by 
the contracting authority exercising a decisive influence on the type or design of the work; 
7) ‘a work’ means the outcome of building or civil engineering works taken as a whole which is 
sufficient in itself to fulfil an economic or technical function;  
(8) ‘public supply contracts’ means public contracts having as their object the purchase, lease, 
rental or hire-purchase, with or without an option to buy, of products. A public supply contract 
may include, as an incidental matter, siting and installation operations;  
(9) ‘public service contracts’ means public contracts having as their object the provision of 
services other than those referred to in point 6;” 
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According to Article 2, (1) (5- 9) in the procurement Directive, public contracts cover a wide 
range of work, supply and service contracts. Article 2 (1) (5) defines public contracts in general. 
The decisive characteristics for the definition of a public contract thus consist of formal 
requirements for: 
- pecuniary interests 118;  
- contracts concluded in writing 
- contracts entered into between economic operators119 and contracting authorities120 
- the object of works, the supply of products or the provision of services 
In this regard, the most controversial requirements are probably the definition of economic 
operators and contracting authorities, which will be analysed in chapters 3 and 4 of this Thesis.  
Regarding the subject of the contract, namely the object of works, the supply of products or the 
provision of services, Article 2, (1) (6-9) defines such contracts as the execution and/or design 
of a work, cf. Article 2, (1) (6) (a-c). In this connection, ‘a work’ is defined as ‘the outcome of 
building or civil engineering works, taken as a whole, which is sufficient in itself to fulfil an 
economic or technical function’, cf. Article 2, (1) (7). Furthermore, public supply contracts 
relate to the purchase, lease, rental or hire-purchase of products - with or without an option to 
buy, cf. Article 2, (1) (8). Examples of public supply contracts could be siting and installation 
operations. Finally, Article 2, (1) (9) defines public service contracts as services, except for 
those referred to in Article 2, (1) (6).  
The definition of a concession contract is set out in 5 (1) (a-b) in the concession Directive. 
Accordingly, a concession contract is defined in the following way. 
“(1)‘concessions’ means works or services concessions, as defined in points (a) and (b) 
(a) ‘works concession’ means a contract for pecuniary interest concluded in writing by means of 
which one or more contracting authorities or contracting entities entrust the execution of works 
to one or more economic operators the consideration for which consists either solely in the right 
to exploit the works that are the subject of the contract or in that right together with payment;  
                                                          
118
 This concept will be analysed further in chapter 6, section 6.2.2 of this Thesis.  
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 See chapter 3 of this Thesis.  
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(b) ‘services concession’ means a contract for pecuniary interest concluded in writing by means 
of which one or more contracting authorities or contracting entities entrust the provision and the 
management of services other than the execution of works referred to in point (a) to one or more 
economic operators, the consideration of which consists either solely in the right to exploit the 
services that are the subject of the contract or in that right together with payment. 
The award of a works or services concession shall involve the transfer to the concessionaire of 
an operating risk in exploiting those works or services encompassing demand or supply risk or 
both. The concessionaire shall be deemed to assume operating risk where, under normal 
operating conditions, it is not guaranteed to recoup the investments made or the costs incurred 
in operating the works or the services which are the subject-matter of the concession. The part of 
the risk transferred to the concessionaire shall involve real exposure to the vagaries of the 
market, such that any potential estimated loss incurred by the concessionaire shall not be merely 
nominal or negligible;” 
Article 5 (1) (a) defines ‘works concession’ in a similar way as the public contract is defined, cf. 
Article 2, (1) (5) of the public procurement Directive. However, a works concession differs from 
the definition of a public works contract by way of payment, which can  consist either solely in 
the right to exploit the works that are the subject of the contract or in that right together with 
payment. Article 5 (1) (b) defines ‘services concession’ as the provision and the management of 
services other than those referred to regarding the execution of works.  
The decisive characteristics for the definition of a concession contract are the payment for the 
contract and the transfer of an operating risk in exploiting the work or service.   
 
2.1.2 Public procurement rules as a way of supporting an Internal Market 
The achievement of an Internal Market is a central aim for the Union. As expressed in Article 3 
(3) TEU: 
“The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development of 
Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social 
market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection 
and improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific and technological 
advance. 
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 It shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and 
protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of 
the rights of the child.  
It shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States.  
It shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe's cultural 
heritage is safeguarded and enhanced.” 
The provisions concerning the Internal Market have two main objectives which probably serve 
as the only reasons for invoking the Internal Market rules; namely support of the four freedoms 
and elimination of appreciable distortions of competition between economic operators.
121,122
 
Overall, two approaches can be used to attain an Internal Market.
123
 Firstly, a negative and 
deregulatory approach prohibits the member states from adopting national legislation that causes 
barriers to market access. An example of regulation that uses this approach is the rules on free 
movement. Secondly, a positive integration approach harmonises national regulation in order to 
overcome barriers to integration, which could be achieved through the adoption of directives. 
The public procurement directives are examples of positive integration through coordinated 
legislation, but negative deregulatory measures can be detected as well, e.g. in recital 1 in the 
preamble of the public procurement Directive, in which it is stated that the award of public 
contracts has to comply with the rules on free movement, of goods, freedom of establishment as 
well as with the freedom to provide services.  
The aim of supporting an Internal Market has been emphasised by the CJEU in several cases.
124
 
In this regard the CJEU has held that the aim of the procurement rules is to open up the Internal 
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Market for public contracts
125
 by ‘promoting the widest possible expression of interests among 
contractors in the Member States’.126 
In Stadt Halle
127
, the CJEU stated that the purpose of the public procurement rules is the free 
movement of services (which was the ambit of the specific case) and the opening to undistorted 
competition in all the Member States.
128
 The CJEU further elaborates on this point by stating 
that the purpose of the procurement rules involves an obligation on all contracting authorities to 
apply the relevant Union rules, where the conditions for such application are satisfied. This 
elaboration could imply that where the award of the contract is made pursuant to a tender 
procedure under the procurement directives, the scope for application of other relevant EU rules 
is broad. 
 In Strong Segurança
129, the CJEU stated that the general principle of ‘effective competition’ is 
an essential objective of the procurement rules which, nevertheless, cannot lead to an 
interpretation that is contrary to the clear terms of the rules.
130
 The term ‘effective competition’ 
is used by the CJEU, arguably to ensure competition by observing general principles of the 
Treaty, such as the principle of equal treatment.
131
  
2.1.2.1 The general principles of the Treaty 
The general principles of the treaty are, arguably, of importance when public contracts are 
awarded.  
The important role of the general principles to procurement law is expressed in the public 
procurement Directive. Cf. Article 18(1) of the public procurement Directive:  
“Contracting authorities shall treat economic operators equally and without discrimination and 
shall act in a transparent and proportionate manner. The design of the procurement shall not be 
made with the intention of excluding it from the scope of this Directive or of artificially 
narrowing competition. Competition shall be considered to be artificially narrowed where the 
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design of the procurement is made with the intention of unduly favouring or disadvantaging 
certain economic operators.“132 
Accordingly, contracting authorities have an express obligation, by way of Article 18(1), to 
ensure that economic operators are treated in an equal and non-discriminatory manner and, 
furthermore, that the contracting authority acts in a transparent and proportionate manner when 
they award public contracts.
 
 
Additionally, the preamble to the public procurement Directive mentions the general principles. 
Recital 1of the preamble reads as follows: 
“the award of public contracts by or on behalf of Member States’ authorities has to comply with 
the principles of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and in 
particular the free movement of goods, freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide 
services, as well as the principles deriving therefrom, such as equal treatment, non-
discrimination, mutual recognition, proportionality and transparency. However, for public 
contracts above a certain value, provisions should be drawn up coordinating national 
procurement procedures so as to ensure that those principles are given practical effect and 
public procurement is opened up to competition.” 
Consequently, the procurement directives provide that contracting authorities should in 
particular
133
 comply with the principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination, mutual 
recognition, proportionality and transparency when they award public contracts.  
The principle of equal treatment 
The principle of equal treatment is of great importance in public procurement law.
134
 Besides the 
mentioning in Article 18 of the procurement Directive as well as in the preamble as described 
above, the directives do not contain an express definition of the principle of equal treatment.  In 
this respect, the material content of the obligation to ensure equal treatment, when public 
contracts are awarded, is derived through the case law of the CJEU. 
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In Überschär
135
 the CJEU formulated an obligation for the contracting authority to treat similar 
situations equally. The CJEU concluded that:
136
  
“according to the established case-law of the court the general principle of equality , of which 
the prohibition on discrimination on grounds of nationality is merely a specific enunciation , is 
one of the fundamental principles of community law . This principle requires that similar 
situations shall not be treated differently unless differentiation is objectively justified.”137 
The obligation to treat similar situations in an equal manner has later been clarified by the CJEU 
in Fabricom
138
 to further entail that different situations cannot be treated equally. The CJEU 
held that:
139
 
[…] it must be borne in mind that the duty to observe the principle of equal treatment lies at the 
very heart of the public procurement directives, which are intended in particular to promote the 
development of effective competition in the fields to which they apply and which lay down 
criteria for the award of contracts which are intended to ensure such competition […]” 
Furthermore, it is settled case-law that the principle of equal treatment requires that comparable 
situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the 
same way unless such treatment is objectively justified […]” 
Based on the above, the principle of equal treatment in a public procurement context thus entails 
an obligation for the contracting authority to ensure that comparable situations are not treated 
differently and that different situations are not treated in the same way unless such treatment is 
objectively justified.  
 In a State aid perspective, it could be argued that the obligation to ensure equal treatment relates 
to the prohibition in Article 107(1) TFEU to favour certain undertakings or conferring an 
advantage to the recipient undertaking.
140
 As held above, Article 18 (1) of the procurement 
Directive entails a prohibition of artificially narrowing the design of the procurement with the 
intention of unduly favouring or disadvantaging certain economic operators.  
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In this respect, the principle of equal treatment, as expressed in Article 18(1) of the procurement 
Directive, obliges contracting authorities to design an appropriate tender procedure, which 
eliminates the risk of favouring certain undertakings or granting an advantage to the recipient 
undertaking.
141
  
Arguably, there are many possibilities to confer an advantage to an economic operator in a 
procurement context.
142
 It is, however, outside the scope of this chapter to discuss in detail how 
different award situations under procurement law might confer an advantage to economic 
operators. This analysis will therefore be conducted in chapter 7 instead. For the purpose of this 
chapter, it suffices to conclude that the principle of equal treatment is connected to the concept 
of selectivity and advantage under Article 107(1) TFEU by way of the formulation in Article 
18(1) in the procurement Directive.  
The principle of equal treatment in relation to the direct award of contracts 
In relation to the analytical framework of this Thesis
143
, it has to be discussed how the principle 
of equal treatment relates to 1) situations in which the award is made pursuant to a tender 
procedure under the procurement Directive; 2) situations in which the award is made under the 
concession Directive and 3) situations in which the award is made directly (legally or illegally). 
As analysed above, the principle of equal treatment is embedded in Article 18(1) of the 
procurement Directive. A similar Article can be found in Article 3 of the concession Directive. 
For this reason, the following will account for how the principle of equal treatment applies to 
legal and illegal direct award of contracts. 
Arguably, the principle of equal treatment applies to situations in which the contracting 
authority awards public contracts without the conduct of a tender procedure. In Storebælt
144
 
which is a case that dates back to before the mentioning of equal treatment in the procurement 
directives, the CJEU held that:
145
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“Since the Commission claims in its pleadings, which were re-worded in its reply, that 
Storebaelt acted in breach of the principle that all tenderers should be treated alike, the Danish 
Government' s argument that that principle is not mentioned in the directive and therefore 
constitutes a new legal basis for the complaint of breach of State obligations must be considered 
first.  
On this issue, it need only be observed that, although the directive makes no express mention of 
the principle of equal treatment of tenderers, the duty to observe that principle lies at the very 
heart of the directive whose purpose is, according to the ninth recital in its preamble, to ensure 
in particular the development of effective competition in the field of public contracts and which, 
in Title IV, lays down criteria for selection and for award of the contracts, by means of which 
such competition is to be ensured.”146 
Accordingly, the principle of equal treatment applies to contracts awarded outside the scope of 
the procurement directives and, therefore, also to contracts awarded directly (whether legal or 
illegal) 
Furthermore, since the principle of equal treatment can be derived from the Treaty, and 
therefore is a principle derived from primary law, it can be argued that the principle of equal 
treatment applies to situations where primary law applies. In this respect, it can be assumed that 
the principle of equal treatment applies to the legal, direct award of contracts where a cross-
border interest exists.
147
  
The principle of transparency  
The principle of transparency is an important principle in relation to the procurement rules. 
Article 18(1) of the procurement Directive, as cited above, refers directly to the principle of 
transparency by stating that contracting authorities shall act in a transparent manner when they 
award public contracts.
148
  
In addition to its treatment in Article 18(1), the transparency principle is cited numerous times in 
the procurement Directive., e.g. in Article 43 (1)
149
 regarding specific labels required for the 
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54 
 
purchase of works or servicers with specifically environmental, social or other characteristics; 
Article 56 (1) (3)
150
 on general principles regarding choice of participants and the award of 
contracts; and Article 58
151
 regarding selection criteria.  Arguably, there is an obligation for 
contracting authorities, by way of the procurement Directive, to act in a transparent manner
152
 in 
all phases of the tender procedure.  
As stated above, Article 3 in the concession Directive resembles Article 18(1) in the public 
procurement Directive. Thus it can be concluded that the principle of transparency applies in a 
similar fashion as described above, to award of contracts under the concession Directive. 
 
The principle of transparency in relation to direct award of contracts 
The transparency principle is of importance to contracts awarded outside the directives. The 
CJEU has, on several occasions, held that the transparency principle applies to contracts below 
threshold or otherwise outside the scope of the directive.
153
   
The first judgment regarding the influence of the principle of transparency to procurement law is 
considered to be the Unitron Scandinavia
154
 case.
155
  
In this case, the CJEU was asked to conclude whether a private undertaking (Danske Slagterier) 
could be considered a contracting authority within the meaning of the procurement directives. 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
correspond to the required characteristics, provided that all of the following conditions are fulfilled: (c) the labels are 
established in an open and transparent procedure in which all relevant stakeholders, including government bodies, 
consumers, social partners, manufacturers, distributors and non-governmental organisations, may participate;” 
150
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The CJEU held that Danske Slagterier was not a contracting authority
156
 and consequently, the 
procurement directives did not apply.
157
 
Regarding the principle of transparency, the CJEU held that
158
  
[…]where a contracting authority grants to a body which is not a contracting 
authority special or exclusive rights to engage in a public service activity, the only 
requirement is that the measure whereby that right is granted must stipulate that, in 
relation to the public supply contracts which it awards to third parties in the context 
of that activity, the body in question must comply with the principle of non-
discrimination on grounds of nationality.  
It should be noted, however, that the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of 
nationality cannot be interpreted restrictively. It implies, in particular, an obligation 
of transparency in order to enable the contracting authority to satisfy itself that it has 
been complied with.
159
  
Accordingly, the principle of transparency applies when contracts are awarded outside the scope 
of the procurement directives. Furthermore, the above shows that the principle of non-
discrimination implies an obligation of transparency. Thus, the case of Unitron establishes a link 
between the principle of non-discrimination and the principle of transparency.  
Other principles 
 As held above, a link between the principles of non-discrimination and transparency was 
established in Unitron.  
In Teleaustria
160
 the CJEU further elaborated on this link. This case concerned the question 
whether a service concession fell inside the scope of the procurement directives. The CJEU held 
that the fact that service concessions did not (at the time) fall within the scope of the 
procurement directives did not rule out the relevance of primary EU law. According to the 
CJEU
161
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“[…] it should be borne in mind that, notwithstanding the fact that, as Community law stands at 
present, such contracts are excluded from the scope of Directive 93/38 [now 2014/25], the 
contracting entities concluding them are, none the less, bound to comply with the fundamental 
rules of the Treaty, in general, and the principle of non-discrimination on the ground of 
nationality, in particular.”162  
In a State aid perspective, it could be argued that the obligation in Article 18(1) in the 
procurement Directive to ensure transparency and non-discrimination supports the prohibition in 
Article 107(1) TFEU of favouring or disadvantaging certain economic operators. In this respect, 
it could be argued that the principles of equal treatment, transparency and non-discrimination 
work coincident to ensure that public contracts are awarded in a non-selective and non-
advantageous way.  
According to the above, the rules on public procurement is an essential instrument of the 
Internal Market and public procurement rules are thus used as a means to an end of achieving an 
Internal Market. In order to obtain this overall objective, public authorities are obliged to 
comply with the principles of the Treaty, and in particular the free movement of goods, freedom 
of establishment, and the freedom to provide services, as well as the principles deriving 
therefrom, as described above. 
 
2.1.3 Complementary objectives of the procurement rules  
Besides the goal of achieving an Internal Market, it should be discussed whether the 
procurement rules have other (complementary) goals. In the light of the research question asked 
in this Thesis, the objectives of the procurement rules become relevant when discussing whether 
the rules on public procurement and the rules on State aid share common objectives
163
, which in 
turn helps answering the research question, when the award of public contracts constitutes State 
aid within Article 107(1) TFEU. Therefore, the following section will account for whether 
complementary objectives, to the achievement of an Internal Market, can be detected in the case 
law from the CJEU. Furthermore, some discussions from academic literature will be 
highlighted.  
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It has been acknowledged by the CJEU that contracting authorities can be guided by 
considerations that are not necessarily economic when they award public contracts:  
“Consequently, the aim of the Directive is to avoid both the risk of preference being given to 
national tenderers or applicants whenever a contract is awarded by the contracting authorities 
and the possibility that a body financed or controlled by the State, regional or local authorities 
or other bodies governed by public law may choose to be guided by considerations other than 
economic ones[…]”164 
Yet, as emphasised by the CJEU, the procurement rules seek to ensure that contracting 
authorities act in an equal manner (avoid the risk of preference) by ensuring that the contracting 
authorities adopt economic considerations when they award public contracts.  
However, examples can be found of objectives that are not purely economic when public 
contracts are awarded.
165
  
The CJEU has considered the use of environmental and social criteria in several cases.
166
  
In Beentjes
167
 the CJEU was asked to conclude whether certain criteria in relation to the 
selection of qualified tenderers were permitted under directive 71/305/EEC (the public works 
Directive). In replying to this question, the CJEU revealed two important aspects in relation to 
this Thesis. Firstly, the CJEU held that the contracting authorities have a certain degree of 
freedom to decide the award criteria:
168
  
“[…] the suitability of contractors is to be checked by the authorities awarding contracts in 
accordance with the criteria of economic and financial standing and of technical knowledge or 
ability referred to in Articles 25 to 28. The purpose of these articles is not to delimit the power 
of the Member States to fix the level of financial and economic standing and technical 
knowledge required in order to take part in procedures for the award of public works contracts 
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but to determine the references or evidence which may be furnished in order to establish the 
contractor' s financial and economic standing and technical knowledge or ability. 
Nevertheless, it is clear from these provisions that the authorities awarding contracts can check 
the suitability of the contractors only on the basis of criteria relating to their economic and 
financial standing and their technical knowledge and ability”.169 
Then, the CJEU held that
170
  
“As regards the exclusion of a tenderer on the ground that it is not in a position to employ long-
term unemployed persons, it should be noted in the first place that such a condition has no 
relation to the checking of contractors' suitability on the basis of their economic and financial 
standing and their technical knowledge and ability or to the criteria for the award of contracts 
referred to in Article 29 of the directive.  
[…] in order to be compatible with the directive such a condition must comply with all the 
relevant provisions of Community law, in particular the prohibitions flowing from the 
principles laid down in the Treaty in regard to the right of establishment and the freedom to 
provide services.  
The obligation to employ long-term unemployed persons could inter alia infringe the 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality laid down in the second paragraph of 
Article 7 of the Treaty if it became apparent that such a condition could be satisfied only by 
tenderers from the State concerned or indeed that tenderers from other Member States would 
have difficulty in complying with it. It is for the national court to determine, in the light of all the 
circumstances of the case, whether the imposition of such a condition is directly or indirectly 
discriminatory.”171  
The citations above serve to show that the contracting authorities possess a certain degree of 
freedom to decide the selection and award criteria. However, the criteria used for the selection 
and award of tenderers should be conducted in accordance with the general principles of the 
Treaty.  
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The second important aspect, in relation to the question asked in this Thesis, relates to the 
following paragraphs, in which the CJEU arguably established a link between the procurement 
rules and the State aid rules:
172
 
“Although the second alternative leaves it open to the authorities awarding contracts 
to choose the criteria on which they propose to base their award of the contract, their 
choice is limited to criteria aimed at identifying the offer which is economically the 
most advantageous. Indeed, it is only by way of exception that Article 29 ( 4 ) [now 
Article 69] provides that an award may be based on criteria of a different nature 
within the framework of rules whose aim is to give preference to certain tenderers 
by way of aid, on condition that the rules invoked are in conformity with the Treaty, 
in particular Articles 92 [now 107] et seq ."  
Furthermore, the directive does not lay down a uniform and exhaustive body of 
Community rules; within the framework of the common rules which it contains, the 
Member States remain free to maintain or adopt substantive and procedural rules 
in regard to public works contracts on condition that they comply with all the 
relevant provisions of Community law, in particular the prohibitions flowing from 
the principles laid down in the Treaty in regard to the right of establishment and the 
freedom to provide services […].“173 
 
Accordingly, the CJEU narrows the alleged degree of freedom of the scope for applying award 
criteria, which are not directly related to the contract, by emphasising that the choice is limited 
to criteria aimed at identifying the offer, which is economically the most advantageous (this was 
the specific ambit of the case). Furthermore, the CJEU emphasises that such criteria should be 
seen as exceptions.  
Then, the CJEU emphasises that an award based on different criteria than the ones listed in the 
directive should be in conformity with Article 107 TFEU. Arguably, Beentjes establishes a link 
between the procurement rules and State aid rules by requiring that award criteria used by 
exception, should conform with the State aid rules. This conclusion is an important contribution 
in answering the research question asked in this Thesis, because the established link between the 
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procurement rules and State aid rules indicates that there is a possibility of granting State aid 
when public contracts are awarded under the procurement Directive.
174
 
2.1.3.1 Discussions in academic literature 
The scope of objectives for the procurement rules has been widely debated in academic 
literature.
175
  
As formulated by Trepte:
176
 
 “Public procurement regulation in Europe suffers from uncertainty over what is and what 
should be. What appears constant is not and even if the objectives of the directives can be 
reduced to a few key principles, as they were at the outset, this is not how they are used and 
interpreted by the regulator, the courts or in practice. There is confusion over the purposes of 
the directives and what they can be used to achieve. Indeed, if they could be used to achieve all 
of the goals claimed for them, they would be very fluid instruments indeed. […] The European 
judiciary has often been required to interpret the directives to make sense of them in practice. It 
has on several occasions, for example, been driven to state that the duty to observe the principle 
of equal treatment lies at the very heart of the public procurement directives even if this has only 
recently been recognised in the directives themselves.[…] The regulator has also continued to 
regulate and the way in which it has done so sometimes appears far removed from the original 
goals of the directives. This is true even where, as is also the case, it has changed tack, 
sometimes reluctantly, to pursue varying goals of the moment. The directives are arguably 
now used explicitly to further political goals which are not covered by the stated objectives and 
have little to do with the procurement function.”177   
The core of the debate seems to be whether the objectives of the procurement rules can be 
deduced to merely supporting an Internal Market by observing the fundamental freedoms in the 
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Treaty (by way of the four freedoms) and the general principles flowing therefrom. Or, whether 
complementary objectives can be detected as well.
178
 
In the light of the research question asked in this Thesis, it is relevant to discuss whether 
procurement rules and State aid rules share common objectives. In this respect, it can be argued 
that if contracting authorities seek to achieve policy goals when they award public contracts, and 
if such policy goals are not supported by the aims of the procurement rules, this could possibly 
lead to the risk that contracting authorities might grant disguised State aid to the winning 
tenderer. From a State aid perspective, policy-based exceptions are neither exceptional nor 
controversial. In fact, as will be elaborated below, rules allow the Commission and the Council a 
wide discretion and extensive power to admit aids to the Member States in derogation of the 
prohibition in 107(1) TFEU.
179
  
As will be elaborated below, policy-based exemptions to the prohibition in Article 107(1) TFEU 
of granting aid are both possible and possibly allowed by way of Article 107(2) and (3). 
However, since the derogations in Article 107 (2) and (3) are outside the scope of this Thesis, it 
is sufficient to conclude that the scope of common objectives between the two sets of rules is 
important in order to answer the main research question. In this regard, the aims and objectives 
of the procurement rules are important factors in this analysis.  
 
2.1.4 Preliminary findings 
To sum up, the rules on public procurement are based on the rules on free movement in the 
Treaty, which have the support of the four freedoms and elimination of appreciable distortions 
of competition between economic operators as their core objectives. These objectives have been 
affirmed in the case law of the CJEU in a number of cases. The core objective for achieving an 
Internal Market is supported in a public procurement context by supporting the four freedoms, 
by way of and securing transparency and preventing protectionist purchasing, and thereby 
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removing discrimination and barriers that prevents entry into the public procurement market. 
The public procurement rules thus support the core objectives of the Internal Market rules in two 
ways. Firstly, the procurement directives seek to support the four freedoms by preventing 
protectionist purchasing.
180
 Secondly, the procurement directives seek to ensure equal treatment 
between economic operators by removing discrimination
181
 and barriers that prevent entry into 
the public procurement market. Furthermore, the procurement directives seek to implement 
competitive procedures in order to secure transparency.
182
  
In addition to the aim of supporting an Internal Market, it has been discussed whether the 
procurement rules have complementary objectives. In this respect, the importance of this 
discussion has been emphasised as detecting a common aim of the procurement rules. The State 
Aid rules are equally important for the research question, as the achievement of policy goals 
through the award of public contracts could lead to disguised State aid.  
2.2 State aid rules and the objectives it pursues   
The actual wording of Article 107 TFEU has remained almost unchanged since its introduction 
in 1951, when the first prohibition of subsidies was seen. Thus, the Treaty of Paris introduced a 
complete ban of subsidies in the coal and steel industries, the reason behind being that such 
subsidies would be incompatible with the Common (coal and steel) Market.
183
 Later, with the 
Treaty of Rome, the complete ban was changed to resemble the formulation of the prohibition 
on the granting of State aid as we know it from Article 107 TEUF. Hence, Article 92 EEC 
contained a prohibition on granting any aid, but at the same time Article 92 (2) listed situations 
where aid is compatible with the Common Market. This structure is continued in Article 107 
TFEU with a prohibition in Article 107(1) followed by several (policy-based) exemptions in 
Articles 107(2) and 107(3).  
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The legal basis concerning the State aid rules is found in the Treaty in Chapter 1 of Title VII on 
the Rules on Competition. The provisions on State aid are directed at public authorities 
(Member States) and have an overall objective of prohibiting measures which distorts 
competition.   
Article 107 (1) read as follows; 
“Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or through State 
resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring 
certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade 
between Member States, be incompatible with the Internal Market.” 
Furthermore, several situations, that are compatible with the Internal Market, are listed in 
Article 107(2):  
“(a) aid having a social character, granted to individual consumers, provided that such aid is 
granted without discrimination related to the origin of the products concerned; 
(b) aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences; 
(c) aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic of Germany affected by 
the division of Germany, in so far as such aid is required in order to compensate for the 
economic disadvantages caused by that division. Five years after the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon, the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt a decision 
repealing this point.” 
Finally, Article 107(3) lists several situations that might be compatible with the Internal Market: 
(a) aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living is 
abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment, and of the regions referred to in 
Article 349, in view of their structural, economic and social situation; 
(b) aid to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest or to 
remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State; 
(c) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, 
where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common 
interest; 
(d) aid to promote culture and heritage conservation where such aid does not affect trading 
conditions and competition in the Union to an extent that is contrary to the common interest; 
64 
 
(e) such other categories of aid as may be specified by decision of the Council on a proposal 
from the Commission. 
In a public procurement context, the situations listed in article 107(3) will mainly be relevant in 
connection with the contracting entity’s use of complementary considerations.184  
As held above, Article 107 TFEU is structured as a complete prohibition against aid in Article 
107 (1) TFEU followed by several exemptions in Article 107 (2) and (3) TFEU that is, or might 
be, compatible with the Internal Market from an assessment by the Commission. This means 
that from the outset, aid granted by Member States is incompatible with the Internal Market; cf. 
Article 107(1), unless the conditions for exception in Article 107(2) or 107(3) are met.  
Article 108 TFEU covers procedural rules, according to which, the Commission is given 
specific competence to decide on the compatibility of State aid within the Internal Market.  
Article 108 TFEU reads as follows: 
“1. The Commission shall, in cooperation with Member States, keep under constant review all 
systems of aid existing in those States. It shall propose to the latter any appropriate measures 
required by the progressive development or by the functioning of the internal market. 
2. If, after giving notice to the parties concerned to submit their comments, the Commission finds 
that aid granted by a State or through State resources is not compatible with the internal market 
having regard to Article 107, or that such aid is being misused, it shall decide that the State 
concerned shall abolish or alter such aid within a period of time to be determined by the 
Commission. If the State concerned does not comply with this decision within the prescribed 
time, the Commission or any other interested State may, in derogation from the provisions of 
Articles 258 and 259, refer the matter to the Court of Justice of the European Union direct. 
On application by a Member State, the Council may, acting unanimously, decide that aid which 
that State is granting or intends to grant shall be considered to be compatible with the internal 
market, in derogation from the provisions of Article 107 or from the regulations provided for in 
Article 109, if such a decision is justified by exceptional circumstances. If, as regards the aid in 
question, the Commission has already initiated the procedure provided for in the first 
subparagraph of this paragraph, the fact that the State concerned has made its application to the 
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Council shall have the effect of suspending that procedure until the Council has made its attitude 
known. If, however, the Council has not made its attitude known within three months of the said 
application being made, the Commission shall give its decision on the case. 
3. The Commission shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of 
any plans to grant or alter aid. If it considers that any such plan is not compatible with the 
internal market having regard to Article 107, it shall without delay initiate the procedure 
provided for in paragraph 2. The Member State concerned shall not put its proposed measures 
into effect until this procedure has resulted in a final decision. 
4. The Commission may adopt regulations relating to the categories of State aid that the Council 
has, pursuant to Article 109, determined may be exempted from the procedure provided for by 
paragraph 3 of this Article.” 
Article 108 TFEU consists of four indents. Firstly, pursuant to Article 108(1) TFEU, the 
Commission has an obligation to keep under constant review all systems of aid existing in the 
Member States. Secondly, Article 108(2) TFEU states that the Commission may decide that a 
State should either alter or abolish a State aid that is incompatible with the Internal Market.
185
 
This also means that the Commission has the power to order recovery of an aid granted in 
breach of the Treaty.
186
 Thirdly, Article 108(3) TFEU states that the Commission must be 
informed of any plans to grant or alter aid. This gives the Commission power to initiate the 
procedure provided for in paragraph 2 of Article 107 TFEU. Finally, Article 108(4) TFEU gives 
the Commission power to adopt regulations relating to the categories of State aid.  Article 108 
TFEU confers a rather significant role to the Commission in regards to the systems of aid 
existing in the Member States.
187
  
In order to increase legal certainty and transparency, the Council Regulation 2015/1589 of 13 
July 2015 has been adopted.
188
 Regulation 2015/1589 lays down detailed rules for the 
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application of Article 108 TFEU and is a codification of the principles and case law that have 
been established over time.
189,190
 
Moreover, Article 109TFEU empowers the Council to impose legislation in derogation from the 
prohibition in Article 107(1) TFEU. Article 109 TFEU provides that:  
“The Council, on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European 
Parliament, may make any appropriate regulations for the application of Articles 107 and 108 
and may in particular determine the conditions in which Article 108(3) shall apply and the 
categories of aid exempted from this procedure.” 
In Article 109, TFEU gives the Council authority to adopt appropriate regulations for the 
application of Articles 107 and 108 TFEU. Also, it empowers the Council to determine in which 
conditions Article 108(3) TFEU applies and on the categories of aid exempted from notification. 
This also implies a right for the Council to specify other categories of aid which may be 
exempted from the prohibition in Article 107(1) TFEU.   
In conclusion to the above, the State aid rules contain, as a point of departure, a prohibition of 
Aid granted by Member States. However, when inspecting Articles 107-109TFEU more closely, 
these Articles reveal that the prohibition set out in Article 107(1) is neither absolute nor 
unconditional. Thus, in Article 107(2) and 107(3) TFEU as well as in Articles 108 and 109, 
TFEU gives the Commission and the Council a wide discretion and extensive power to admit 
aids to the Member States in derogation of the prohibition in 107(1) TFEU, something which 
has been acknowledged by the Courts.
191
 2.2.1 Classification of a measure as aid  
The application of the State aid rules require that a measure can actually be classified as aid. In 
connection with the research question asked in this Thesis, the definition of aid is of vital 
importance, as it is decisive when assessing whether the award of public contracts can constitute 
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aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. For this reason, the following section will 
discuss the definition of aid in general.
192
  
The Treaty does not provide a definition of the concept of aid and so, the definition of aid has 
been developed through case law.
193
 
The definition of aid was laid down in the case of Steenkolenmijnen
194
 in which the CJEU gave 
the following definition of the terms subsidy and aid:
195
 
“A subsidy is normally defined as a payment in cash or in kind made in support of an 
undertaking other than the payment by the purchaser or consumer for the goods or services 
which it produces. An aid is a very similar concept, which, however, places emphasis on its 
purpose and seems especially devised for a particular objective which cannot normally be 
achieved without outside help. The concept of aid is nevertheless wider than that of a subsidy 
because it embraces not only positive benefits, such as subsidies themselves, but also 
interventions which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the 
budget of an undertaking and which, without, therefore, being subsidies in the strict meaning of 
the word, are similar in character and have the same effect.”196  
Accordingly, the definition of aid laid down in Steenkolenmijnen is broad in scope, as it covers 
subsidies in the form of direct payments in cash or in kind in support of an undertaking, as well 
as aid granted for a particular
197
 purpose, which cannot normally be achieved without outside 
help.  
In spite of the fact that the Treaty does not directly define aid, the CJEU has, through its case 
law, clarified and defined the different constituent elements of the concept of aid. The definition 
of aid is not exhaustive, but the CJEU has expressed the view that the definition of aid should be 
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interpreted sufficiently wide in order to ‘prevent trade between Member States from being 
affected by advantages granted by public authorities which, in various forms, distort or threaten 
to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or certain products’.198 As a 
consequence, a certain measure must be analysed based on its effects rather than on its aim or 
causes.
199
  
In his opinion in Belgium V Commission
200
 AG Lenz elaborated on the expediency of a broad 
definition of aid:
201
  
“[…]To provide a definition in the Treaties would probably be neither feasible nor useful, since 
concrete definitions would be liable to restrict the scope of the term. However, a broad interpretation is 
necessary in order that Article 92 [now 107] of the EEC [now TFEU] Treaty may make a meaningful 
contribution towards ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted, in accordance 
with the objective set out in Article 3 (f) of the EEC Treaty [now Article 3 TEU…]. 
It can be inferred from those decisions that any type of support granted by a Member State or through 
State resources other than for commercial purposes constitutes aid within the meaning of Article 92 
(1) [now 107(1)]of the EEC [TFEU] Treaty. At least, support constitutes aid where the recipient 
undertaking obtains an advantage which it would not normally have obtained, for example, where 
capital is made available in circumstances which do not correspond to the normal conditions of the 
capital market.”202 
Conclusively, the definition of aid is broad in scope, which could probably be explained by an 
aim to cover all forms of direct payments in support of an undertaking, as well as aid granted for 
a particular purpose, which cannot normally be achieved without outside help.  
2.2.2. State aid rules as a way of supporting an Internal Market 
The connection between the State aid rules and the Internal Market can be detected directly from 
the wording of Article 107(1) TFEU: 
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“[…] any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources […] shall, in so far as it 
affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the Internal Market.”203 
Furthermore, Article 107(2) and (3) TFEU mention the Internal Market. Article 107(2) TFEU 
states: 
“The following shall be compatible with the internal market[…]”204 
Article 107(3) TFEU states: 
“The following may be considered to be compatible with the internal market[…]”205 
Accordingly, the benchmark for assessment of compatibility with the State aid rules is (the 
preservation of) the Internal Market.  
Furthermore, the CJEU has held that the aim of Article 107(1) TFEU is to prohibit benefits 
granted by public authorities, which distort or threatens to distort competition:
 206
 
“The aim of article 92 [now 107] is to prevent trade between member states from being affected 
by benefits granted by the public authorities which, in various forms, distort or threaten to 
distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods .”207 
The above supports the aim of preserving an Internal Market by prohibiting Member States to 
act in a way that can distort trade between the Member States, and thereby distort competition in 
the Internal Market.  
2.2.3 Complementary objectives of the State aid rules 
Despite the fact that the wording of Articles 107 and 108 TFEU has changed very little since the 
introduction of State aid rules, the interpretation of the rules has arguably evolved over time in 
order to adapt to a legal policy context.
208
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Today, State aid policy is still used to contribute to the goals of the Internal Market
209
, but the 
context is different from when the State aid rules were introduced in the Treaty of Paris as a 
means to avoid disturbances with the Common (coal and steel) Market. 
In the Europe 2020 Strategy, State aid policy was mentioned as a means to contribute to the 
Europe 2020 Strategy by ‘prompting and supporting initiatives for more innovative, efficient 
and greener technologies, while facilitating access to public support for investment, risk capital 
and funding for research and development’.210 Also, in its 2015 Report on Competition Policy, 
the Commission mentions EU State aid rules as a means to “steer public resources towards 
mobilising new investment, ensuring that public funding incentivises private investments which 
would not have been made otherwise”.211  
2.2.3.1 Discussions in academic literature  
Furthermore, it has been pointed out in the academic literature that the legal concept of ‘aid’, 
that can be identified in the case law from the Court, has changed over time
212
 to be more 
competition oriented
213
, which means that, today, State aid rules is arguably used as a means to 
prevent distortion of competition between competitors, as opposed to a means to prevent 
distortion between states.  
Also, it is submitted that the economic crisis, which has afflicted the European economy since 
2007, has (temporarily) had an impact on the Commission’s State aid policy.214 Hence, the 
Europe 2020 Strategy,
215
 which sets the goals for Europe towards 2020, focuses on the 
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challenges that the economic crisis has brought with it, and recognises the need for a strategy to 
come out (stronger) from the crisis.
216
  
It is uncontroversial that the economic crisis has had a severe impact on the economies of the 
Member States, and in a State aid context this means that some sectors, such as the financial 
sector, has been supported in a temporary, and exceptional, framework for State aid.
217
 During 
the financial crisis, the Commission modified the legal requirements to banks and other financial 
institutions by setting up a temporary legal framework, under which the Commission approved 
State aid to banks in the Member States.
218,219
  
When compared, State aid policy under the Treaty is probably more lenient, especially in some 
sectors as explained above. Perhaps it even accepts a higher degree of economic nationalism 
than what was the case, when the first prohibition of subsidies in the Common (coal and steel) 
Market was formulated in 1951. The financial crisis is a great example of the dynamic nature of 
the State aid policy.  
Seen in the light of the above, State aid policy could be used, not only to support the Internal 
Market, but also in a wider societal context and with a built-in handle that can either be used to 
increase or decrease the Member States’ use of economic nationalism. However, the 
Commission has stressed that the exceptional framework for State aid, which was seen during 
the financial crisis, cannot be permanent.
220
 This message is a clear signal to the Member States 
that the Commission intends to promote a more stringent use of State aid rules in the future.  
The above supports the argument that State aid rules have secondary goals that support the 
overarching goal of strengthening the Internal Market. However, it is not clear that the alleged 
complementary objectives are ingrained in the case law from the CJEU. In this connection it has 
to be assumed that possible complementary objectives have to comply with the aim of 
supporting an Internal Market.  
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2.2.3.2 State aid rules as a derogation from Competition law? 
Since their introduction, State aid rules have been placed in the chapter on Rules on 
Competition, and have thus formally been part of the rules on competition. This position could 
imply that the rules on State aid in Articles 107-109 TFEU share common objectives with the 
rest of the competition rules, by way of ensuring economic welfare, and strengthening the 
Internal Market.
221
 However, as will be discussed below, the objectives of the State aid rules 
derogate from the objectives of the competition rules in certain aspects.  
Competition policy is an economic, regulatory policy
222
 which e.g. means that efficiency 
considerations prevail under this policy.  Nevertheless, as accounted for above, social 
considerations are taken into account as well as economic progress and the welfare of European 
citizens has been pointed out as the very intention of the EU competition policy.
223
  
Furthermore, the competition rules have to be interpreted in the light of the Treaty’s 
objectives
224
 and especially Articles 2 and 3 TEU, which set out the Union’s values and the aims 
of achieving these. Hence, Article 3(3) TEU states that the Union must establish an Internal 
Market with a highly competitive social market economy.
225
  
Historically, the State aid rules had the creation of the Internal Market as their main objective.
226
 
Thus, State aid control has been defined as an instrument of competition policy that plays a 
fundamental role in defending and strengthening the Internal Market:
227
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“[…]An effective internal market requires the deployment of two instruments: first, regulation to 
create one integrated market without national borders and, second, competition policy 
including State aid control to ensure that the functioning of that internal market is not distorted 
by anticompetitive behaviour of companies or by Member States favouring some actors to the 
detriment of others. […]Thus, as one of the instruments of competition policy, State aid control 
plays a fundamental role in defending and strengthening the single market.”228 
The statement from the Commission implies that, overall, State aid rules share common 
objectives with the rest of the competition rules, insofar as both set of rules aim at achieving an 
Internal Market. However, the question is whether the rules on State aid should simply be 
regarded as an instrument of competition policy, or if the rules on State aid hold separate and 
more specific aims, which distinguishes them from the competition rules in Articles 101-106 
TFEU.   
In the literature, State aid rules have been described as an independent pillar of competition 
policy
229
 and it has been stated that non-economic considerations prevail in State aid policy.
230
 
On the other hand, it has been argued that ‘State aid is basically a technical subject and has 
nothing to do with a desire to ensure fairness’231 This line of literature suggests that the State aid 
rules hold separate objectives from the competition rules. 
In conclusion, the State aid policy allows for the use of national policy considerations in 
addition to the identified objectives of ensuring economic welfare and achieving an Internal 
Market - although in general, the Commission favours a stringent use of State aid rules.  
2.2.4 Preliminary findings 
The State aid rules consist of a general prohibition in Article 107(1) TFEU against aid granted 
by Member States or through State resources, in any form whatsoever, which distorts or 
threatens to distort competition, by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain 
goods, insofar as it affects trade between Member States. The general prohibition in Article 
107(1) TFEU is supported by several exceptions laid down in Articles 107(2) and (3) TFEU. 
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Furthermore, Articles 108-109 TFEU provide for specific competences conferred on the 
Commission and the Council to decide on the compatibility of State aid with the Internal Market 
and to adopt appropriate regulations for the application of Articles 107 and 108 TFEU.  
Furthermore, the definition of aid has been accounted for. It has been argued that no definition 
can be detected from Treaty and consequently, the definition of aid has been developed through 
the case law from the CJEU. It has been held that a broad definition of aid is applied, which, 
arguably, could be explained by a wish to cover all forms of direct payments in support of an 
undertaking, as well as aid granted for a particular purpose, which cannot normally be achieved 
without outside help.  
The rules on State aid support the achievement of an Internal Market by way of expressing 
reference to the preservation of the Internal Market in Article 107(1-3).  
Besides the aim of supporting an Internal Market, it has been discussed whether complementary 
objectives exist as well. However, it is not clear that the alleged complementary objectives are 
ingrained in the case law from the CJEU, but it has to be assumed that possible complementary 
objectives have to comply with the aim of supporting an Internal Market.  
 
2.3 Common objectives of State aid rules and public procurement rules? Detecting 
disparities between the respective aims of the rules   
This section will discuss whether disparities exist between the objectives of procurement rules 
and State aid rules. The main reason for this discussion is to analyse whether the two sets of 
rules possess contradictory or even mutually exclusive objectives, as well as highlighting the 
coincident goals of the rules. 
The most important difference between State aid rules and public procurement rules is the legal 
basis. State aid rules have their legal basis directly in the Treaty, where Articles 107-109 TFEU 
belong to the competition rules. The public procurement directives do not have direct Treaty 
basis, instead they are founded on the free movement rules in the Treaty. Thus, the rules on 
procurement have Treaty basis by way of the rules of free movement in the Treaty.  
75 
 
The procurement rules and State aid rules have a common denominator insofar as both sets of 
rules seek to achieve the strengthening of the Internal Market. This goal is achieved in different 
ways by the rules.
232
 Firstly, as stated above, the procurement rules support the achievement of 
an Internal Market by prohibiting protectionist purchasing as well as by seeking to ensure equal 
treatment between economic operators by removing discrimination.
233
 Secondly, as expressed in 
Article 107(1) TFEU, the State aid rules aim to protect the Internal Market from being affected 
from distortions of competition.   
In this respect, it could be argued that the rules on State aid and public procurement, 
respectively, possess a common denominator in the sense that both sets of rules regulate the 
distortive powers of the State: In a public procurement context, this means that the public 
procurement rules aim to ensure that the public authority does not discriminate or act in a way 
that favours certain undertakings, but rather that the public market is open to all interested 
parties. In this respect, the logic behind the procurement directives is that they aim to create fair 
competition in order for all interested parties to have access to the public procurement markets. 
In a State aid perspective, the State aid rules seek to ensure that no advantage is given to certain 
undertakings, in order to avoid that those undertakings enjoy a favourable position, which they 
can use when they act on the market. In other words, it could be argued that procurement rules 
are designed to prevent distortion for the market (the public contract), while the State aid rules 
should prevent distortion on the market. 
Accordingly, and as held above in section 2.1, both sets of rules seek to minimise the degree of 
which Member States favour national undertakings. Furthermore, they aim to make sure that no 
undue economic advantage
234
 is conferred on economic operators. 
 
2.3.1 A common aim of ensuring ‘competition’ under the procurement rules and State aid 
rules  
One common denominator between the procurement rules and State aid rules is the concept of 
competition. In the following, the concept of competition under the State aid rules and 
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procurement rules, respectively, will be detected. . It will also be discussed whether the concept 
of competition under the State aid rules and procurement rules coincide under the two sets of 
rules. This is done in order to assess whether the phenomenon, that is subject for protection, 
namely the concept of ‘competition’ coincides under the two sets of rules, or put in other words, 
how the State aid rules and the procurement rules aim to achieve this phenomenon. 
It seems clear that preserving or enhancing competition is a key element of both State aid rules 
and procurement rules. Article 107(1) TFEU mentions, as one of the constituent elements for the 
assessment of aid, a prohibition against distorting competition. According to Article 107(1) 
TFEU: 
Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or through State 
resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring 
certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade 
between Member States, be incompatible with the Internal Market.
235
 
Similarly, the procurement Directive emphasises, as one of the ‘principles of procurement’, a 
prohibition against artificially narrowing competition. According to Article 18(1) of the 
procurement Directive: 
“contracting authorities shall treat economic operators equally and without discrimination and 
shall act in a transparent and proportionate manner. The design of the procurement shall not 
be made with the intention of excluding it from the scope of this Directive or of artificially 
narrowing competition. Competition shall be considered to be artificially narrowed where the 
design of the procurement is made with the intention of unduly favouring or disadvantaging 
certain economic operators.“236 
 In this connection, competition is considered to be artificially narrowed, when it ‘favours or 
disadvantages’ certain economic operators, which is a formulation that resembles the one in 
article 107(1) TFEU.  
In connection to the above, the question of how the concept of competition is expressed under 
State aid law and procurement law, respectively, arises. This is an interesting question for two 
reasons. Firstly, a clarification of the concept of competition, in relation to both areas of law, 
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can help determine more precisely how the contracting authority should or could act in order to 
live up to the obligations that arises from the concept. I submit that the concept of competition 
creates different obligations for the contracting authority under the State aid rules and 
procurement rules, respectively. However, it is also submitted that the various obligations that 
arises under the concept are not mutually exclusive. This could, secondly, help to answer the 
main research question asked in this Thesis, when the award of public contracts constitutes State 
aid within Article 107(1) TFEU.  
2.3.1.1 The concept of competition under the procurement rules 
As held above, ‘competition’ is mentioned in Article 18(1) of the public procurement directive 
with the aim of prohibiting that competition is not artificially narrowed.  
Furthermore, the aim of competition is mentioned several times in the preamble to the public 
procurement Directive. Recital 1 mentions the opening up to competition: 
“[…] However, for public contracts above a certain value, provisions should be drawn up 
coordinating national procurement procedures so as to ensure that those principles are given 
practical effect and public procurement is opened up to competition.”237 
In CoNISMa
238
, the CJEU had to conclude whether national legislation which excluded a 
consortium of an inter-university group from participating in a tender procedure, on the grounds 
that the inter-university group constituted a public body and thus did not fall under the definition 
of economic operator.
239
 The CJEU ultimately held that such an exclusion was in breach of the 
procurement directives and held in this connection:
240
 
“The Court has thus held that one of the primary objectives of Community rules on public 
procurement is to attain the widest possible opening-up to competition […]and that it is the 
concern of Community law to ensure the widest possible participation by tenderers in a call for 
tenders […] It should be added that the widest possible opening-up to competition is 
contemplated not only from the point of view of the Community interest in the free movement of 
goods and services but also the interest of the contracting authority concerned itself, which will 
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thus have greater choice as to the most advantageous tender which is most suitable for the 
needs of the public authority in question […] “241  
Thus, the widest possible opening up to competition entails a wider possibility for the 
contracting authority to choose the tenderer who is most suitable for the needs of the public 
authority.  
As held above, the principle of effective competition has been mentioned by the CJEU as an 
essential objective of the competition rules.  
In this connection the CJEU held in Strong Segurança
242
: 
“With regard to the Commission’s contention that the general principle of ‘effective 
competition’ specific to Directive 2004/18 could lead to such an obligation, it must be noted that, 
whereas effective competition constitutes the essential objective of that directive, that objective, 
as important as it is, cannot lead to an interpretation that is contrary to the clear terms of the 
directive, which do not mention Article 47(2) thereof as being among the provisions which the 
contracting authorities are obliged to apply when awarding contracts concerning the services 
referred to in Annex II B to that directive.”   
This statement from the CJEU implies that the obligations to ensure effective competition have 
limits. Accordingly, in spite of the fact that effective competition is an essential objective of the 
procurement rules, this cannot lead to an interpretation contrary to the clear terms of the rules.    
The CJEU has emphasised that the aim of public procurement rules is to create an Internal 
Market for public contracts. In Technische Universität Hamburg
243
 the CJEU held that:
244
 
“In accordance with the case-law of the Court, the principal objective of the EU rules in the field of 
public procurement is the opening-up to undistorted competition in all the Member States with regard 
to the execution of works, the supply of products or the provision of services; that entails an obligation 
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on all contracting authorities to apply the relevant rules of EU law where the conditions for such 
application are satisfied […]”245 
In this respect, it can be argued that the aim of competition under procurement law should be 
seen as referring to the objective of increasing the number of (potential) tenderers.
246
  
It can be discussed whether the concept of effective competition should merely be seen as a way 
to support the achievement of an Internal Market or whether effective competition can be seen 
as an individual aim in itself. Trepte seems to argue that the concept of effective competition is 
merely a confirmation of the obligations to ensure the general principles of the Treaty:
247
  
“The key mechanism of both directives is thus to impose Community[Union]-wide advertising of 
public contracts that will (1) provide effective competition by ensuring equality of opportunity 
(by notifying tenderers in all member states of contracts to be le throughout the Community) and 
equal access to those contracts (by fixing objective criteria for participation and prohibiting the 
use of discriminatory technical specifications) and (2) guarantee a degree of transparency 
enabling supervision” 
248
 
In this respect, effective competition should merely be seen as a means of securing the aims of 
the directives by ensuring equal opportunities for the tenderers when public contracts are 
awarded and as a way to increase the potential number of tenderers. 
2.3.1.2 The concept of competition under the State aid rules 
The concept of competition is not clearly defined under the State aid rules. For the most part, 
competition is not mentioned as an independent concept, but merely as a prerequisite for the 
constituent element of the distortive effects of a measure.
249
 Since competition is the benchmark 
for the distortive measures prohibited by article 107(1) TFEU, it must, however, be held that 
competition is a vital and important element of the State aid rules.  
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The goal of ensuring undistorted competition has been stated repeatedly by the CJEU.
250
 None 
of the cited cases mention what the concept of competition entails, but they do, however, reveal 
that the aim of ensuring undistorted competition relates closely to the preservation of the 
Internal Market. This corresponds to the overall objective of the State aid rules as discussed 
above.       
Under the State aid rules, the State’s obligation to ensure competition relates to ensuring that the 
measures adopted do not release an undertaking from costs which it would normally have had to 
bear.
251
 In other words, ensuring that competition is not distorted is an obligation that somehow 
relates to the competitive environment between undertakings. This aim can be detected from the 
case law:   
In Phillip Morris
252
, the CJEU was asked to assess the alleged aid to a cigarette manufacturer. 
The applicant (Phillip Morris) contested the Commission’s decision by stating that the 
Commission had not assessed the criteria for possible restriction of competition. Phillip Morris 
asked the CJEU to do so by ultimately assessing whether the measure had affected the relation 
between competitors by i) determining the relevant market in ways of taking account of the 
product, the territory and the period of time in question and ii) consider the patterns of the 
market.
253
 . The CJEU did not reply in detail to this request but merely stated that the aid in 
question had the possibility of reducing the costs of the undertaking and thereby giving the 
undertaking in question (Phillip Morris) a competitive advantage over their competitors.
254
  
Even though the CJEU did not uphold the applicant’s argument, this case shows that, when 
assessing whether competition has been distorted, the effects on the relevant market has to be 
considered.  
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In Germany v Commission
255
 the CJEU commented on the conditions of competition by stating 
that aid, which is intended to release an undertaking from costs which it would normally have 
had to bear, distorts the conditions of competition:
256
  
“In principle, operating aid […] is intended to release an undertaking from costs which it would 
normally have had to bear in its day-to-day management or normal activities, distorts the 
conditions of competition […]”257 
Thus, the conditions for competition can be related to the costs of the undertaking.  
As formulated by Cecco, constraining competition is vital to the aims of State aid rules:
258
 
“The desire to constrain locational competition is precisely the rationale for the existence of 
State aid law and policy” 
Accordingly, the concept of competition under State aid rules relates, in essence, to the aim of 
ensuring that competition between competitors in the Internal Market is not distorted. 
2.3.2 Preliminary findings  
The concept of competition appears as central objectives of both procurement rules and State aid 
rules. However, the concept creates different obligations under the two sets of rules. In this 
respect, the concept of competition under procurement rules implies an obligation for the 
contracting authority to ensure equal access to the competition of the contract for the tenderers 
Thusly, the concept of competition in relation to procurement rules aims at increasing the 
number of (potential) tenderers. Accordingly, the concept of competition in relation to 
procurement rules aims at creating more competition for the public contracts.  
The concept of competition under State aid law refers to protecting existing competition in the 
Internal Market. Accordingly, the concept of competition under State aid rules seeks to ensure 
that competition between competitors in the Internal Market is not distorted. In this respect, the 
concept of competition under State aid law implies an obligation for the State to ensure that 
already existing competition is not distorted. Accordingly, the concept of competition in relation 
to State aid rules aims to preserve or protect existing competition.  
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2.3.3 Mutually exclusive objectives of procurement rules and State aid rules? 
Above, I have argued that competition appears as a central concept of both procurement rules 
and State aid rules. Accordingly, it is submitted that ‘competition’ is a concept of both State aid 
law and procurement law. However, the concept has different implications under the two sets of 
rules. Firstly, it could be argued that procurement rules seek to create competition between 
economic operators for the public contract by ensuring equal access to the contract. Secondly, 
the State aid rules arguably seek to ensure that competition, which already exists on the market, 
is protected by prohibiting that no advantage is conferred on the undertaking. However, these 
aims are not mutually exclusive or contradictory. This means that ensuring the objectives under 
State aid law does not imply that the aims and objectives under procurement law are 
compromised. An example of a situation, where the two objectives mentioned above clearly 
coincide, can be found in recital 32 of the preamble to the procurement Directive: 
“The exemption should not extend to situations where there is direct participation by a private 
economic operator in the capital of the controlled legal person since, in such circumstances, the 
award of a public contract without a competitive procedure would provide the private 
economic operator with a capital participation in the controlled legal person an undue 
advantage over its competitors. However, in view of the particular characteristics of public 
bodies with compulsory membership, such as organisations responsible for the management or 
exercise of certain public services, this should not apply in cases where the participation of 
specific private economic operators in the capital of the controlled legal person is made 
compulsory by a national legislative provision in conformity with the Treaties, provided that 
such participation is non-controlling and non-blocking and does not confer a decisive influence 
on the decisions of the controlled legal person. It should further be clarified that the decisive 
element is only the direct private participation in the controlled legal person. Therefore, where 
there is private capital participation in the controlling contracting authority or in the controlling 
contracting authorities, this does not preclude the award of public contracts to the controlled 
legal person, without applying the procedures provided for by this Directive as such 
participations do not adversely affect competition between private economic operators.”259 
 Recital 32 concerns the in-house exception provided for in Article 12 of the procurement 
Directive. According to Article 12, it is entirely up to the contracting authorities whether they 
wish to buy the desired work or service from the market or whether they choose to make the 
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good or service themselves.
260
 In this respect, recital 32 lists situations in which private capital 
participation results in the conferral of an undue advantage on the private undertaking. Recital 
32 resembles the aim of not conferring an advantage to the economic operator and thereby 
distorting competition on the market. Thus, this recital can be used as an example of a situation 
where procurement rules and State aid rules share common objectives.  
 
2.4 Conclusions 
Above, I have argued that the procurement rules and the State aid rules both seek to support the 
Internal Market. However, the two sets of rules accomplish this aim in different ways. Firstly, 
the procurement rules support an Internal Market by preventing protectionist purchasing and 
ensuring equal treatment between economic operators by removing discrimination and barriers 
that prevent entry into the public procurement market and further seek to implement competitive 
procedures in order to secure transparency. Secondly, the State aid rules support an Internal 
Market by way of prohibiting the transfer of advantages to the recipient undertaking and thus 
avoiding distortion of competition between competitors in the Internal Market.   
It has been established that complementary objectives can be detected in both the procurement 
rules and the State aid rules. However, such complementary objectives cannot compromise the 
achievement of an Internal Market. 
Furthermore, common goals of the two sets of rules have been detected. Aside from the 
achievement of an Internal Market, as mentioned above, it has been argued that both the 
procurement rules and the State aid rules seek to ensure competition. In this respect, it has been 
argued that the concept of competition in relation to procurement rules aims at increasing the 
number of (potential) tenderers. Accordingly, the concept of competition in relation to 
procurement rules aims at creating more competition for the public contracts. Under State aid 
law, the concept of competition relates to the protection of existing competition in the Internal 
Market. In this respect, the concept of competition under State aid law implies an obligation for 
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the State to ensure that already existing competition is not distorted. Thus, the concept of 
competition in relation to State aid rules aims at preserving or protecting existing competition.  
However, in spite of the fact that the two sets of rules seek to support competition in different 
ways, it has been argued that these aims of increasing or preserving competition are not 
mutually exclusive.   
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CHAPTER 3 
3. Defining the concept of State versus contracting authority:  When are 
contracting authorities regarded as State under the State aid rules?    
This chapter investigates what triggers the applicability of procurement rules and State aid rules. 
The personal scope, ratione personae, for the public procurement rules and the State aid rules, 
respectively, will be accounted for in order to conclude whether contracting authorities fall 
under the scope of the State, and thereby whether contracting authorities are capable, within the 
meaning of the State, of granting aid. Firstly, section 3.1 examines the concept of contracting 
authority under the public procurement Directives and then compares it, in section 3.2, to the 
concept of State under the State aid rules to see if these two concepts coincide.  
3.1. The concept of ‘contracting authority’ under the procurement rules  
The definition of the concept of contracting authority is crucial in order to define which entities 
are covered by the public procurement directives.
261
 Article 1 of the public procurement 
Directive states that the directive establishes procedural rules for procurement by contracting 
authorities, and thus, the personal scope of the directive is ‘contracting authorities’: 
“1. This Directive establishes rules on the procedures for procurement by contracting 
authorities with respect to public contracts as well as design contests, whose value is estimated 
to be not less than the thresholds laid down in Article 4.”262  
Article 2(1) defines in subsections 1-4 what is meant by ‘contracting authorities’, ‘central 
government authorities and ‘sub-central contracting authorities’, and ‘bodies governed by public 
law’, respectively:   
“2(1). For the purposes of this Directive, the following definitions apply: 
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(1) ‘contracting authorities’ means the State, regional or local authorities, bodies governed by 
public law or associations formed by one or more such authorities or one or more such 
bodies governed by public law;  
(2) ‘central government authorities’ means the contracting authorities listed in Annex I and, in 
so far as corrections or amendments have been made at national level, their successor 
entities;  
(3) ‘sub-central contracting authorities’ means all contracting authorities which are not central 
government authorities; 
(4)  ‘bodies governed by public law’ means bodies that have all of the following characteristics:  
(a) they are established for the specific purpose of meeting needs in the general interest, 
not having an industrial or commercial character;  
(b) they have legal personality; and  
(c) they are financed, for the most part, by the State, regional or local authorities, or by 
other bodies governed by public law; or are subject to management supervision by those 
authorities or bodies; or have an administrative, managerial or supervisory board, more 
than half of whose members are appointed by the State, regional or local authorities, or 
by other bodies governed by public law;” 
 What is meant by ‘contracting authorities’, ‘central government authorities, ‘sub-central 
contracting authorities’, and ‘bodies governed by public law’ is analysed in detail in the 
following.  
3.1.1 Contracting authorities: Article 2(1) (1) 
As stated in Article 2 (1) (1), contracting authorities cover the State, regional or local 
authorities, bodies governed by public law or associations formed by one or more such 
authorities, or one or more such bodies governed by public law
263
.  When defining which 
entities are contracting authorities, it must be taken into account whether the entity is at risk of 
giving preferential treatment to national industry when they purchase.
264
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The concept of contracting authority is a concept of EU law, which means that it is independent 
of how broad this concept is defined in the Member States, including for example how the 
different Member States have arranged their public sectors and public administrations.
265
 The 
Court has held that the concept of ‘contracting authority’ must be interpreted in ‘functional’ 
terms
266
, which arguably necessitates a flexible approach that develops over time. Furthermore, 
it has been stated by the CJEU that the actions of a contracting authority are imputable to the 
State
267
, which presupposes a close connection between the State and contracting authorities.
268
  
As indicated by Article 2 (1) (1), the concept of contracting authority covers the State, regional 
or local authorities, bodies governed by public law or associations. 
The concept of State is not further explained in the Directive, but it has been held by the CJEU 
that the concept of State entails legislative, executive, and judicial power.
269
  
Regional or local authorities refer to the central and regional level of the government, which has 
the responsibility for local matters.
270
 The concept of regional and local authority is further 
explained in Article 2 (2) of the Directive as follows:  
“2. For the purpose of this Article ‘regional authorities’ includes authorities listed non-
exhaustively in NUTS 1 and 2, as referred to in Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council [FN deleted], while ‘local authorities’ includes all authorities of 
the administrative units falling under NUTS 3 and smaller administrative units, as referred to in 
Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003.” 
As stated in Article 2(2), regional and local authorities are listed in Regulation 1059/2003 on the 
establishment of a common classification of territorial units for statistics (NUTS)
271
 level 1 and 
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2 as regards regional authorities, and NUTS level 3 as regards local authorities, The list is non-
exhaustive and can therefore be modified continually.   
3.1.2 Central government authorities and sub-central contracting authorities: Articles 2(1) 
(2) and 2(1) (3) 
Central government authorities are listed in Annex I of the Directive, cf. Article 2(1) (2) and 
‘sub-central contracting authorities’ mean all contracting authorities, which are not central 
government authorities.  
 
3.1.3 Bodies governed by public law: Article 2(1) (4)  
Article 2(1) (4) states the characteristics of a ‘body governed by public law’; 
(1) ‘bodies governed by public law’ means bodies that have all of the following characteristics:  
(a) they are established for the specific purpose of meeting needs in the general interest, not 
having an industrial or commercial character;  
(b) they have legal personality; and 
(c) they are financed, for the most part, by the State, regional or local authorities, or by other 
bodies governed by public law; or are subject to management supervision by those 
authorities or bodies; or have an administrative, managerial or supervisory board, more 
than half of whose members are appointed by the State, regional or local authorities, or by 
other bodies governed by public law; 
 
Article 2(1) (4) implies that the concept of ‘bodies governed by public law’ is not a simple one. 
First of all, the EU legislator has found it necessary to elaborate on the scope of the concept of 
‘body governed by public law’ by spelling out three cumulative272 criteria that have to be met in 
order to fulfill the concept of ‘body governed by public law’. This implicitly shows that the 
Court has found it necessary to elaborate on the constituent elements of the concept, possibly 
because the directive does not provide for an exhaustive interpretation, or because national 
courts have been in doubt as to how to interpret the concept. Furthermore, it has been noted in 
recital 10 of the preamble to the public procurement Directive that the concept of ‘bodies 
governed by public law’ has been examined repeatedly by the CJEU: 
“(10) The notion of ‘contracting authorities’ and in particular that of ‘bodies governed by 
public law’ have been examined repeatedly in the case-law of the Court of Justice of the 
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European Union. To clarify that the scope of this Directive ratione personae should remain 
unaltered, it is appropriate to maintain the definitions on which the Court based itself and to 
incorporate a certain number of clarifications given by that case-law as a key to the 
understanding of the definitions themselves, without the intention of altering the understanding 
of the concepts as elaborated by the case-law. For that purpose, it should be clarified that a 
body which operates in normal market conditions, aims to make a profit, and bears the losses 
resulting from the exercise of its activity should not be considered as being a ‘body governed by 
public law’ since the needs in the general interest, that it has been set up to meet or been given 
the task of meeting, can be deemed to have an industrial or commercial character.
273
 
Similarly, the condition relating to the origin of the funding of the body considered, has also 
been examined in the case-law, which has clarified inter alia that being financed for ‘the most 
part’ means for more than half, and that such financing may include payments from users which 
are imposed, calculated and collected in accordance with rules of public law.” 
This indicates that the concept is not clear in scope and therefore needs to be interpreted by the 
CJEU repeatedly.   
It has been held by the CJEU that the concept of ‘bodies governed by public law’ should be 
interpreted in a broad sense
274
, although, as will be elaborated on below, quite extensive 
guidance, as to how to interpret the constituent elements of the concept, exists.   
As the formulation implies, the three conditions mentioned in Article 2(1) (4) are cumulative: 
‘‘bodies governed by public law’ means bodies that have all of the following characteristics’.275 
The three subsections of Article 2(1) (4) will be accounted for in the following in order to 
deduce the criteria for the definition of ‘bodies governed by public law’. 
(a) Meeting needs in the general interest, not having an industrial or commercial character: 
the first subsection 
The first subsection of Article 2(1) (4) relates to the concept of a ‘body governed by public law’ 
and more specifically, the question of whether a body governed by public law acts in the public 
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interest (as opposed to creating profit). The State may act  either by exercising public powers or 
by carrying activities of an industrial or commercial nature by offering goods and services on 
the market. In situations, where the latter activity is present, the entity in question is no longer 
considered ‘public’ and competition rules apply instead.276  
The crucial assessment for the definition of ‘body governed by public law’ is whether the body 
in question has operated in normal market conditions
277
, which is aimed at making a profit, and 
has faced the risk of bearing the (potential) losses from the activity.
278
 Or, put in other words, if 
the needs in the general interest have been met.  
Bovis finds that the acid test for needs in the general interest not having an industrial or 
commercial character is whether the State or contracting authority chose themselves to meet the 
needs in the general interest, or at least have decisive influence over their provision:
279
  
“The acid test for needs in the general interest not having an industrial or commercial character 
is that the state or other contracting authorities choose themselves to meet these needs or to have 
a decisive influence over their provision.”  
The CJEU has held that the concept of meeting the needs in the general interest is a concept of 
EU-law, which should be interpreted in light of the purpose of the procurement rules.
280
 This 
means that it is not dependent on how it is defined in the Member States. The CJEU states, 
directly in relation to the above, that the purpose of the procurement rules “is to eliminate 
barriers to the freedom to provide services and goods and therefore to protect the interests of 
traders established in a Member State who wish to offer goods or services to contracting 
authorities established in another Member State”281 by combatting both “the risk of preference 
being given to national tenderers or applicants whenever a contract is awarded by the 
contracting authorities and the possibility that a body financed or controlled by the State, 
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regional or local authorities or other bodies governed by public law may choose to be guided by 
considerations other than economic ones”.282  
This statement from the CJEU could be interpreted to imply that when contracting authorities 
buy goods and services, they should only be guided by economic considerations (as opposed to 
social or other).  
However, the CJEU acknowledged in Fernwärme Wien
283
 that a body governed by public law 
can sometimes be guided by considerations other than economic ones, when they meet needs in 
the general interest. The CJEU stated that the concept of a body governed by public law should 
be interpreted in functional terms
 284
, which means that in a specific situation other 
considerations than economic ones can prevail when a body governed by public law acts.  
However, it must be noted that the procurement law regime is set up to avoid that a contracting 
authority, including a body governed by public law, chooses to be guided by considerations 
other than economic ones,
285
. However, this point of departure can be deviated from, if, as in the 
specific case, the relevant economic environment leads to the outcome that the ‘body governed 
by public law’ is not capable of meeting the needs of the general interest by only being guided 
by economic considerations.
286
  
In Agora,
287
 the Court was asked whether a national body was to be classified as a body 
governed by public law.
288
 The Court first repeated the wording of Article 2(1) (4) by noting 
that a body governed by public law means a body established for the specific purpose of a) 
meeting needs in the general interest, b) not having an industrial or commercial character, c) 
having a legal personality, and d) being closely dependent on the State, regional or local 
authorities or other bodies governed by public law.
289
 The Court emphasized that the activities 
conducted by the entity in question (organisation of fairs, exhibitions, and other similar 
activities) did not only benefit the individual interest of the entities (manufacturers and traders) 
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who attended, but  also benefited the consumers.
290
  The Court then found that the body in 
question was to be considered as ‘meeting the needs in the general interest’.291 
The procedure laid out from the Court in Agora was laid out to establish whether the reasons for 
establishing the body in question were to meet the needs in the general interest.
292
 If the Court 
finds that this is the case, it then moves on to analyse the commercial character of the activity. 
 In BFI,
293
 the Court considered whether the term ‘needs in the general interest’ can include both 
situations that can be characterised as having an industrial or commercial character and 
situations that cannot be characterised as having an industrial or commercial character. The 
Court concluded that the [term ‘meeting the needs in the general interest’] creates, within the 
category of needs in the general interest, a sub-category of needs which are not of an industrial 
or commercial character
294
 i.e. the fact that an activity has a commercial or industrial character 
does not mean that it is not capable of meeting the needs in the general interest. Or put in other 
words; ‘needs in the general interest’ can either have an industrial or commercial character or 
not have an industrial or commercial character.  
The Court went even further by stating that needs in the general interest, and not having an 
industrial or commercial character, does not exclude needs which are or can be satisfied by 
private undertakings as well.
295
 This means that, as a general rule, private undertakings are 
capable of performing a certain task in the need of the general interest. This makes sense, as it 
would otherwise be possible to circumvent the public procurement rules, for example if a 
contracting authority has entrusted a private undertaking under their control to award public 
contracts.
296
  
The general rule that private undertakings are capable of performing tasks in the need of the 
general interest has been modified, however, as the Court clarified in Agora. The existence of 
‘significant competition’ may cause the absence of a need in the general interest, not having an 
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industrial or commercial character.
297
 Hereby, the Court indicates that it is necessary to look at 
the level of competition present at the relevant market in order to assess whether ‘needs in the 
general interest’ have been met. It also indicates that there are boundaries connected to the 
dividing line between tasks performed in the general interest and task performed for commercial 
reasons.   
Based on the above, it can be concluded that the reasons and objectives for establishing a body 
should be taken into consideration when deciding whether a specific body meets the need in the 
general interest. Furthermore, both activities that do not have an industrial or commercial 
character and activities that do have an industrial or commercial character can meet the need in 
the general interest. Finally, it cannot be ruled that private undertakings could meet the needs of 
the general interest, but it must be considered whether ‘significant competition’ is present in the 
relevant market. 
 The case law analysed above can be interpreted to entail a rather broad definition of the concept 
of bodies governed by public law by including both activities that do have an industrial or 
commercial character and activities that do not have an industrial or commercial character.  
Recital 10 of the preamble in the public procurement Directive gives some guidance on the 
applicability of the concept by stating that: 
“[…]it should be clarified that a body which operates in normal market conditions, aims to 
make a profit, and bears the losses resulting from the exercise of its activity should not be 
considered as being a ‘body governed by public law’ since the needs in the general interest, that 
it has been set up to meet or been given the task of meeting, can be deemed to have an industrial 
or commercial character.” 
Recital 10 is as a codification of the case law from the CJEU.  
(b) Legal personality: the second subsection 
The second subsection of Article 2(1) (4) concerns the question whether the body in question 
has a legal personality. A body must have legal personality in order to fall under the concept of a 
body governed by public law.  
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The assessment of a body having legal personality does not depend on whether or not it forms 
part of the same group or concern. This was emphasized by the CJEU in BFI, where it held 
that:
298
   
“Since the status of a body governed by public law is not dependent on the relative importance, 
within its business as a whole, of the meeting of needs in the general interest not having an 
industrial or commercial character, it is a fortiori immaterial that commercial activities may be 
carried out by a separate legal person forming part of the same group or concern as it.” 
In Commission v. Ireland,
299
 the Court considered whether a national body was to be considered 
a contracting authority. The Court concluded that the body in question could not be regarded as 
being the State or a regional or local authority, as it did not award public contracts on behalf of 
the State or a regional or local authority.
300
 Rather, the CJEU considered whether the body in 
question could be considered a body governed by public law.
301
 The specific case concerned 
whether the entity (Coillte Teoranta), who carried out business of forestry and related activities 
on a commercial basis, and who was set up as a private company under national law, could be 
considered to have legal personality.  
The Court revealed that the decisive element of the term ‘body with legal personality’ depends 
on whether the State controls that body.
302
 The Court elaborated on the scope of the 
requirements of control in the specific case. First of all, emphasis was put on the fact that the 
State had set up the body in question and could appoint members of the management of the 
body, and further, that the State had entrusted specific tasks to the body.
303
 Then the Court 
highlighted, as a ground for control to be present in the specific case, the possibility for the State 
to instruct the body in question to comply with state policy on forestry (which was the ambit of 
the case) and to provide specified services or facilities. Finally, the Court emphasised the States’ 
control over the body’s economic activities.304 These requirements were moderated though, as 
the Court stated that the State must exercise the control, at least indirectly
305
:  
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“It follows that, while there is indeed no provision expressly to the effect that State control is to 
extend specifically to the awarding of public supply contracts by Coillte Teoranta, the State may 
exercise such control, at least indirectly.”306   
The above shows that the decisive elements for deciding whether a body has legal personality, 
and thus can be considered a contracting authority, are dependent on whether the State exercises 
control (at least indirectly) over the body.  
(c) Dependency on the State in terms of financing, or management, or by having an 
administrative, managerial or supervisory board appointed by the State, regional or 
local authorities, or by other bodies governed by public law or have: the third subsection 
The third subsection of Article 2(1) (4) can be divided into three alternative criteria. This means 
that the satisfaction of one of the criteria will be enough to fulfil the requirements of 
‘dependency of the State’. The three alternative criteria share a common theme of close 
dependency between the body in question and the State.
307
  
As a first alternative, the body in question could be financed, for the most part by the State or by 
regional or local authorities. In regard to the term ‘for the most part’, the Court has explained 
that this term should be understood as ‘more than half’.308 This means that it is possible for the 
body in question to be financed, in part, by other sources than public funds and still fulfil the 
requirements of a ‘body governed by public law’, as long as ‘more than half’ of the financing 
stems from public sources.
309
  
 
In University of Cambridge,
310
 the Court expressed the view that the question of financing is not 
absolute; in the sense that not all financing from the State will have the effect of creating 
dependency on the State. The Court seems to express the view that there is a relationship 
between the specificity of the payment and the connection to the State: Payments, that support 
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activities without general considerations, i.e. payments, which are not intended for any specific 
purpose, are more likely to be considered public financing:
 311
     
“Whilst the way in which a particular body is financed may reveal whether it is closely 
dependent on another contracting authority, it is clear that that criterion is not an absolute one. 
Not all payments made by a contracting authority have the effect of creating or reinforcing a 
specific relationship of subordination or dependency. Only payments which go to finance or 
support the activities of the body concerned without any specific consideration therefor may be 
described as public financing.”312 
The second alternative, which could satisfy the requirements of a ‘dependency on the State’, is 
that the body could be subject to management supervision by the State, regional or local 
authorities, or by other bodies governed by public law.  
Regarding this alternative, the Court held in Opac
313
 that the term ‘management supervision’ 
must give rise to dependence on the public authority equivalent to the requirements of 
dependence regarding the term ‘financed, by most part, by the public authority’ as described 
above.
314
 Moreover, a decisive element seems to be whether the public authority is able to 
influence the decisions of the body in question, in relation to public contracts.
315
 The 
requirement of influence seems quite strict, as Court states that management supervision could 
entail transfer of ‘significant’316 and ‘permanent’317 influence on the public authorities as well as 
the possibility for the public authority to ‘impose a specific course of management action’318 on 
the body in question.  
As a third alternative, the body could meet the requirements of a ’dependency on the State’ by 
having an administrative, managerial or supervisory board, on which more than half of the 
members are appointed by the State, regional or local authorities, or by other bodies governed 
by public law. This alternative shares the common requirement of dependence on the public 
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authority
319
 by requiring a specific level (more than half) of the board in question to be 
appointed by the public authority.  
In conclusion to the above, the third subsection of Article 2(1) (4) includes three alternative 
ways of satisfying the requirements of the term ‘dependency on the State’ which thereby 
possibly falls within the concept of ‘body governed by public law’. If the body in question is 
financed by more than half by the State, it will be enough to render that body within the scope of 
‘body governed by public law’. Alternatively, the body could be subject to management 
supervision, e.g. by being dependent of the public authority in terms of influence. The 
requirement of influence seems rather strict, as it could entail transfer of both ‘significant’ and 
‘permanent’ influence on the public authorities. As a final alternative, the body in question 
could meet the requirements of ’dependency on the State’ by having an administrative, 
managerial or supervisory board, on which more than half of the members are appointed by the 
State, regional or local authorities, or by other bodies governed by public law.   
Accordingly, the following criteria for the definition of ‘bodies governed by public law’ can be 
deduced from the analysis above:  
- The ‘objectives’ criterion: This concerns whether the reasons behind establishing the 
body in question meet the needs in the general interest (this relates to the first indent of 
Article 2(1)(4)) 
- The ‘control’ criterion: This concerns whether the body in question is controlled (at least 
indirectly) by the public authority (this relates to the second indent of Article 2(1) (4)) 
- The ‘dependency’ criterion: This concerns whether or not there is a close dependency of 
the body in question on the public authority (this relates to the third indent of Article 
2(1) (4)) 
The fulfilment of at least one of the above identified criterions will thus be enough to satisfy the 
requirements of the term ‘body governed by public law’. 
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3.1.4 Preliminary findings 
This section has accounted for the constituent elements of the concept ‘contracting authority’. 
This concept is crucial in order to define which entities are covered by the procurement rules. 
The concept of ‘contracting authority’ must be interpreted in functional terms, which arguably 
necessitates a flexible approach that develops over time.  Article 2(1) of the procurement 
Directive defines contracting authorities as a) the State, b) regional or local authorities, c)bodies 
governed by public law, c) central government authorities d) sub-central contracting authorities 
and e) bodies governed by public law. The analysis has shown that the scope of the concept of 
contracting authority is rather broad. 
 
3.2 The concept of ‘State’ under the State aid rules 
We now turn to analyse the personal scope of the State aid rules. The definition of the concept 
of the ‘State’ is crucial when assessing whether ‘contracting authorities’ under the procurement 
rules are capable of granting aid to economic operators.
320
 In this section, the characteristics of 
the concept of State will be analysed in order to address when contracting authorities act in the 
capacity of State in accordance with Article 107(1) TFEU.  
3.2.1 Direct or indirect transfer of State resources: The first sub-criteria    
Article 107(1) TFEU prohibits the granting of aid by Member States or through State resources 
as the first cumulative criterion for assessing whether a measure should be categorised as State 
aid within the meaning of the Treaty. In this respect, the concept of State resources is the most 
difficult to define. Consequently, this concept will be the subject for analysis in the following.  
The criterion of State resources can be divided in two sub-criteria, namely: 1) whether there has 
been a direct or indirect transfer of State resources and 2) whether the measure in question can 
be considered to be imputable to the State. The two sub-criteria will be accounted for in the 
following. 
The concept of ‘State resources’ has been interpreted repeatedly in the case law of the CJEU.  In 
Steinike & Weinlig,
321
 the CJEU emphasised for the first time that no difference exists between 
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aid granted by the State or through State resources. The CJEU held that no account should be 
given as to whether aid is granted directly by the State, or by public or private bodies appointed 
by the State to administer the aid:
322
   
“The prohibition contained in article 92 ( 1 ) [now 107(1)] covers all aid granted by a member 
state or through state resources without its being necessary to make a distinction whether the 
aid is granted directly by the state or by public or private bodies established or appointed by it 
to administer the aid . In applying article 92 [now 107] regard must primarily be had to the 
effects of the aid on the undertakings or producers favoured and not the status of the institutions 
entrusted with the distribution and administration of the aid.”323 
Instead, the Court emphasised that the crucial assessment is the effect the aid has on the 
undertakings or producers favoured by the aid, and not the legal status of the body in 
question.
324
 With this, the Court applies a functional approach to the assessment of whether a 
body is capable of transferring ‘State resources’.  
In Van Tiggele,
325
 the Court established that a measure must entail a financial burden on the 
State’s resources in order to meet the requirements of the notion of State aid.326,327  
In his opinion to the case, A.G. Capotorti elaborated on the above:
328
  
“It is clear that for a measure which has the effect of favouring certain undertakings to 
constitute an aid it must entail a financial burden for the State. This follows from the actual 
wording of Article 92 (1) [now 107(1)] in which reference is made to 'any aid granted by a 
Member State or through State resources'. It is thus necessary that the State should grant 
                                                          
322
 Ibid., para 21. Confirmed in Commission of the European Communities v French Republic, 290/83, 
EU:C:1985:37, para 14; Hellenic Republic v Commission of the European Communities, 57/86, EU:C:1988:284, 
para 12;  
323
 Emphasis added. 
324
 Ibid., para 21.  
325
Ministère public du Kingdom of the Netherlands v Jacobus Philippus van Tiggele, 82/77, EU:C:1978:10. 
326
 Ibid., paras 24-25. 
327
 See also J A Winter, ‘Re(de)fining the notion of State aid in Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty’, (2004) 41, Common 
Market Law Review, 475-504 and M. M. Slotboom, ‘State aid in Community law: a broad or narrow definition?’, 
(1995) 20 (3), E.L. Rev., 289-301. 
328
 Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Capotorti delivered on 13 December 1977 in Ministère public du Kingdom of 
the Netherlands v Jacobus Philippus van Tiggele, Case 82/77, EU:C:1977:205, point 8. 
100 
 
certain undertakings, selected individually or by categories, an advantage entailing a burden 
on the public finances in the form either of expenditure or of reduced revenue.”329  
The CJEU seemed to agree with this view, as it did not find that a ‘fixing by a public authority 
of minimum retail prices for a product at the exclusive expense of consumers’ could constitute 
aid granted by a State within the meaning of Article 107 TFEU.
330
  
In a public procurement context, the limits of this requirement is important, as it could imply 
that a contracting authority does not fall under the notion of the State in situations, where the 
contracting authority does not impose a financial burden to the State. One example of a 
situation, as the one described above, could be award under the concession Directive. As held in 
chapter 2, one of the constituents of the definition of concession contracts is remuneration, 
which can consist either solely in the right to exploit the works that are the subject of the 
contract or in that right together with a payment. In this respect, it can be argued that contracts 
awarded under the concession Directive, where payment consist solely of the right to exploit the 
service in question, can never constitute a financial burden on the State, as no money is used to 
pay for the work or service performed under the contract.   
In Air France,
331
 the GC had to consider whether an investment amounted to an advantage 
granted directly or indirectly through State resources. The GC discussed whether the body in 
question (the ‘Caisse’) should be seen as a body forming part of the public sector. The GC 
concluded that the body in question formed part of the public sector,
332
 even though the body 
‘enjoyed legal autonomy from the political authorities of the State’.333 The grounds for this 
conclusion was that the tasks carried out by the body in question were ‘governed by statutory 
and regulatory rules’ and also that the Director-General of the body was appointed by the 
President.
334
Therefore, the body in question should be seen as a ‘public-sector body whose 
conduct is attributable to the French State’.335 Additionally, the GC emphasised the fact that the 
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funds in question were not at the permanent disposal of the body did not affect its status as aid, 
because the notion of aid covers aid granted ‘in any form whatsoever’.336  
In Nord Pas-de-Calais,
337
 the GC found that intervention by a member State or through State 
resources is not necessarily influenced by the central State authority, but may as well be affected 
by an authority situated below the national level.
338
  
 The above suggests that the concept of State resources is widely scoped, as it includes entities 
such as bodies that enjoy legal autonomy from the political authorities of the State, as well as 
authorities situated below the national level. The decisive criterion concerning transfer of State 
resources seems to be ‘public control’.339The CJEU has emphasised that the exercise of control 
cannot be automatically presumed.
340
 The mere possibility of control will not be sufficient to 
fulfil the criterion of ‘public control’. The requirement of control seems quite strict, as it 
presupposes that the right of control is actually exercised. 
In Germany v Commission,
341
 the Court found that the term ‘any aid granted by a Member State 
or through State resources’ includes all aid financed from public resources. This also includes 
measures adopted by a State in a federation or by a regional authority, i.e. not by the federal or 
central power.
342
 The term ‘aid financed from public resources’ has been interpreted by the GC 
to include intra-state entities, which means ‘decentralised, federated, regional or other’ 
entities.
343
  
 
3.2.2 Imputability to the State: the second subsection 
The second sub-criterion concerns the assessment of whether the transfer of State resources can 
be imputed to the State.  
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In Van der Kooy,
344
 the CJEU established for the first time that a measure has to be attributable 
to the State in order to constitute State aid. In this case, the CJEU had to decide whether the 
fixing of a tariff was the result of an action performed by the Netherland’s State.345 The CJEU 
answered the question by interpreting whether the body in question enjoyed full autonomy in the 
fixing of the tariff, and furthermore, whether the body acted under the control and instructions of 
the public authority. The CJEU concluded that it was not possible for the body in question to 
perform its task (fixing of the gas tariff) without taking account of the requirements of the public 
authority:
346
  
“Considered as a whole, these factors demonstrate that Gasunie in no way enjoys full 
autonomy in the fixing of gas tariffs but acts under the control and on the instructions of the 
public authorities. It is thus clear that Gasunie could not fix the tariff without taking account 
of the requirements of the public authorities.” 
Therefore, the Court found that the task performed by the body in question was the result of an 
action performed by the Netherlands State, which falls under Article 107 TFEU.
347
 
The case law of the Court has confirmed that this criterion is separate from the assessment of 
whether the aid is granted ‘through State resources’. As held by the CJEU in Stardust Marine:348  
“However, for advantages to be capable of being categorised as aid within the meaning of 
Article 87(1) EC [now 107(1) TFEU], they must, first, be granted directly or indirectly through 
State resources […] and, second, be imputable to the State[…]”349 
Stardust Marine provides clarification of the scope of the requirement of imputability and, 
consequently, this case will be analysed in the following.  
The case concerned an application for annulment of a Commission Decision
350
. Stardust Marine 
(hereafter Stardust) was a company, whose main business is in the pleasure-boat market. 
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Stardust was initially financed by way of loans and guarantees by the bank SBT-Batif, which is 
a subsidiary of Altus Finance (Altus), part of the Crédit Lyonnais group. In 1994, after several 
losses by Crédit Lyonnais, the French authorities decided to support Stardust financially.
351
   
The French government put forward four pleas in their support. The first and second pleas, 
which will be subjects of further analysis immediately below, concerned the question of State 
origin of the funds supporting Stardust as well as an argument that the Commission made an 
obvious error of assessment in holding the conduct of SBT and Altus with respect to Stardust 
was imprudent to the State.
352
 
Regarding the first plea, CJEU first held that no distinction should be made between State aid 
granted by the State and public or private bodies established in order to administer the aid, as 
such a distinction could risk the circumvention of EU law:
353
 
“It is settled case-law that no distinction is to be drawn between cases where the aid is granted 
directly by the State and those where it is granted by public or private bodies which the State 
establishes or designates with a view to administering the aid […]. Community[Union] law 
cannot permit the rules on State aid to be circumvented merely through the creation of 
autonomous institutions charged with allocating aid.
354
 
Then, the CJEU continued to emphasise that in order to fall within the scope of State aid rules a 
measure must be granted, directly or indirectly, through State resources
355
 . They subsequently 
concluded that the funding in question were State resources because Crédit Lyonnais, Altus and 
SBT were under the control of the State and thus had to be regarded as public undertakings 
(something which the French government had already agreed upon).
356
 Furthermore, the CJEU 
emphasised the requirement that the financial measure remains under public control:
357
  
“Second, it should be recalled that it has already been established in the case-law of the Court 
that Article 87(1) EC [now 107(1) TFEU] covers all the financial means by which the public 
authorities may actually support undertakings, irrespective of whether or not those means are 
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permanent assets of the public sector. Therefore, even if the sums corresponding to the measure 
in question are not permanently held by the Treasury, the fact that they constantly remain 
under public control, and therefore available to the competent national authorities, is 
sufficient for them to be categorised as State resources […]”358  
In the second part of the first plea, the French government argued that the Commission had 
misinterpreted the concept of imputability to the State and contended that the financial aid 
granted to Stardust by SBT and Altus were not imputable to the State.
359
  The CJEU agreed with 
the arguments made by the French State and concluded that the Commission had indeed 
misinterpreted the criterion of imputability to the State.
360
 The CJEU founded its conclusion on 
the following arguments. Firstly, the CJEU emphasised that the criterion of imputability cannot 
be presumed by the fact that the measure is taken by a public undertaking.
361
 It held that:
362
 
“Even if the State is in a position to control a public undertaking and to exercise a dominant 
influence over its operations, actual exercise of that control in a particular case cannot be 
automatically presumed. A public undertaking may act with more or less independence, 
according to the degree of autonomy left to it by the State. That might be the situation in the case 
of public undertakings such as Altus and SBT. Therefore, the mere fact that a public 
undertaking is under State control is not sufficient for measures taken by that undertaking, 
such as the financial support measures in question here, to be imputed to the State. It is also 
necessary to examine whether the public authorities must be regarded as having been involved, 
in one way or another, in the adoption of those measures.”363 
The CJEU then went on to examine whether the measure in question could be imputed to the 
State. The CJEU held that:
364
 
“[…]the imputability to the State of an aid measure taken by a public undertaking may be inferred from 
a set of indicators arising from the circumstances of the case and the context in which that measure was 
taken. In that respect, the Court has already taken into consideration the fact that the body in question 
could not take the contested decision without taking account of the requirements of the public 
authorities […]or the fact that, apart from factors of an organic nature which linked the public 
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undertakings to the State, those undertakings, through the intermediary of which aid had been granted, 
had to take account of directives issued by a [Interministerial Committee]  
Other indicators might, in certain circumstances, be relevant in concluding that an aid measure taken 
by a public undertaking is imputable to the State, such as, in particular, its integration into the 
structures of the public administration, the nature of its activities and the exercise of the latter on the 
market in normal conditions of competition with private operators, the legal status of the undertaking 
(in the sense of its being subject to public law or ordinary company law), the intensity of the supervision 
exercised by the public authorities over the management of the undertaking, or any other indicator 
showing, in the particular case, an involvement by the public authorities in the adoption of a measure 
or the unlikelihood of their not being involved, having regard also to the compass of the measure, its 
content or the conditions which it contains.
365
 
Accordingly, the CJEU developed a test regarding the imputability to the State of an aid 
measure taken by a public undertaking. The central assessment seems to be the degree of control 
which the State exercises over the public undertaking (referred to as the organic criterion
366
). 
Furthermore, the following criteria
367
 can be deduced: 
- Are the resources at the permanent disposal of the State? 
- Is the measure required by law? 
- Is there a recourse to the general budget of the State?  
In a recent case, namely the case of Commission V TV2/Danmark
368
, the Court made an 
important clarification regarding the question when financing may be considered to fall inside 
the scope of State resources. In the appeal the Commission relied on a single ground of appeal, 
whereby it submits that the GC had misinterpreted the concept of State resources.
369
 In the years 
1995 and 1996, the advertising space on TV2/Danmark was sold  - not by TV2/Danmark itself, 
but by a third company, TV2 Reklame, and the income from those sales was transferred to 
TV2/Danmark through the TV2 Fund.
370
 In that regard, it was not disputed that, like 
TV2/Denmark, TV2 Reklame and the TV2 Fund were public undertakings owned by the Danish 
                                                          
365
 Emphasis added. 
366
 Stardust Marine, C-482/99, para 58. 
367
 Referred to as the “Stardust criteria” in the literature, see L. Hancher, ‘The general framework’ in L. Hancher, T. 
Ottervanger and P.J. Slot (eds), EU State Aids (Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 72. 
368
 European Commission v TV2/Danmark A/S, C-656/15 P, EU:C:2017:836.  
369
 Ibid., para 26. 
370
 Ibid., para 49. 
106 
 
State. And furthermore, that they had been awarded the task of administering the transfer, to 
TV2/Danmark, of the revenue derived from the sale of that advertising space.
371
 Consequently, 
the question arose whether the revenue could be considered to fall within the scope of State 
resources.  
The CJEU first examined the Stardust criteria, as deduced above, by concluding that:
372
  
“[…] the entire distribution channel of that revenue ending with its transfer to TV2/Danmark 
was governed by Danish legislation, under which public undertakings specially appointed by the 
State had the task of administering that revenue. 
The revenue in question was, accordingly, under public control and at the disposal of the State, 
which could decide how it was to be used. 
Consequently, […] the revenue at issue constitutes ‘State resources’, within the meaning of 
Article 107(1) TFEU.”373 
Then the CJEU went on to discuss a dispute between the parties regarding the source of the 
resources concerned. In its judgment
374
, the GC had held that the revenue could not be 
considered as falling within the scope of State resources, since it originated from private 
sources. The Commission argued contrary to the view of the GC by holding that the initially 
private nature of the resources was of no relevance for the purposes of classifying the resources 
as ‘State resources’.375  
To this point the CJEU held:
376
 
“As stated above in paragraph 48 of the present judgment, and contrary to what is stated in 
paragraph 211 of the judgment under appeal, the fact that the source of that revenue, which 
came from advertisers, was private is of no significance in that regard and is irrelevant to the 
question whether that revenue was controlled by the Danish authorities. 
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Moreover, the General Court was wrong to hold, in paragraphs 208 and 212 of the judgment 
under appeal, that resources originating with third parties that are managed by public 
undertakings can constitute State resources only when they are voluntarily placed at the 
disposal of the State by their owners or abandoned by their owners and when the State has 
assumed the management of those resources. 
Contrary to what is stated by the General Court, there is no basis for such a consideration in the 
Court’s case-law.”377 
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the appeal by the Commission could be upheld and that 
“the judgment under appeal must be set aside, to the extent that it annulled the contested 
decision in so far as the Commission had held that the advertising revenue for 1995 and 1996 
paid to TV2/Danmark through the TV2 Fund constituted State aid.”378 
The case of Commission V TV2/Denmark adds to the concept of State resources, as analysed 
above, insofar as it concludes that the origin of the resources is of no importance for the 
classification of a measure as State resources. Accordingly, resources originating from private 
funds are capable of fulfilling the requirements of State resources.  
3.2.3 Preliminary findings 
The concept of State should, according to the above, be interpreted widely in the sense that the 
concept covers all measures transferred by the State or through State resources. The concept of 
State resources can be divided in two sub-criteria, namely: 1) whether there has been a direct or 
indirect transfer of State resources and 2) whether the measure in question can be considered to 
be imputable to the State. State resources cover a broad variety of units, e.g. bodies which enjoy 
legal autonomy from the political authorities of the State, as well as authorities situated below 
the national level. The decisive criterion concerning transfer of State resources seems to be 
‘public control’. Furthermore, the concept of ‘imputability’ has been analysed. In this respect, a 
measure has to be attributable to the State in order to constitute State aid. The decisive element 
for the concept of imputability is the degree of control, which the State exercises over the public 
undertaking. Accordingly, the concept of State comprises all units and resources over which the 
State has a decisive or controlling influence or where the State is likely to have a decisive 
influence on how the resources are spent.  
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3.2.4 Can procurement measures be imputed to the State?  
In relation to the research question asked in this Thesis, it is relevant to discuss whether 
procurement measures can be imputed to the State a priori. In this respect, the connection 
between imputability and specific procurement measures has to be analysed in order to conclude 
whether specific State involvement is required in order to fulfil the requirement of imputability 
or whether the concept of imputability under State aid law implies State involvement a priori. 
This discussion is important for this Thesis’ research question , as the analysis might influence 
the degree of which the award of public contracts constitutes State aid within the meaning of 
Article 107(1) TFEU. In other words, the analysis below will seek to conclude whether 
imputability in relation to procurement procedures requires the conduct of a specific test or 
whether the award of public contracts are always imputed to the State.  
In section 3.1 above, it was concluded that the concept of contracting authority is broad in 
scope, as it entails the State, regional or local authorities bodies governed by public law, central 
government authorities, sub-central contracting authorities as well as bodies governed by public 
law. This conclusion implies that contracting authorities fall under the scope of State or State 
resources, as all measures taken by contracting authorities can be imputed to the State. In 
paragraph 23 of Stardust Marine, the CJEU held that the non-distinction between State and 
State resources in relation to public undertakings is made in order to prevent circumvention 
through the creation of autonomous institutions charged with allocating aid. In this respect, it 
can be argued that if the CJEU’s findings in Stardust Marine applies to the State in general (as 
opposed to only for public undertakings), contracting authorities fall within the scope of State or 
State resources, as the opposite would allow for circumvention of the State aid rules. 
Arrowsmith seems to disagree with the argument above:
379
 
“Thus for public undertakings a procurement measure can be imputed to the State either 
because of state involvement in the specific procurement […] or because of general 
circumstances suggesting involvement in the entity’s procurement policy. However, a 
procurement measure cannot be imputed to the State simply because it is a procurement measure 
of an undertaking subject to dominant state influence.“ 
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In this respect, as held by the CJEU in paragraph 52 of Stardust Marine (cited above), the actual 
exercise of control in a particular case cannot be presumed. This implies that the relevant test for 
assessment of state imputability, as deduced above, should be conducted in each case.  
However, building on the conclusions drawn above, it could be argued that since the concept of 
contracting authority under procurement law coincide with the concept of State under State aid 
rules, State imputability can be presumed when contracting authorities award public contracts. 
The opposite conclusion might risk circumvention of State aid rules. Hence, uniform conditions 
should apply to all contracting authorities in order to prevent circumvention.   
 
 
3.3. Conclusions 
State aid rules apply to a transfer of resources by the State (a public authority, public 
undertaking or part of the State administration) to undertakings. The ratione personae 
concerning public procurement rules are contracting authorities. The public procurement rules 
and State aid rules thus apply to the State. 
The concept of State under the State aid rules and contracting authority under the procurement 
rules are both wide in scope and it is found that contracting authorities fall under the scope of 
State, under State aid rules. Hence, procurement rules and State aid rules share personal scope. 
The actions of a contracting authority are imputable to the State, which presupposes a close 
connection between the State and contracting authorities. This means that contracting authorities 
fall within the scope of the State and hence, contracting authorities are capable of transferring 
resources which fall under the ambit of the State aid rules. 
It has been discussed whether the measures of contracting authorities can be imputed to the State 
a priori. In spite of the fact that the actual exercise of control in a particular case cannot be 
presumed, it is argued that State imputability can be presumed when contracting authorities 
award public contracts. The opposite conclusion might cause circumvention of State aid rules 
and hence, uniform conditions should apply to all contracting authorities in order to prevent 
circumvention.   
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Chapter 4 
 
 
4. Defining the concept of economic operator versus undertaking: When are 
economic operators regarded as undertakings under the State aid rules? 
 
 
The personal scope of the procurement rules and the State aid rules is examined in this chapter. 
As will be elaborated, the concept of economic operator applied under procurement law builds 
on the concept of undertaking under competition law. For this reason, the structure in this 
chapter deviates from the structure in the rest of this Thesis. Accordingly, the chapter starts by 
accounting for the concept of undertaking under State aid law in section 4.1 and then moves on 
to account for the concept of economic operator under procurement law in section 4.2. Then, 
section 4.3 discusses whether contracting authorities fall under the definition of undertaking. 
Finally, section 4.4 concludes on the arguments of this chapter. 
Under State aid law, the requirement for the application of State aid rules is that the transaction 
concerns an undertaking which offers goods or services on the market. In procurement law the 
decisive criterion regarding what transactions fall under the procurement rules is whether the 
transaction is an economic activity performed by economic operators (Article 1 of the 
procurement directive presupposes an acquisition from economic operators). It is therefore 
relevant to discuss whether the concepts of undertaking and economic operator are coincident in 
order to answer the research question asked in this Thesis.  
Arguably, the concept of economic operator coincides under the three award situations analysed 
in this Thesis. Consequently, the following will take the public procurement Directive as the 
point of departure for the analysis.  
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4.1 The concept of ‘undertaking’ under the State aid rules 
Article 107(1) TFEU prohibits any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in 
any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods. Thus, the aid recipient must be an undertaking.  
The Treaty does not contain a definition of an ‘undertaking’. Rather, this concept has been 
developed through the case law of the CJEU.
380
  
 As has been established in case law, the concept of an ‘undertaking’ is broad in scope:  
In Höfner
381
 the CJEU was asked to decide whether a public employment agency could be 
classified as an undertaking subject to the competition rules in the Treaty.  
The case concerned a dispute concerning the compatibility of a recruitment contract concluded 
between a public employment agency (Messrs Hoefner and Elser), on the one hand, and a 
German company (Macrotron), on the other.
382
 According to German law, employment in 
Germany is governed by the Arbeitsfoerderungsgesetz (Law on the promotion of employment, 
hereinafter referred to as "the AFG"). Paragraph 3 of the AFG entrusts the promotion of 
employment to the Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (Federal Office for Employment, hereinafter 
referred to as "the Bundesanstalt"), who’s activity essentially consists of bringing prospective 
employees into contact with employers and administering unemployment benefits.
383
 However, 
in spite of the exclusive right granted to the Bundesanstalt, specific recruitment and employment 
procurement activity has developed in Germany for business executives.
384
 As required by the 
contract, Messrs Hoefner and Elser presented Macrotron with a candidate for the post of sales 
director. The candidate was a German national who, according to the recruitment consultants, 
was perfectly suitable for the job in question. However, Macrotron decided not to appoint that 
candidate and refused to pay the fees stipulated in the contract.
385
 For this reason, Messrs 
Hoefner and Elser commenced proceedings against Macroton before a German national Court in 
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order to obtain the fees agreed upon. The national German court decided to refer four questions 
to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. The CJEU formulated the questions as follows:
386
 
“In its first three questions and the part of its fourth question concerning Article 59 of the 
Treaty, the national court seeks essentially to determine whether the Treaty provisions on the 
free movement of services preclude a statutory prohibition of the procurement of employment for 
business executives by private recruitment consultancy companies. The fourth question is 
concerned essentially with the interpretation of Articles 86 and 90 of the Treaty, having regard 
to the competitive relationship existing between those companies and a public employment 
agency enjoying exclusive rights in respect of employment procurement.” 
In its reply, the CJEU held that the concept of an undertaking encompasses:
387
 
“It must be observed, in the context of competition law, first that the concept of an undertaking 
encompasses every entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the 
entity and the way in which it is financed and, secondly, that employment procurement is an 
economic activity.”388 
Accordingly, every entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the 
entity and the way it is financed, falls under the scope of the concept of ‘undertaking’.   
4.1.1 Economic activities  
As held above, the decisive criterion for the definition of undertakings is whether the entity in 
question performs an economic activity. No definition exists in the Treaty as to what constitutes 
an economic activity, but the CJEU has held that this assessment must be made on a case-by-
case basis.  
The concept of undertaking relies, in essence, upon whether an economic activity is performed 
by offering goods and services on the market.
389
  This was established in Italy v Commission
390
 
where the CJEU held that:
391
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 “the distinction provided for in the sixth recital flows from the recognition of the fact that the 
state may act either by exercising public powers or by carrying on economic activities of an 
industrial or commercial nature by offering goods and services on the market . In order to make 
such a distinction, it is therefore necessary, in each case, to consider the activities exercised by 
the state and to determine the category to which those activities belong.”392 
Accordingly, the decisive factor for the concept of undertaking under competition law is not the 
legal personality, but rather the function it fulfils. This approach implies that the concept of 
undertaking is functional. 
As the concept of economic activities has no exhaustive definition, it is not possible to define a 
conclusive list of activities which are economic in nature a priori. However, the CJEU has 
elaborated on activities which do not constitute economic activities. Thus, the concept of 
economic activity is defined by a negative delimitation.  
For the purpose of this Thesis, the most relevant non-economic activity relates to the exercise of 
public powers. In this connection, where the entity acts by exercising public powers or in the 
capacity of public authorities,
393
 Article 107 TFEU does not apply. Thus, the activity is outside 
the scope of the competition rules if the activity performed is considered part of the essential 
functions of the State. 
4.1.1.1 Entities acting in the capacity of public powers 
In a line of case law the CJEU has dealt with the distinction between entities acting in the 
capacity of public powers or performing economic activities.  
In SAT
394
 the CJEU had to consider whether the European Organization for the Safety of Air 
Navigation (Eurocontrol) performed economic activities. This could result in Eurocontrol falling 
under the scope of the competition rules.  
Eurocontrol is an international organisation, established by the Convention of 13 December 
1960.
395
 Eurocontrol' s primary function is  to establish and collect the charges of air navigation 
services on behalf of the contracting states (the Kingdom of Belgium, the French Republic, the 
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Federal Republic of Germany, the Greek Republic, Ireland, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic and the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Cypriot Republic, the Hungarian Republic, the Maltese 
Republic, the Swiss Confederation and the Turkish Republic)and the non-member States 
(Austria and Spain) parties to the agreement.
396
  
The case laid before the CJEU arose as a request for a preliminary ruling referred by a Belgian 
court. The dispute before the national Belgian court concerned the recovery of route charges, 
payable by SAT Fluggesellschaft mbH (a company governed by German law, hereafter referred 
to as SAT) to Eurocontrol. During the dispute before the national Belgian court, SAT claimed 
the right to refuse the payment. SAT argued that the procedures followed by Eurocontrol 
constituted an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 106 TFEU.
397
 The 
grounds were based on the fact that Eurocontrol   charged different rates for equivalent services 
and that the amounts varied from State to State and from year to year. 
This claim led the Belgian court to ask the CJEU to decide whether Eurocontrol constituted an 
undertaking within the meaning of the Treaty.
398
 
The CJEU considered the public character of Eurocontrol’s activities and balanced them against 
their public authority characteristics
399
. They found that Eurocontrol carried out tasks in the 
public interest. In reaching this conclusion, the CJEU emphasised that  Eurocontrol’s activities, 
by their nature, their aim and the rules to which they are subject, are connected with the exercise 
of powers relating to the control and supervision of air space which are typically considered the 
powers of a public authority’.400 Accordingly, Eurocontrol should be regarded as a public 
authority acting in the exercise of its powers.
401
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In the case of Selex
402
, the CJEU had to consider whether Eurocontrol was in breach of Article 
82 and 86 EC [now 102 and 106 TFEU]. This case concerned activities performed by 
Eurocontrol in relation to assisting national administrations, which was not considered in SAT, 
as analysed above. In this case, the arguments of the GC are rather distinct from the arguments 
of the Court, and therefore both the conclusions from the GC in T‑155/04 Selex V Commission 
as well as the conclusions from the Court in the appeal will be analysed in the following.  
The case before the Court was an appeal seeking to set aside a judgment of the GC
403
 stating 
that Eurocontrol could not be considered an undertaking.  
In its judgment, the GC made a distinction between the various activities performed by 
Eurocontrol. Accordingly, the activities were divided into three types, namely; technical 
standardisation; research and development and assisting national administrations.
404
 The GC 
emphasised that these activities should be considered individually. Accordingly, any activity, 
which can be severed from those in which it engages as a public authority, has to be assessed 
separately.
405
  
Regarding the activity of technical standardisation, the GC found that the adoption of standards 
by the Eurocontrol was a legislative activity and therefore a public task. Thus, the preparation 
and production of technical standards could be separated from its tasks of managing airspace 
and developing air safety, but could not be deemed an economic activity, since the applicant had 
failed to demonstrate that this activity consisted in offering goods or services on a given 
market.
406
    
Concerning the activity of research and development, the GC held that the acquisition of 
prototypes in the context of research and development activities and the related management of 
intellectual property rights did not involve the offer of goods or services on a given market. 
Consequently, the activity could not be considered economic in nature. On these grounds, the 
GC found that “[the] activity [was] ancillary to the promotion of technical development, 
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forming part of the aims of Eurocontrol’s public service tasks and not being pursued in its own 
interest, separable from those aims”.407 
With regard to the third activity, namely the activity of assisting the national administrations, the 
GC held that is was separable from Eurocontrol’s tasks of airspace management and 
development of air safety, because the connection with air navigation safety was “only a very 
indirect one”.408 In connection with the technical assistance provided by Eurocontrol in the 
implementation of tendering procedures, the GC held that this was provided only on the request 
of the national administrations and was therefore in no way essential or indispensable when 
ensuring the safety of air navigation.
409
 Furthermore, the GC held that the activity of assisting 
national administrations could be perceived as offering services on the market for advice.
410
 In 
this respect, the GC emphasised that the fact that activities are normally entrusted to public 
authorities cannot affect the economic nature of the activity. They also stressed that “the fact 
that the assistance provided is not remunerated may constitute an indication that it is not an 
economic activity, although it is not in itself decisive.”411 Consequently, the GC found that the 
activity of assisting national administrations constituted an economic activity and, accordingly, 
Eurocontrol was, in the exercise of that activity, an undertaking within the meaning of Article 
102 TFEU.
412
 
The Court did not agree with the view that Eurocontrol performed an economic activity in 
assisting the national administrations. The Court held:
413
 
 “it can be inferred from the Convention on the Safety of Air Navigation that the activity of 
providing assistance is one of the instruments of cooperation entrusted to Eurocontrol by that 
convention and plays a direct role in the attainment of the objective of technical 
harmonisation and integration in the field of air traffic with a view to contributing to the 
maintenance of and improvement in the safety of air navigation. That activity takes the form, 
inter alia, of providing assistance to the national administrations in the implementation of 
tendering procedures for the acquisition of air traffic management systems or equipment and is 
intended to ensure that the common technical specifications and standards drawn up and 
                                                          
407
 SELEX, T-155/04, paras 75-77. Citing SELEX, C-113/07 P, para 18. 
408
 SELEX,  T-155/04, para 86. 
409
 Ibid. 
410
 Ibid., para 87. 
411
 Ibid., paras 88-91. Citing SELEX, C-113/07, para 20. 
412
 Ibid. 
413
 SELEX, C-113/07 P, para 76. 
117 
 
adopted by Eurocontrol for the purpose of achieving a harmonised European air traffic 
management system are included in the tendering specifications for those procedures. It is 
therefore closely linked to the task of technical standardisation entrusted to Eurocontrol by the 
contracting parties in the context of cooperation among States with a view to maintaining and 
developing the safety of air navigation and is thus connected with the exercise of public 
powers.”414 
As a result, the Court found that the activity of assisting the national administrations was closely 
linked to the activities performed in the capacity of public powers and hence, no economic 
activity was performed.  
In reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasised that the GC did not provide sufficient 
arguments to conclude that the relationship between the activity of assisting national 
administrations and the activities performed in the exercise of public powers were only indirect. 
The Court held in this respect:
415
  
“the fact that the assistance provided by Eurocontrol is optional and that, as the case may be, 
only certain Member States have recourse to it cannot preclude such a connection or alter the 
nature of the activity. Moreover, in order for there to be a connection with the exercise of 
public powers, it is not necessary for the activity concerned to be essential or indispensable to 
ensuring the safety of air navigation, since what matters is that the activity is connected with 
the maintenance and development of air navigation safety, which constitute public powers.”   
According to the above, the Court seems to accept that even activities that do not play a vital 
role can form part of the activities performed in connection with the exercise of public powers. 
Or put in other words, it can therefore be argued that the demand for connectivity is not very 
strong.  
 
4.1.2 The concept of undertaking for the purpose of Article 107(1) TFEU: Deviation from 
the concept of undertaking under competition law? 
As has been accounted for in chapter 2 of this Thesis, State aid law is distinguished from the 
competition rules in a number of aspects and therefore it is relevant to analyse whether the 
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concept of undertaking, within the meaning of State aid law, differs from the concept applied 
with respect to competition rules.  This will be done in the following.  
As will be explained, the CJEU has emphasised a close connection between the concept of 
undertaking in Article 107(1) TFEU and the rest of the competition rules. 
In Steinike & Weinlig
416
, the CJEU was asked to conclude ‘hether the expression 'undertakings 
or the production of certain goods ' in Article 107 TFEU was restricted to private businesses or 
whether it also included non-profit-making institutions governed by public law.’417 The CJEU 
replied that:
418
  
“Article 90 ( 1 ) [now 106(1)] of the treaty provides : ' in the case of public 
undertakings and undertakings to which member states grant special or exclusive 
rights , member states shall neither enact nor maintain in force any measure 
contrary to the rules contained in this treaty , in particular to those rules provided 
for in article 7 [now 12]and articles 85 to 94[now 101 to 109] . Article 90 ( 2 ) [now 
106(2)] provides : ' undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general 
economic interest or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be 
subject to the rules contained in this treaty , in particular to the rules on competition , 
in so far as the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance , in law or 
in fact , of the particular tasks assigned to them . The development of trade must not 
be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the community '. 
From this it follows that save for the reservation in article 90 ( 2 )[now 106(2)] of the 
treaty , article 92 [now 107]covers all private and public undertakings and all their 
production .”419 
This conclusion was reiterated in Banco Exterior de España
420
, where the CJEU held that:   
“[…] it must be recalled that it follows from Article 90 [now 106] of the Treaty that, save for the 
reservation in Article 90(2) [now 106(2)], Article 92 [now 107] covers all private and public 
undertakings and all their production.”421 
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Furthermore, AG Mischo has explained that the concept of undertaking has the same meaning 
regardless of whether the undertaking concerned is private or public.
422
  
“since, like Articles 85[now 101] and 86 [now 102], Article 90 [now 106] is contained in Part 3, 
Title I, Chapter 1, Section 1 of the Treaty, entitled "Rules applying to undertakings", and since, 
subject to paragraph 2 thereof, it makes public undertakings subject to all the rules laid down in 
the Treaty which apply also to private undertakings ( judgment of 6 July 1982 in Joined Cases 
188 to 190/80 […]), it may logically be concluded that the term "undertaking" has the same 
meaning, independently of whether the undertaking concerned is private or public.”423  
The above implies a close connection between the concept of undertaking in Article 107(1) 
TFEU and the rest of the competition rules. However, as will be elaborated on below, the 
concept of undertaking for the purpose of Article 107(1) TFEU differs from that of the Treaty 
competition rules.  
In ACEA-Electrabel
424
, the CJEU was asked to decide whether the identification by the GC of 
the aid recipient was correct in a case concerning alleged aid to a joint venture. 
The case concerned an appeal by AceaElectrabel (an Italian joint venture set up by ACEA SpA 
(hereafter ‘ACEA’) and Electrabel Italia, who is an active player in the electricity and gas 
sectors) to set aside a judgment from the GC dismissing an action for annulment of a 
Commission Decision
425
. ACEA has a controlling stake of 59.41% in AceaElectrabel and 
Electrabel Italia owns a stake of 40.59%. The agreements on the constitution of the joint venture 
provided that ACEA was to transfer two thermoelectric production installations and five 
hydroelectric power plants to AEP, while Electrabel was to provide a number of projects for the 
construction of installations.
426
 
In its judgment, the GC took the view that “the Commission was entitled to classify the aid at 
issue as State aid, since the local nature of the urban heating network concerned did not 
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preclude either competitive relationships with other energy products or any adverse effect on 
trade between Member States”.427 
According to the Commission, ACEA and AEP form an economic unit and thusly, ACEA and 
AEP were considered as beneficiaries of the aid.
428
 In the appeal, AEP argued that the GC was 
incorrect in holding that ACEA and AEP formed one economic unit.
429
  
According to AEP, it is not possible to claim that AEP formed an economic unit together with 
ACEA, since ACEA holds a stake of less than 30% in AEP. Hence, according to AEP, “[when] 
an undertaking is controlled by a joint venture, which itself is controlled by two separate 
groups, it cannot be inferred from that case-law that the Commission is entitled to conclude that 
there is an economic unit between the controlled undertaking and one of the two companies 
which control the joint venture.”430 
Furthermore, AEP held that the GC erred in concluding
431
 that AEP did not have genuine 
operational independence vis-à-vis ACEA and Electrabel, due to the fact that it was jointly 
controlled by those companies.
432
 AEP further claimed that “the Commission would never have 
adopted such an approach in other areas of competition law, even though that law applies the 
same concepts in all areas covered by it. Contrary to view taken by the General Court, the 
concepts applicable to concentrations or restrictive practices can be transposed to the field of 
State aid, except in certain specific situations in which a different interpretation is justified.”433 
In its reply, the Court first emphasised that, from an economic point of view, AEP; Electrabel 
and ACEA can “form an economic unit, inter alia, where the restructuring carried out 
constitutes an indivisible whole, from an industrial and economic point of view.”434 In this 
respect, the Court explained that an entity that owns controlling shareholdings in a company 
must be regarded as taking part in the economic activity carried on by the controlled undertaking 
insofar as the entity actually exercises control by involving itself directly or indirectly in the 
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management of the entity.
435
 The Court then concluded that the Commission and the GC were 
correct in concluding that ACEA and AEP formed an economic unit with regard to the received 
aid.
436
 The Court further stressed that:
437
  
“First, it must be concluded that, in the light of the above analysis, the arguments relating to, 
first, the Commission’s finding in its assessment of the concentration that AEP was operationally 
independent of ACEA and, second, the concept of an economic unit as applied in the field of 
restrictive practices and concentrations, cannot be accepted. Indeed, as the General Court 
correctly held at paragraphs 135, 137 and 138 of the judgment under appeal, the concept of an 
economic unit in State aid matters can differ from that applicable in other areas of 
competition law.  
In any event, neither any operational independence on the part of AEP nor the concept of an 
economic unit applicable in the field of restrictive practices and concentrations is capable of 
altering the fact that in the light, in particular, of ACEA’s power to block decisions for the most 
important matters concerning the management of AEP, the General Court was entitled, in the 
circumstances, to confirm the Commission’s finding that ACEA exercised joint control over AEP 
and that the latter formed part of an indivisible whole.”438 
This case serves to show that the concept of undertaking in relation to State aid rules is different 
from the concept of undertaking under competition rules. Thus, the level of required control 
seems to be more lenient under State aid law than under competition law. The Court has 
explained this difference with the aim of making sure that entities, which benefit from aid, 
cannot be excluded from the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU, because they do not live up to the 
formal requirements under the competition rules. In this respect, it can be argued that the 
concept of undertaking for the purpose of Article 107(1) TFEU relates to the protection against 
distortions of competition in the Internal Market, which is one of the key aims of the State aid 
rules.
439
  
However, it cannot be concluded that the concept of undertaking under State aid law is 
completely independent from the concept of competition under competition law. As emphasised 
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by the Court in ACEA-Electrabel, the purpose of defining ACEA and AEP as indispensable 
units should be seen in the wider context of avoiding circumvention of State aid rules.  
4.1.3 Preliminary findings 
As held above, the concept of undertaking in relation to competition rules implies the 
performance of economic activity. As no definition exists in the Treaty as to when an activity is 
economic, no exhaustive definition exists. Consequently, the concept of undertaking is 
functional in the sense that the concept is based on an assessment of the effects caused, rather 
than the form. Furthermore, the CJEU has not provided a definition of the concept of economic 
activity and therefore the analysis above has focused on when an activity is not economic. For 
the purpose of this Thesis, the most relevant non-economic activity relates to the distinction 
between the exercise of public powers and the exercise of economic activity. The former activity 
excludes an entity from exercising economic activities, and is therefore  defined as an 
undertaking within competition law.  
Since the rules on State aid deviate from the competition rules in a number of areas, it has been 
relevant to discuss whether the concept of undertaking under competition law coincide with the 
concept of undertaking for the purpose of State aid law. As held by the CJEU in ACEA-
Electrabel, the concept of an economic unit in State aid matters can differ from what is 
applicable in other areas of competition law. However, it has been concluded that the purpose of 
defining the concept of undertaking under State aid law should be seen in the wider context of 
avoiding circumvention of State aid rules. Consequently, the concept of undertaking under State 
aid law is not completely independent from the concept of competition under competition law. 
 
4.2 The concept of ‘economic operator’ under the procurement rules 
The concept of ‘economic operator’ relates to the ‘supply’ side of the procurement market 
insofar as the concept covers any persons and entities which offer the execution of works, 
products or services on the market. The definition of ‘economic operator’ is relevant to define, 
as the scope of the procurement rules can be affected according to which contracting parties are 
part of the transaction in question. Hence, contracts between contracting authorities and 
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economic operators fall within the scope of the procurement rules, whereas an in-house award is 
not governed by the directives.
440
 
Article 2(10) of the public procurement Directive defines economic operators in the following 
way:  
“’economic operator’ means any natural or legal person or public entity or group of such 
persons and/or entities, including any temporary association of undertakings, which offers the 
execution of works and/or a work, the supply of products or the provision of services on the 
market” 
Furthermore, the concept of economic operator covers tenderers and candidates. Thus, Article 
2(11) defines tenderers as: 
“‘[…] an economic operator that has submitted a tender” 
Whereas the concept of candidates, cf. Article 2(12), covers: 
“[…] an economic operator that has sought an invitation or has been invited to take part in a 
restricted procedure, in a competitive procedure with negotiation, in a negotiated procedure 
without prior publication, in a competitive dialogue or in an innovation partnership” 
This implies that the concept of ‘economic operator’ is broad. This is confirmed by recital 14 of 
the preamble to the public procurement Directive: 
“it should be clarified that the notion of ‘economic operators’ should be interpreted in a broad 
manner so as to include any persons and/or entities which offer the execution of works, the 
supply of products or the provision of services on the market, irrespective of the legal form 
under which they have chosen to operate. Thus, firms, branches, subsidiaries, partnerships, 
cooperative societies, limited companies, universities, public or private, and other forms of 
entities than natural persons should all fall within the notion of economic operator, whether or 
not they are ‘legal persons’ in all circumstances.”441  
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According to the above, the legal form of the entity is irrelevant.
442
 In this respect, public 
entities can constitute economic operators for the purpose of the Directives.
443
  
Accordingly, the decisive element for the concept of economic operator is the offer of goods or 
services on the market.  
4.2.1 Execution of works, the supply of products or the provision of services on the market 
As held above, the decisive criterion for the concept of economic operator is whether the entity 
in question offers the execution of works, the supply of products or the provision of services on 
the market. 
 
As will be elaborated on, the concept of economic operator for the purpose of procurement law 
builds on the concept of undertaking, as analysed above in section 4.1.  
 
In CoNISMa
444
 the CJEU was asked to conclude whether a national provision, after which a 
consortium of universities (CoNISMa) was excluded from a procedure of a public services 
contract, was in breach of directive 2004/18/EC (now 2014/24/EU). The CJEU rejected that the 
concept of economic operator entailed the possibility of excluding CoNISMa because it was 
governed by public law.
445
 The CJEU  emphasised in this connection that one of the primary 
objectives of the procurement rules is the widest possible opening up to competition.
446,447 
 
The CJEU further held that the concept of economic operator encompasses entities that offer 
services (this was the specific ambit of the case) on the market:
448
  
“However, if and to the extent that such entities are entitled to offer certain services on the 
market, the national legislation transposing Directive 2004/18 into domestic law cannot prevent 
them from taking part in public procedures for the award of contracts for the provision of those 
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services. Such a prohibition would be incompatible with the provisions of Directive 2004/18, as 
interpreted in connection with the examination of the first question referred.”449 
Accordingly, the case of CoNISMa establishes a connection between the concept of undertaking 
for the purpose of competition law and the concept of economic operator for the purpose of 
procurement law. This was established in Ordine:
450
 
“[…] whether the conclusion of an agreement between public authorities is not contrary to the 
principle of free competition where one of the authorities concerned can be regarded as an 
economic operator, a classification which encompasses any public body proposing services on 
the market, regardless of whether it has a primarily profit-making objective, whether it is 
structured as an undertaking or whether it has a continuous presence on the market. 
[…]From that perspective, provided that the University has the capacity to take part in a 
procurement procedure, the contracts concluded with it by contracting authorities fall within the 
scope of European Union public procurement rules where they relate, as in the case in the main 
proceedings, to research services which do not appear to be incompatible with the services 
mentioned in categories 8 and 12 of Annex II A to Directive 2004/18.”451 
4.2.2 Preliminary findings 
The concept of economic operator is defined directly in the public procurement Directive and 
covers any natural or legal person; public entity or group of such persons and/or entities, 
including any temporary association of undertakings, which offers the execution of works, the 
supply of products or the provision of services on the market. Furthermore, the concept covers 
“candidates” and “tenderers”. This implies that the concept of ‘economic operator’ is broad, . 
This also appears from recital 14 of the preamble to the public procurement Directive.  
It has been argued that the concept of economic operator builds on the concept of undertaking 
under competition law. Thus, it can be concluded that the concepts of economic operator and 
undertaking are coincident insofar as the decisive element for both the definition of economic 
operator and undertaking depends on whether or not the entity in question offers the execution 
of works, the supply of products or the provision of services on the market. 
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4.3 Do contracting authorities perform economic activities on the market? 
As held above, the concept of economic activities is rather broad. Furthermore, since no positive 
definition exists regarding the scope of economic activities, this concept has instead evolved in 
case law through a negative approach. This means that the CJEU has, at least indirectly, defined 
the concept by concluding what is not an economic activity. In this respect, it is relevant to 
analyse whether the activities of contracting authority can be regarded as economic for the 
purpose of State aid law. The conclusion to this analysis has wide implications, as it affects the 
applicability of State aid rules to the contracting authorities.  
The leading case in this respect is the case of FENIN
452
, where the CJEU was asked to conclude 
whether a contracting authority performed economic activities for the purpose of Article 102 
TFEU and thereby whether the contracting authority could fall under the scope of the 
competition rules. Since the concept of undertaking for the purpose of State aid rules coincides 
with the concept of undertaking in relation to the competition rules, this case also has 
implications for the research question asked in this Thesis. In this respect, the following will 
discuss whether the contracting authority can be considered to perform economic activities for 
the purpose of Article 107(1) TFEU.  
FENIN concerned an appeal brought by the Federación Española de Empresas de Tecnología 
Sanitaria (hereafter FENIN) to set aside a judgment by the GC
453
 holding that FENIN is an 
association of undertakings that market medical goods and equipment, particularly medical 
instruments, used in Spanish hospitals. The members of FENIN primarily sell their products to 
the Spanish hospital sector, and more specifically, to bodies and organisations that run the 
Spanish, national health system (hereafter referred to as SNS). The dispute before the GC 
concerned an allegation from FENIN that SNS was guilty of abusing their dominant position on 
the market, cf. Article 102 TFEU, as SNS took on average 300 days to pay their debts to the 
members of FENIN.
454
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The GC concluded that the plea from FENIN could not be upheld, as SNS could not be 
considered an undertaking and consequently fell outside the scope of Article 102 TFEU. The 
GC held in this connection:
455
 
“[…] it is the activity consisting in offering goods and services on a given market that is the 
characteristic feature of an economic activity […] not the business of purchasing, as such. 
Thus, as the Commission has argued, it would be incorrect, when determining the nature of that 
subsequent activity, to dissociate the activity of purchasing goods from the subsequent use to 
which they are put. The nature of the purchasing activity must therefore be determined 
according to whether or not the subsequent use of the purchased goods amounts to an 
economic activity.”456 
Thus, according to the GC, purchasing activities cannot be classified as economic activities a 
priori. Rather, the nature of the activity should be determined according to the subsequent use. 
As emphasised by the GC:
457
 
“[…] an organisation which purchases goods ─ even in great quantity ─ not for the purpose of 
offering goods and services as part of an economic activity, but in order to use them in the 
context of a different activity, such as one of a purely social nature, does not act as an 
undertaking simply because it is a purchaser in a given market. Whilst an entity may wield very 
considerable economic power, even giving rise to a monopsony, it nevertheless remains the case 
that, if the activity for which that entity purchases goods is not an economic activity, it is not 
acting as an undertaking for the purposes of Community competition law and is therefore not 
subject to the prohibitions laid down in Articles 81(1) EC [now 101(1) TFEU] and 82 EC [now 
102 TFEU].”458 
The Court agreed with the arguments of the GC. It held:
459
  
“The Court of First Instance rightly deduced, in paragraph 36 of the judgment under appeal, 
that there is no need to dissociate the activity of purchasing goods from the subsequent use to 
which they are put in order to determine the nature of that purchasing activity, and that the 
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nature of the purchasing activity must be determined according to whether or not the 
subsequent use of the purchased goods amounts to an economic activity.” 
The FENIN case has been confirmed by the Court in Selex
460
, as analysed above in section 
4.1.1.1.
461
 
According to the above, purchasing activities are not considered economic in nature, unless the 
subsequent use amounts to an economic activity. The Court did not elaborate further on the 
requirements for when the subsequent use can be dissociated from the purchasing activity, but it 
can be discussed whether the subsequent use of the purchase can be dissociated from the 
purchasing activity at all.  
In a procurement context, it can be argued that the purchase made by contracting authorities is, 
for the most part, used for a public purpose and, consequently, the purchase cannot be classified 
as economic. However, no requirement exists under procurement rules that the purchase in 
question should be made for a public purpose. In this respect, Article 1(2) of the public 
procurement Directive explicitly states that the Directives apply whether or not the works, 
supplies or services under the contract are intended for public purposes: 
“Procurement within the meaning of this Directive is the acquisition by means of a public 
contract of works, supplies or services by one or more contracting authorities from economic 
operators chosen by those contracting authorities, whether or not the works, supplies or 
services are intended for a public purpose.”462 
In this respect, it can be argued that the legal consequence derived from Article 1(2) of the 
procurement Directive, read in conjunction with FENIN, is the following; Since no requirement 
exists in the procurement directives that the purchase should be intended for a public purpose, 
and since the nature of the activity is determined according to the subsequent use, then if no 
public purpose lies behind the purchasing activity, the activity is economic in nature. The 
consequences of this conclusion will be further analysed in chapter 8 of this Thesis. For the 
purpose of this chapter, it is sufficient to conclude that purchasing activities cannot be 
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considered economic in nature, unless the subsequent use of the purchase is considered 
economic.  
 
4.4 Conclusions  
This chapter has analysed the concept of undertaking for the purpose of State aid law and 
procurement law. The analysis has aimed at concluding whether the two concepts coincide and 
thus, whether economic operators fall under the concept of undertaking for the purpose of 
competition law. The analysis has shown that the concept of undertaking is broad, as it entails 
every entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity whether 
the way it is financed falls under the scope of the concept of undertaking.  No definition exists in 
the Treaty as to when an activity is economic in nature. For this reason, the CJEU has defined 
the concept of economic activity indirectly, which means that the concept is defined according 
to when an activity is not economic in nature. For the purpose of this Thesis, the most relevant 
non-economic activity relates to the distinction between the exercise of public powers and the 
exercise of economic activity. The former activity excludes an entity from exercising economic 
activities, and is therefore defined as an undertaking within competition law.  
Furthermore, it has been discussed whether the concept of undertaking under competition law 
coincides with the concept of undertaking for the purpose of State aid law. It has been concluded 
that the concept of an economic unit under State aid law can differ from what is applicable in 
other areas of competition law. However, the purpose of defining the concept of undertaking 
under State aid law should be seen in the wider context of avoiding circumvention of State aid 
rules. Consequently, the concept of undertaking under State aid law is not completely 
independent from the concept of competition under competition law. 
It has been held that the concept of economic operator, as defined in the public procurement 
Directive, is broad in scope, as it covers any natural or legal person; public entity or group of 
such persons and/or entities, including any temporary association of undertakings, which offers 
the execution of works, the supply of products or the provision of services on the market.  
It has been argued that the concept of economic operator builds on the concept of undertaking 
under competition law. Thus, it can be concluded that the concepts of economic operator and the 
130 
 
concept of undertaking are coincident insofar as the decisive element for both the definition of 
economic operator and undertaking is whether or not the entity in question offers the execution 
of works, the supply of products or the provision of services on the market. Consequently, 
economic operators are capable of receiving State aid, as they fulfil the constituent element 
under Article 107(1) TFEU that relates to transfer by the State or through State resources to 
undertakings.  
Finally, it has been discussed whether purchasing activities are included in the definition of 
undertaking. It has been held that purchasing activities are not considered economic in nature 
unless the subsequent use amounts to an economic activity. 
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Chapter 5 
5. Does the award of public contracts fulfil the requirements for the existence 
of Aid: An analysis of the cumulative criteria set out in Article 107(1) TFEU 
 
Having analysed the personal scope of the State aid rules and public procurement rules 
separately in chapters 3 and 4, I now turn to look at the interface between the two sets of rules in 
terms of assessing whether public contracts are able to satisfy the cumulative criteria set out in 
article 107(1) TFEU with regard to measures which distort or threaten to distort competition, 
measures which favour certain undertakings or the production of certain goods and measures 
which affect trade between Member States. 
In chapter 3, it was concluded that the concepts of ‘contracting authority’ under the procurement 
rules coincide with the concept of ‘State’ under the State aid rules. Accordingly, the contracting 
authority is, in theory, capable of fulfilling the requirement in article 107(1) TFEU of aid being 
transferred by the State or through State resources. Furthermore, chapter 4 concluded that the 
concept of ‘economic operator’ under the procurement rules coincide with the concept of 
‘undertaking’ under the State aid rules. Consequently, economic operators are capable of 
receiving State aid as they fulfil the constituent element under Article 107(1) TFEU that relates 
to ‘transfer by the State or through State resources to undertakings’. This means that the 
requirement in article 107(1) TFEU that the recipient of the aid is an ‘undertaking’ is also 
fulfilled.  
Chapters 3 and 4 thereby partly contribute to answering the research question in the Thesis by 
concluding that contracting authorities fall under the personal scope of the State aid rules and 
thereby, a priori, are capable of granting aid to tenderers when they award public contracts.  
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This chapter will now analyse the constituent elements of article 107(1) TFEU that relate to the 
requirement of measures which ‘distort or threaten to distort competition’ (part 5.1); measures 
that ‘favour certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’ (part 5.2) and finally, 
measures that ‘affect trade between Member States’ (part 5.3). The three parts are outlined as 
follows:  
Part 5.1 discusses measures which ‘distort or threaten to distort competition’ relating to the 
award of public contracts. The analysis in this part partially draws on the conclusions made in 
chapter 2 where it was argued that competition is a common denominator for the procurement 
rules and the State aid rules, although the means to achieving competition are different under the 
two sets of rules. Hence, part 5.1 analyses how the award of public contracts distorts or threatens 
to distort competition for each of the award situations identified in chapter 1.
463
 
Part 5.2 analyses measures that favour certain undertakings or the production of certain goods. 
This part will first account for the concept of selectivity under State aid law in general and then 
discuss what the relevant test for assessment of selectivity is in a procurement context. In this 
respect, it will be discussed whether the award of public contracts is selective a priori, or if this 
assessment should rather be made on a case-by-case basis. It is argued that a functional 
approach should be taken in this respect which means that the assessment of selectivity in a 
procurement context should be made individually rather than as a theoretical assumption. 
Finally, part 5.2 discusses the concept of selectivity relating to the three award situations 
identified in chapter 1.
464
 This approach is chosen because the assessment of selectivity is 
different for each of the identified award situations and this arguably affects the conclusion with 
regard to whether selectivity is present.  
Part 5.3 analyses measures that affect trade between Member States. This section starts by 
accounting for the requirement of effect on trade under Article 107(1) TFEU and then moves on 
to discuss how the requirement of effect on trade relates to procurement law.  
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5.1 Measures which distort or threaten to distort competition  
Measures which are transferred from the State or through State resources are only prohibited if 
they distort or threaten to distort competition. This part analyses the constituent element of 
article 107(1) TFEU relating to measures which distort or threaten to distort competition. 
In chapter 2, it was concluded that competition is a mutual aim of the procurement rules and the 
State aid rules.
465
 The following section builds on the conclusions in chapter 2 by discussing 
how the different ways of achieving competition under the two sets of rules support the 
obligation under Article 107(1) TFEU in prohibiting measures which distort or threaten to 
distort competition.  
 
5.1.1 General remarks on distortion of competition  
Both measures which distort competition and measures which threaten to distort competition are 
covered by Article 107(1) TFEU. Accordingly, the wording of Article 107(1) TFEU implies a 
broad scope of application of measures that either distort or simply threaten to distort 
competition. The cases analysed below are illustrative to this point. 
In Philip Morris,
466
 the CJEU emphasised that distortion of competition can be said to occur 
where the measure is liable to improve the competitive position of the recipient undertaking 
compared to other undertakings with which it competes:
467,468
 
“When state financial aid strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other 
undertakings competing in intra-community [Union] trade the latter must be regarded as 
affected by that aid. […] On the other hand the aid is said to have reduced the cost of converting 
the production facilities and has thereby given the applicant a competitive advantage over 
manufacturers who have completed or intend to complete at their own expense a similar 
increase in the production capacity of their plant. 
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These circumstances, which have been mentioned in the recitals in the preamble to the disputed 
decision and which the applicant has not challenged, justify the commission' s deciding that the 
proposed aid would be likely to affect trade between member states and would threaten to 
distort competition between undertakings established in different member states.”469 
The requirement of distortion of competition has been examined by the CJEU on many 
occasions.
470
 The case of Germany v Commission
471
 is illustrative to the point that the actual 
effects of a measure do not have to be proven. Thus, as will be elaborated below, CJEU 
confirmed in this case that the Commission is not required to demonstrate the actual impact of 
the aid on competition.  
In this case, the CJEU had to consider whether a tax advantage was at risk of distorting 
competition in so far as the measure had the effect of reducing the costs of certain charges for 
the undertakings in question.
472
 The case before the CJEU was an application for annulment of a 
Commission Decision
473
. The measure at issue was a special tax concession introduced by 
Germany which, according to the Commission, was intended to “strengthen the market in 
holdings in companies in the new German Länder and West Berlin, and thus to increase their 
equity capital”.474  
Regarding the distortive element of the measure, the Commission held in its Decision that “the 
scheme threatens to distort competition, since it favours undertakings with their registered 
office and central administration in the relevant region as compared with those in the rest of 
Germany and in other Member States.”475 Germany contested this finding by stating that the 
Commission had merely stated that an effect of distorting competition was possible without 
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setting out any precise evidence in support of that view
476
, and therefore asked the CJEU to 
consider whether the measure in question was liable of distorting competition.
477
  
The CJEU replied by taking the view that measures which are intended to release an undertaking 
from costs which it would normally have had to bear in its day-to-day management or normal 
activities
478
  distort the conditions of competition.
479
 Furthermore, the CJEU held that:
480
  
“The Commission therefore rightly considered that the aid provided for by the 
measure at issue threatened to distort competition.”481 
 
Hence, according to the CJEU, the distortive effects of a measure must therefore be assessed 
with regard to whether the measure has the effect of reducing the costs of certain charges for the 
undertakings in question in the relevant Member State.  
According to the above, the condition that a measure must distort or threaten to distort 
competition is thus normally met with ease since the actual effects of a measure do not have to 
be proven.
482
 In this respect, it is sufficient that the measure is likely to have an effect on 
competition.  
 
5.1.2 Award of public contracts as a possible distortive measure of competition 
In chapter 2, it was argued that ‘competition’ is a common concept for the State aid rules and the 
procurement rules. In this respect, it was concluded that the aims of achieving and protecting 
competition are not mutually exclusive under the two sets of rules.
483
 Building on the conclusion 
in chapter 2, this section will analyse how the award of public contracts can be seen as a 
distortive measure of competition under State aid law. 
It could be argued that the assessment of whether competition has been distorted when public 
contracts are awarded is two-fold: Firstly, the contracting authority is obliged to make sure that 
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competition for the contract is not artificially narrowed, e.g. due to lack of compliance with the 
general principles of the Treaty.
484
 Secondly, the contracting authority is also obliged to ensure 
that no competitive advantage is conferred on the economic operator. The concept of advantage 
will be analysed further in chapter 6 of this Thesis. For now, it is sufficient to emphasise that 
this dual obligation rests on the contracting authority to make sure that competition is not 
distorted when public contracts are awarded.  
 
5.1.3 Preliminary findings 
A measure which distorts or threatens to distort competition is prohibited under Article 107(1) 
TFEU. It has been argued that the requirement of distortion of competition under State aid law is 
easily met, and thus measures which are likely to distort competition fall under the scope of 
Article 107(1) TFEU. Furthermore, no obligations exist to prove the actual effects on 
competition of the measure. 
Furthermore, it has been argued that the obligation for the contracting authority to ensure that 
competition is not distorted is twofold. Firstly, the requirement embedded in the public 
procurement Directives to ensure that competition is not artificially narrowed should be 
followed by the contracting authorities when they award public contracts. Secondly, there is an 
obligation for the contracting authority to make sure that no competitive advantage is conferred 
on the recipient when public contracts are awarded. The concept of advantage will be analysed 
in more detail in chapter 6 of this Thesis.  
5.2 Measures which favour certain undertakings or the production of certain goods 
– the selective nature of a tender 
The selectivity criterion under Article 107(1) TFEU relates to measures that favour certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods. Measures which are general – that is to say they 
do not support any specific industry or group of undertakings – will therefore not be caught by 
article 107(1) TFEU. The driving argument behind this framework is that if a measure is 
general, no individual aid is granted, and hence it is not only available to certain undertakings.  
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For the purpose of the research question asked in this Thesis, it is relevant to discuss when and 
how the award of public contracts favours certain tenderers. Arguably, the prohibition against 
selectivity under State aid law is reflected in the obligation to ensure equal treatment and to 
avoid discrimination under procurement law. Thus, as will be elaborated below, measures which 
have the effect of benefitting only certain tenderers could be argued to be selective if they 
breach the obligations flowing from the general principles of the Treaty in the form of equal 
treatment and non-discrimination.  
 
Before turning to this discussion, some general remarks will be made regarding the concept of 
selectivity under State aid law.  
 
5.2.1 General remarks on the concept of selectivity  
No specific definition of ‘general measures’ exists in the case law from the CJEU. However, in 
Adria Wien Pipeline
485
 the CJEU qualified a general measure as:
486
  
 
“a State measure which benefits all undertakings in national territory, without distinction.”  
 
The statement from the CJEU in Adria Wien Pipeline should be understood to mean that if a 
measure can benefit the entire economy, it does not create a selective benefit, and thus the 
measure will not fulfil the cumulative criteria in article 107(1) TFEU.  
 
However, the GC has pointed out that the fact that a measure is not aimed at specific recipients 
in advance and is formulated in general and objective terms does not preclude the measure from 
being regarded as a selective measure:
487
 
 
“[…]The fact that the aid is not aimed at one or more specific recipients defined in advance, 
but that it is subject to a series of objective criteria pursuant to which it may be granted, within 
the framework of a predetermined overall budget allocation, to an indefinite number of 
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beneficiaries who are not initially individually identified, cannot suffice to call in question the 
selective nature of the measure and, accordingly, its classification as State aid within the 
meaning of Article 92(1) [now 107(1)] of the Treaty. At the very most, that circumstance means 
that the measure in question is not an individual aid. It does not, however, preclude that public 
measure from having to be regarded as a system of aid constituting a selective, and therefore 
specific, measure if, owing to the criteria governing its application, it procures an advantage 
for certain undertakings or the production of certain goods, to the exclusion of others.”488 
  
Accordingly, the selectivity assessment seems broad in scope as it even entails situations which 
do not distinguish between undertakings and which are directed at an indefinite number of 
beneficiaries. 
 
In this respect, the CJEU has consistently held that the selectivity of a measure should be 
assessed on the basis of the actual effects caused by the measure as opposed to the intentions 
behind the measure.
489
 Hence, the CJEU seems to apply an ‘effects-based’ formula, which was 
spelled out for the first time in Italy v Commission where the CJEU held that:
490
 
 
“the aim of article 92 [now 107] is to prevent trade between member states from 
being affected by benefits granted by the public authorities which, in various forms, 
distort or threaten to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods.  
Accordingly, article 92 [now 107] does not distinguish between the measures of 
state intervention concerned by reference to their causes or aims but defines them 
in relation to their effects.  
Consequently, the alleged fiscal nature or social aim of the measure in issue cannot 
suffice to shield it from the application of article 92[now 107].”491  
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The effects-based formula thus requires a measure to be assessed according to the effects it 
causes. In a procurement perspective, this could be argued to imply that all measures imposed 
by the contracting authorities are likely to fall under the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU. 
5.2.2 The (non)selective nature of a tender 
Having established the material content of measures favouring certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods under article 107(1) TFEU, I now turn to discuss whether the award 
of a public contract can be said to fulfil the requirements of the selectivity criterion under the 
State aid rules. Before turning to the possible presence of selectivity under the three award 
situations, it is first necessary to discuss whether selectivity can be excluded a priori when 
contracting authorities award public contracts.   
This section will first account for two arguments that both support the finding that a tender 
procedure will, by definition, never fulfil the requirements for selectivity. Then, the two 
arguments are discussed, and arguments are put forward that reject the finding that a tender 
procedure, by definition, never fulfils the requirements of selectivity.  
So far, no case law exists which concludes whether a procurement procedure is selective a 
priori. However, the selective nature of a tender procedure has been discussed in academic 
literature with differing arguments and conclusions.
492
 Disagreement seems to exist as to 
whether the award of public contracts is selective by nature.  
Graells
493
 argues that:
 494
 
“the award of public contracts is necessarily selective, as it only favours a given tenderer or 
grouping of tenderers at one time.” 
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The reasoning behind such a statement seems to be that the award of the contract itself should be 
based on the assessment of selectivity, as opposed to on measures relating to the tender 
procedure prior to the award. 
Insofar as this argument is accepted, two possible situations arise. The first possible outcome is 
that the cumulative criterion entailed in article 107(1) TFEU that a measure must favour certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods will always be fulfilled when contracting 
authorities award public contracts. This situation would imply that the selective nature of an 
award of a public contract is presumed, and hence the test of selectivity would never be 
conducted. The second possible outcome finds support in this reasoning; the award of a contract 
to one specific undertaking (the winning tenderer) will implicitly favour certain undertakings or 
the production of certain goods, but these situations will always be justified because of the fact 
that selectivity is inherent in the nature of the system (the award of a contract will always result 
in a selective measure). This line of reasoning would follow the ‘logic of the system’ test495 as 
applied by the CJEU in Sloman Neptun
496
 and Ladbroke v Commission
497
.
498
  
In Sloman Neptun, the CJEU had to consider whether (lower) working conditions and rates of 
pay that were applicable to certain Member States constituted State aid within the meaning of 
Article 107(1) TFEU. The case concerned a reference for a preliminary ruling in a dispute 
between a German shipping company (Sloman Neptun) and the Seafarers Committee 
(Seebetriebsrat)
499
 concerning working conditions and rates of pay for workers not covered by 
national German law on shipping. According to German law, foreign shipping companies were 
allowed to employ workers on less favourable terms than the ones applying to German residents, 
concerning pay and social protection, if the workers in question where not members of the 
German shipping register.
500
 According to German law, (the Law on the introduction of an 
additional shipping register for ships flying the federal German flag in international trade (ISR)), 
ship owners who registered their vessels in the ISR were relieved of certain financial burdens for 
                                                          
495
 This term is used by L. Hancher, ‘The general framework’ in L. Hancher, T. Ottervanger and P.J. Slot (eds.), EU 
State Aids (Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 84. 
496
 Firma Sloman Neptun Schiffahrts AG v Seebetriebsrat Bodo Ziesemer der Sloman Neptun Schiffahrts AG, joined 
cases C-72/91 and C-73/91, EU:C:1993:97. 
497
 Tiercé Ladbroke SA v Commission of the European Communities, C-353/95 P, EU:C:1997:596. 
498
 For a critique of the ‘logic of the system’ test, see J. Winter, ‘Re(de)fining the notion of state aid in article 87(1) 
of the EC Treaty’, C.M.L.R Rev., (2004), 42 (2), 475-504, 482.  
499
 Sloman Neptun, joined cases C-72/91 and C-73/91, para 2. 
500
 Ibid., paras 3-4 and 7. 
141 
 
workers whose contracts of employment were not governed by German law.
501
 The national 
court in Germany argued that the less favourable rates of pay and social protection constituted 
State aid in so far as it permitted partial non-application of German employment law and social 
security law.
502
  
The CJEU held that the social security contributions and tax revenues, determined on the basis 
of the lower working conditions and rates of pay, did not constitute State aid because such 
measures were inherent in the system, and were thus not a means of granting a particular 
advantage to the undertakings concerned:
503
  
“The system at issue does not seek, through its object and general structure, to create an 
advantage which would constitute an additional burden for the State or the abovementioned 
bodies, but only to alter in favour of shipping undertakings the framework within which 
contractual relations are formed between those undertakings and their employees. The 
consequences arising from this, in so far as they relate to the difference in the basis for the 
calculation of social security contributions, mentioned by the national court, and to the potential 
loss of tax revenue because of the low rates of pay, referred to by the Commission, are inherent 
in the system and are not a means of granting a particular advantage to the undertakings 
concerned”504 
Thus, according to the CJEU, the measure in question could be exempted from the scope of 
Article 107(1) TFEU since the consequences arising from the measure were inherent in the 
system and therefore did not grant an advantage to a particular undertaking.  
In Ladbroke v Commission,
505
 the CJEU had to consider an appeal from a Belgian book-maker 
firm (Ladbroke) against a judgment from the GC
506
 concluding that an agreement between a 
French and a Belgian non-profit organisation did not constitute State aid. The case concerned an 
agreement made by a French and a Belgian non-profit organisation (The French and the Belgian 
PMU) under which the French PMU on behalf of the Belgian PMU was authorised to take bets 
in France on Belgian horse-races.
507
 The applicant (Ladbroke) argued that the agreement 
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entailed the provision by France of unlawful State aid to the Belgian PMU in so far as the 
amount of the levy retained for bets on French races was lower than the levy retained for 
Belgian races, and thus it favoured the Belgian PMU over the French PMU.
508
 
The CJEU assessed the nature of bets on Belgian races and what differentiates them from bets 
on French races
509
 and concluded that since the measure accords with the general system of 
Belgian races, it did not therefore constitute a measure which derogates from the scheme of the 
general system but “on the contrary accords with that general system”.510  
‘The logic of the system’ test as applied by the CJEU in Sloman Neptun and Ladbroke v 
Commission seems to imply that the benchmark for assessing whether a measure constitutes aid 
is the system in place where the measure applies. If the CJEU finds that the measure in question 
derogates from the system in place, it is possible that the measure constitutes aid in the meaning 
of article 107(1) TFEU, but if, on the contrary, the measure accords with the general system it 
can be justified on reasons of ‘the logic of the system’.  
If the framework of ‘the logic of the system’ test is transferred to the award of public contracts, 
it could thus be argued that the award of public contracts will always be justified and thus never 
meet the requirements of selectivity.  
The two outcomes as discussed above rely on the same assumption, namely that the award of a 
public contract is selective a priori. In the latter situation, however, the selective nature of the 
award will always be justified because of the nature of the system. This finding is opposite what 
Graells argues as his argumentation seems to imply that the award of public contracts will 
necessarily be selective.  
The opposite conclusion to Graells is reached by Baistrocchi
511
 who submits that the 
requirement of selectivity will never be fulfilled as the public procurement rules will always 
ensure that no specific undertaking is favoured. Baistrocchi submits that if the contracting 
authorities follow the procedures set out in the public procurement Directives, the requirement 
of selectivity will not be fulfilled as the requirement of transparency under the public 
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procurement regime renders it difficult for the contracting authorities to favour a specific 
undertaking.
512
 Baistrocchi argues that the transparency requirement entailed in the procurement 
Directives reduces the risk of selectivity as transparent procedures will make it difficult for the 
public authority to favour certain parties (tenderers).
513
   
From the discussion above, two criteria can be deduced. Firstly, by applying the ‘the logic of the 
system’ criterion, the prima facie selective nature of the award of public contracts is justified on 
the grounds that it is inherent in the system that the winning tenderer will always be favoured by 
winning the contract. Then, according to the ‘requirement of transparency’ criterion, the public 
procurement framework will always entail that selectivity does not occur as the requirement of 
transparency under the procurement Directives renders it difficult for the contracting authority 
to favour a certain undertaking.   
The ‘the logic of the system’ criterion and the ‘requirement of transparency’ criterion each apply 
their own different logic, but eventually reach the same conclusion, namely that the award of a 
public contract does not fulfil the requirement of selectivity a priori. The arguments put forward 
by Graells imply the opposite, namely that the award of public contracts is necessarily selective.  
In conclusion to the above, one common denominator can be deduced from the two arguments 
put forward, namely that the selective nature of the award of public contracts (whether the 
outcome) can be decided by definition, as opposed to on a case-by-case assessment.  
However, this line of reasoning would seem to contradict the effects-based approach as 
discussed above, in which the actual effect of a measure should be assessed, as opposed to the 
intentions behind the measure. I therefore submit that the arguments put forward above are 
insufficient for concluding whether an award procedure is selective. I support this view on the 
basis of the following arguments.  
Firstly, as discussed above, the CJEU has consistently held that a measure should be assessed on 
the basis of the actual effects rather that the intentions behind the measure. This finding from the 
CJEU contradicts the arguments above that the selectivity of a measure can be assessed by 
definition or that the general procurement framework will always ensure that no undertaking or 
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production of certain goods is favoured. Secondly, as submitted above, the effects-based 
criterion is wide in scope and applies in spite of generally objective reasons. Hence, I do not find 
support in the case law from the CJEU, as discussed above, to support the argumentation that 
the selective nature of award of public contracts can be defined a priori. 
Finally, the argumentation that the award of a public contract by definition does not meet the 
requirements of selectivity seems to contradict previous case law from the CJEU, in which the 
selectivity criteria is generally easily met.
514
 
In conclusion, I submit that the assessment of whether the award of a public contract can be 
deemed to be selective must be based on a case-by-case evaluation, and furthermore, that the 
selective nature of the award of a contract must be assessed at all phases of the procurement 
process, as opposed to only at the outcome when a contract has been awarded, and is hence 
selective. Although the requirements of selectivity could be said to be easily met, it would be 
insufficient to conclude by definition whether the award of a public contract is selective. On this 
note, it is therefore necessary to assess the selective nature of the award of public contracts in 
relation to the chosen procedure. For this reason, the following section will analyse how and 
when the award of public contracts can be deemed to be selective when public contracts are 
awarded under the public procurement Directive, the concession Directive and in relation to the 
direct (legal and illegal) award of contracts.  
5.2.2.1 Non-selectivity as an expression of equal treatment  
As held above, it is unsettled in case law how the concept of selectivity applies to procurement 
measures. Furthermore, avoiding the granting of State aid is not an aim of the procurement 
Directive, and thus no specific procedural safeguards have been put in place which specifically 
aim at making sure that the selectivity requirement under State aid law is met. The prohibition in 
article 107(1) TFEU against favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods is 
thus not repeated directly in the procurement Directives.  
However, the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination could be argued to resemble 
the selectivity criterion under State aid law in several ways.  
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Firstly, the principle of non-discrimination under the procurement rules aims at preventing 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality. Article 18 of the public procurement Directive 
states in relation to the principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment: 
“Contracting authorities shall treat economic operators equally and without discrimination and 
shall act in a transparent and proportionate manner. 
The design of the procurement shall not be made with the intention of excluding it from the scope 
of this Directive or of artificially narrowing competition. Competition shall be considered to be 
artificially narrowed where the design of the procurement is made with the intention of unduly 
favouring or disadvantaging certain economic operators.”   
In this respect, it could be argued that the requirement of equal treatment resembles the 
prohibition of selectivity in so far as both concepts aim at preventing that specific entities 
(undertakings or economic operators) are favoured.  
In Arge,
515
 the CJEU considered the interplay between State aid rules and procurement rules. 
The case does not concern the question of whether State aid was granted by the contracting 
authority to the tenderer. Rather, the CJEU had to consider whether the fact that one of the 
tenderers had received State aid conferred an advantage to the subsidised tenderer over the rest 
of the participants in the competition for award of the contract.
516
 As will be elaborated below, 
the case serves to show that the concept of selectivity is connected to the principle of equal 
treatment, and thereby that an obligation (or at least an opportunity) exists for the contracting 
authority to avoid conferring selective measures when public contracts are awarded.  
The case was a request for a preliminary ruling referred by the federal procurement office in 
Austria (Bundesvergabeamt) in a case between an association of undertakings and civil 
engineers (ARGE Gewässerschutz, hereafter ARGE) and the Federal Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry (Bundesministerium für Land- und Forstwirtschaft).
517
 The fact that subsidised 
bodies took part in a tender procedure alongside strictly private tenderers gave rise to a case 
before a national Austrian court, which referred several questions for a preliminary ruling. 
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Among others, the CJEU was asked to clarify whether undertakings receiving State aid were 
allowed to participate in a tender procedure in competition with unsubsidised tenderers.
518
 
In its reply, the CJEU emphasised that the principle of equal treatment does not preclude 
contracting authorities from allowing subsidised tenderers to participate in a tender procedure, 
and furthermore that the procurement Directives do not entail an explicit requirement to exclude 
subsidised tenderers from participating in the tender procedure:
519
 
“[…] the mere fact that contracting authorities allow bodies which receive subsidies enabling 
them to submit tenders at prices appreciably lower than those of the other, unsubsidised, 
tenderers, to take part in a procedure for the award of a public procurement contract does not 
amount to a breach of the principle of equal treatment. 
If the Community legislature had intended to require contracting authorities to exclude such 
tenderers, it would have stated this explicitly.”520 
However, the CJEU did not completely reject the possibility of excluding subsidised tenderers 
from tender procedures:
521
 
“[…] a tenderer may be excluded from a selection procedure where the contracting authority 
considers that it has received aid incompatible with the Treaty and that the obligation to repay 
illegal aid would threaten its financial well-being, so that that tenderer may be regarded as 
unable to offer the necessary financial or economic security.”522 
Accordingly, the contracting authority can choose to exclude a tenderer from the procedure (“a 
tenderer may be excluded”) if the tenderer has received incompatible State aid.523  
In chapter 2, it was concluded that the aim of the procurement Directives is to ensure equal 
access to public contracts. Furthermore, it was argued that the aim of the State aid rules was to 
avoid giving preference to some undertakings over others in comparable situations. In this 
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respect, it could be argued that the CJEU observes the principle of equal treatment as well as the 
concept of selectivity by allowing contracting authorities to exclude subsidised tenderers from 
tender procedures if the tenderer has received incompatible aid. The chosen wording by the 
CJEU in the citation above must be assumed to mean that incompatible aid (which includes 
selective aid) can justify that a tenderer is excluded from the tender.  
The connection between the principle of equal treatment and selectivity was also emphasised by 
the AG in his opinion in Arge:
524
  
“The questions raised by the invitation to tender at issue concern the principle of equality in two 
ways.  
It is necessary to establish whether the fact that subsidised bodies were allowed to submit 
tenders is likely to infringe the principle of non-discrimination on the ground of nationality or, 
at the very least, to create an obstacle to the freedom to provide services, since all the bodies 
concerned are Austrian.  
Even assuming that no restriction on trade can be identified, it is important to determine 
whether the advantage over the other tenderers which these bodies are able to enjoy as a result 
of the public funding they are accorded is compatible with the aim of securing effective 
competition pursued by Directive 92/50/EEC. (1) 
The first three questions for a preliminary ruling relate, as I have said, to the principle of 
equality, in terms of both discrimination on grounds of nationality (the second and third 
questions) and discrimination between tenderers in receipt of subsidies and the other tenderers 
(the first question).”525 
 
According to AG Léger, the principle of non-discrimination and equality are thus connected 
with the concept of advantage in the present case.  
Arguably, the case of Arge thus established a link between the principle of equal treatment and 
the concept of selectivity by allowing contracting authorities to exclude tenderers which have 
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received incompatible State aid. The reason for this should most likely be found in the fact that 
allowing the exclusion of lawful aid would infringe the principle of equal treatment. As 
emphasised by AG Léger: 
“If Community law accepts that some State aid is lawful, then, in my view, operators in receipt 
of that aid must have the right to carry on their activity in the same way as other operators. 
What point would there be in according undertakings aid lawfully if, at the same time, they were 
barred from engaging in normal economic activity or even merely from certain contracts on the 
pretext that the latter were regulated. Moreover, that interpretation would hardly be compatible 
with the concept of compensation which justifies some kinds of aid, because aid in the form of 
subsidy or logistical assistance would soon be eliminated as a result of the restrictions on an 
undertaking's activity.  
The fact that State aid may be legal therefore implies that economic entities in receipt of 
lawful aid cannot be precluded from participating fully in the market. As the market is not 
restricted to unregulated contractual relations but also includes public contracts, there is no 
reason why such operators should be excluded from public contract award procedures.”526 
According to the above, even though no express obligation exists in the procurement Directives 
to exclude subsidised tenderers, this opportunity exists where the tenderer has received 
incompatible aid. In this respect, the chosen wording of the CJEU has to be emphasised. As 
elaborated above, a tenderer may be excluded from the selection procedure when the tenderer 
has received incompatible aid. Consequently, there is no express obligation for the contracting 
authority to exclude subsidised tenderers, but the possibility does exist.  
The above applies to situations that relate to award under the public procurement Directive. 
However, award of public contracts by the concession Directive is covered as well. As stated in 
chapter 2 of the Thesis, Article 3 of the concession Directive contains a similar obligation of 
ensuring equal treatment as the one flowing from the public procurement Directive.
527
 For this 
reason, the concession Directive arguably contains a similar link between the concept of 
selectivity and the principle of equal treatment as the one described above.   
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 See chapter 2, section 2.1.2.1. 
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5.2.3.3 Selectivity in relation to direct award of public contracts 
Having established that the concept of selectivity is linked to the obligations flowing from the 
general principles in the Treaty, including the principles of equal treatment and non-
discrimination, the following will discuss how the (legal and illegal) direct award of public 
contracts might meet the concept of selectivity. 
Legal direct award of public contracts is possible under certain circumstances. One possible way 
of direct award is accounted for in Article 32 in the public procurement Directive. According to 
Article 32(1), contracting authorities may award public contracts by a negotiated procedure 
without prior publication in specific circumstances: 
The negotiated procedure without prior publication may be used for public works contracts, 
public supply contracts and public service contracts in any of the following cases: 
(a) where no tenders or no suitable tenders or no requests to participate or no suitable requests 
to participate have been submitted in response to an open procedure or a restricted procedure, 
provided that the initial conditions of the contract are not substantially altered and that a report 
is sent to the Commission where it so requests. 
A tender shall be considered not to be suitable where it is irrelevant to the contract, being 
manifestly incapable, without substantial changes, of meeting the contracting authority’s needs 
and requirements as specified in the procurement documents. A request for participation shall be 
considered not to be suitable where the economic operator concerned is to be or may be 
excluded pursuant to Article 57 or does not meet the selection criteria set out by the contracting 
authority pursuant to Article 58; 
(b) where the works, supplies or services can be supplied only by a particular economic operator 
for any of the following reasons: 
(i) the aim of the procurement is the creation or acquisition of a unique work of art or artistic 
performance; 
(ii) competition is absent for technical reasons; 
(iii) the protection of exclusive rights, including intellectual property rights; 
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The exceptions set out in points (ii) and (iii) shall only apply when no reasonable alternative or 
substitute exists and the absence of competition is not the result of an artificial narrowing down 
of the parameters of the procurement; 
(c) in so far as is strictly necessary where, for reasons of extreme urgency brought about by 
events unforeseeable by the contracting authority, the time limits for the open or restricted 
procedures or competitive procedures with negotiation cannot be complied with. The 
circumstances invoked to justify extreme urgency shall not in any event be attributable to the 
contracting authority. 
Accordingly, the public procurement Directive allows for the direct award of contracts when it 
is probable that competition for the contract is absent, e.g. because no tenderers have requested 
to participate in the competition for award or where the works, supplies or services can be 
supplied only by a particular economic operator. In such situations, it could be argued that if the 
contracting authority is able to substantiate the decision of awarding the contract directly cf. the 
mentioned situations in Article 32, no selectivity occurs because the competition for the contract 
is not defined in a way that favours certain economic operators.  
However, award of public contracts cf. Article 32 may be assumed to occur only in specific 
situations. Hence, Article 32 should be interpreted strictly.
528
 
The possibility of direct award also exists for concession contracts. Cf. Article 31(1) of the 
concession Directive, the point of departure is that contracting authorities are obliged to 
announce their intention to award a concession: 
“Contracting authorities and contracting entities wishing to award a concession shall make 
known their intention by means of a concession notice.”  
 
However, derogations from the above are set out in Article 31(4) and (5):  
“4. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, contracting authorities or contracting entities shall 
not be required to publish a concession notice where the works or services can be supplied only 
by a particular economic operator for any of the following reasons:  
                                                          
528
 On the same note, see P. Nicolaides and S. Schoenmaekers, ‘The Concept of ‘Advantage’ in State Aid and 
Public Procurement and the Application of Public Procurement Rules to Minimise Advantage in the New GBER’, 
(2015), 14 (1), EStAL, 143-156, 146. 
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(a) the aim of the concession is the creation or acquisition of a unique work of art or artistic 
performance;  
(b) the absence of competition for technical reasons;  
(c) the existence of an exclusive right;  
(d) the protection of intellectual property rights and exclusive rights other than those defined in 
point (10) of Article 5.  
The exceptions set out in points (b), (c) and (d) of the first subparagraph only apply when no 
reasonable alternative or substitute exists and the absence of competition is not the result of an 
artificial narrowing down of the parameters of the concession award.  
5. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the contracting authority or contracting entity shall 
not be required to publish a new concession notice where no applications, no tenders, no 
suitable tenders or no suitable applications have been submitted in response to a prior 
concession procedure, provided that the initial conditions of the concession contract are not 
substantially altered and that a report is sent to the Commission, where it so requests;  
For the purposes of the first subparagraph, a tender shall be considered not to be suitable where 
it is irrelevant to the concession, being manifestly incapable, without substantial changes, of 
meeting the contracting authority or contracting entity’s needs and requirements as specified in 
the concession documents.  
For the purposes of the first subparagraph, an application shall be considered not to be suitable:  
(a) where the applicant concerned shall or may be excluded pursuant to Article 38(5) to (9) or 
does not meet the selection criteria set out by the contracting authority or the contracting entity 
pursuant to Article 38(1);  
(b) where applications include tenders which are not suitable within the meaning of the second 
subparagraph.” 
Accordingly, as is the case under the public procurement Directive, the concession Directive 
allows for direct award of contracts when it is probable that competition for the contract is 
absent or if the concession can only be supplied by one particular economic operator.  
The specific possibilities to award public contracts directly may not fulfil the selectivity 
requirement under Article 107(1) TFEU and especially not in cases where the procurement 
Directives provide an express derogation from the requirement of conducting a tender 
procedure. Furthermore, if the general principles flowing from the Treaty, including the 
principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination, are adhered to, it is likely that no selectivity 
occurs when the contract is awarded. 
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The above might not apply for situations concerning illegal direct award. In such situations, it 
might be argued that the general principles in the Treaty are not adhered to and consequently, 
the possibility of selectivity is likely to occur. In this respect, the CJEU has confirmed that 
illegal direct award of a contract is the most serious breach of EU law in the field of public 
procurement on the part of a contracting authority:
529
  
“[…] Such an option could lead to the most serious breach of Community [Union] law in the 
field of public procurement on the part of a contracting authority […] and would interfere with 
the objectives pursued by Directive 92/50 [now 2014/24], namely the objectives of free 
movement of services and open and undistorted competition in this field in all the Member 
States.” 
In this respect, where no tender procedure has been conducted, and if the direct award cannot be 
substantiated by way of derogation, there is a presumption that distortion of competition is a 
risk.
530
  
  
5.2.3 Preliminary findings 
This section has analysed the constituent element of Article 107(1) TFEU that relates to 
measures which favour certain undertakings or the production of certain goods.  
As has been accounted for, general measures that benefit the entire economy are not selective 
and will not be caught by Article 107(1) TFEU. When assessing whether a measure is selective 
in nature, an effects-based formula is applied. This means that the effects of the measure are 
decisive, rather than the causes or aims of the measure.  
Furthermore, it was discussed how the requirement of selectivity applies to procurement 
situations. It is unsettled in the case law from the CJEU how the concept of selectivity applies to 
procurement measures; however, it was argued that the requirement of selectivity cannot be 
determined a priori, and thus the assessment of whether the award of public contracts are 
selective must be determined on a case-by-case basis.  
                                                          
529
 Stadt Halle and RPL Recyclingpark Lochau GmbH v Arbeitsgemeinschaft Thermische Restabfall- und 
Energieverwertungsanlage TREA Leuna, C-26/03, para 37.  
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 On the same note, see P. Nicolaides and S. Schoenmaekers, ‘The Concept of ‘Advantage’ in State Aid and 
Public Procurement and the Application of Public Procurement Rules to Minimise Advantage in the New GBER’, 
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Finally, this section has analysed the requirement of selectivity in relation to the three award 
situations identified in chapter 1 of this Thesis.
531
 In this respect, it was argued that the 
principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination as embedded in the procurement rules 
resemble the concept of selectivity under State aid law. In relation to direct legal award of 
contracts it was concluded that in so far as the general principles of the Treaty are adhered to, it 
is likely that no selectivity occurs. However, it was found that the same conclusion did not apply 
to illegal direct award of contracts, especially in situations where the general principles of the 
Treaty are not adhered to.      
 
5.3 Measures which affect trade between Member States 
In order to fall within the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU, a measure must have an effect on 
competition and trade.  
The actual effect on trade is not a necessary requirement.
532
 Rather, the decisive benchmark is 
whether the aid is liable to affect trade.
533
 
This was e.g. stated in Libert and others
534
 where the CJEU held:
535
  
“[…] for the purpose of categorising a national measure as State aid, it is necessary, not to 
establish that the aid has a real effect on trade between Member States and that competition is 
actually being distorted, but only to examine whether that aid is liable to affect such trade and 
distort competition” 
The actual effects are thus not decisive. Rather, what should be taken into account is whether the 
aid strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings in the Union.
536
 
It is not required that the aid beneficiary is actually involved in cross-border trade:
537
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“[…] it is not necessary that the beneficiary undertaking itself be involved in intra-Community 
trade. Where a Member State grants aid to an undertaking, internal activity may be maintained 
or increased as a result, so that the opportunities for undertakings established in other Member 
States to penetrate the market in that Member State are thereby reduced. Furthermore, the 
strengthening of an undertaking which, until then, was not involved in intra-Community trade 
may place that undertaking in a position which enables it to penetrate the market of another 
Member State” 
Accordingly, the requirement of effect on trade seems wide in scope as it entails measures that 
are only likely to have an effect on trade. Furthermore, the aid recipient is not required to be 
involved in cross-border trade.  
However, the effect on trade cannot be merely hypothetical. Thus, it is necessary to establish 
whether the measure is liable to have an effect on trade between Member States.
538
  
When establishing an effect on trade, it is not necessary to define the market or to analyse the 
impact that the measure has on the competitive position of the beneficiary and its competitors. 
This was held by the GC in Italy v Commission:
539
   
“[…] the Commission was not obliged to show that competition was undermined ‘permanently’, 
or to carry out a more detailed investigation of the substantial impact of the measures at issue on 
the competitive position of the recipients, and even less so by viewing this in the context of their 
turnover. The case-law does not require the distortion of competition, or the threat of such 
distortion, and the effect on intra-Community trade to be significant or substantial […] 
Moreover, as already stated at paragraph 87 above, with regard to aid that has not been notified 
to the Commission, the decision declaring that aid incompatible with the common market need 
not necessarily demonstrate the real effect of that aid on competition or trade between Member 
States.  
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Furthermore, contrary to the Italian Republic’s claims, nor did the fact that certain recipient 
undertakings could operate on markets which were only of national interest impose an 
obligation on the Commission to carry out an in-depth analysis.  
[…] the Commission may confine itself to examining the general characteristics of the scheme 
without being required to examine each particular case in which it applies in order to establish 
whether the scheme involves elements of aid. The fact that, in some circumstances, it also 
benefits recipients which operate only on markets of national interest does not call into 
question that finding, which is sufficient for Article 87(1) EC [now 107(1) TFEU] to apply to 
an aid scheme”540  
 
5.3.1 A requirement of cross-border interest under public procurement law 
The question regarding whether a cross-border interest exists is an element that is included in 
the assessment of whether a measure falls under the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU. However, a 
similar requirement cannot necessarily be detected in relation to public procurement law. The 
following section will discuss how the requirement of cross-border interest is relevant in relation 
to the different award situations  
The public procurement Directive and the concession Directive set out predefined thresholds. 
Accordingly, Article 4 of the public procurement Directive and Article 8 of the concession 
Directive set out applicable thresholds for procurements above a certain value. This means that 
the question of applicability of the procurement Directives is directed by how great the value of 
the contract is. The reasons behind requiring certain thresholds for the applicability of the 
procurement rules are twofold: Firstly, the administrative costs in connection with conducting a 
tender procedure should be outweighed by the benefits of conducting the tender.
541
 Secondly, 
the thresholds in the procurement Directives are defined in order to identify contracts for which 
there will likely be competition from undertakings operating across borders.
542
  
Accordingly, the thresholds in the Directives could be argued to have the objective of ensuring 
that competition is created for the contracts.  
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On the basis of the above, the following will discuss how cross-border interest is relevant for the 
different award situations identified. 
Firstly, cross-border interest is not a relevant benchmark for the applicability of the procurement 
rules when the award of the contract is made pursuant to a tender procedure under the 
procurement Directives. However, in order to fall within the scope of the State aid rules, effect 
on trade is one of the constituent elements that must be considered. Accordingly, the assessment 
of whether the award of public contracts constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 
107(1) TFEU relies both on the relevant threshold and on the assessment of cross-border 
interest.  
Secondly, in situations where the award of the contract is made outside the procurement 
Directives as a legal direct award,
543
 e.g. because the value of the contract is below the 
thresholds, the abovementioned thresholds are not relevant either. In this case, the requirement 
of effect on trade is irrelevant for the applicability of the procurement rules,
544
 but not for the 
application of the State aid rules. Accordingly, in situations where the award of the public 
contract is made pursuant to legal direct award, the requirement of cross-border interest is 
relevant in the assessment of whether the award constitutes State aid.  
Thirdly, in situations where the award is made pursuant to illegal direct award, the thresholds of 
the procurement Directives are irrelevant as the award is made without the conduct of a tender 
procedure. In the situation of illegal direct award, it can therefore be argued that the assessment 
of effect on trade becomes relevant, as the only way to make sure that competition is secured is 
by way of an assessment of whether trade has been affected by concluding whether the award of 
contract has a cross-border interest.  
Conclusively, the assessment of whether the award of a public contract has a cross-border 
interest and thus whether the award affects trade is important when the contract is awarded 
directly either legally or illegally.  
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5.3.2 Preliminary findings 
Measures which have an effect on competition and trade fall within the scope of Article 107(1) 
TFEU. In this respect, the requirement of effect on trade and competition is wide in scope, and it 
has been argued that it is easily met. When establishing whether a measure has an effect on 
trade, it is sufficient to establish that the measure is likely to fulfil the requirements set out 
above.  
In a procurement context, the requirement of effect on trade is not relevant as the procurement 
Directives set out predefined thresholds to be applied when determining whether an award falls 
under the scope of the Directives. In this respect, it has been argued that the thresholds set out in 
the procurement Directives aims at creating competition, and therefore, the requirement of 
cross-border interest becomes irrelevant for public contracts awarded under the Directives. 
However, when the contract is awarded directly, either by way of legal direct award or by way 
of illegal direct award, the assessment of cross-border interest is relevant to ensure that trade and 
competition is not distorted.  
 
 
5.4 Conclusions  
This chapter has analysed the constituent elements of Article 107(1) TFEU that relate to 
measures which distort or threaten to distort competition, measures which favour certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods and measures which affect trade between 
Member States. 
In section 5.1, it was argued that the requirement of distortion of competition under State aid 
law is easily met. Thus, measures which are likely to distort competition fall under the scope of 
Article 107(1) TFEU. Furthermore, no obligations exist to prove the actual effects on 
competition of the measure. The obligations for the contracting authority to ensure that 
competition is not distorted are embedded in the public procurement Directives by way of an 
obligation for the contracting authority to ensure that competition is not artificially narrowed 
when public contracts are awarded.  
Section 5.2 analysed measures which favour certain undertakings or the production of certain 
goods. General measures that benefit the entire economy are not selective and will not be caught 
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by Article 107(1) TFEU. It was argued that the assessment of whether a measure is selective in 
nature is based on an effects-based approach. This means that the effects of the measure are 
decisive, rather than the causes or aims of the measure. Furthermore, it was discussed how the 
requirement of selectivity applies to procurement situations. It was held that it is unsettled in the 
case law from the CJEU how the concept of selectivity applies to procurement measures. 
However, arguably, the requirement of selectivity cannot be determined a priori, and thus  it 
must be determined on a case-by-case basis whether the award of public contracts is selective. 
Then, the requirement of selectivity was analysed in relation to the three award situations 
identified in chapter 1 of this Thesis. In this respect, it was argued that the principles of equal 
treatment and non-discrimination as embedded in the procurement rules resemble the concept of 
selectivity under State aid law. It was found that no selectivity occurs in relation to legal direct 
award of contracts in so far as the general principles of the Treaty are adhered to. However, it 
was found that the same conclusion did not apply for illegal direct award of contracts, especially 
in situations where the general principles of the Treaty are not adhered to.      
Finally, section 5.3 analysed measures which affect trade. It was found that the requirement of 
effect on trade and competition is wide in scope and thus easily met. Then, the requirement of 
effect on trade was analysed in a procurement context. It was assessed that the requirement of 
effect on trade is not relevant when the award of contract is made pursuant to a tender procedure 
under the procurement Directives as the Directives set out predefined thresholds to be applied 
when determining whether the award falls under the scope of the Directives. In this respect, it 
was argued that the thresholds set out in the procurement Directives aim at creating competition, 
and therefore, the requirement of cross-border interest becomes irrelevant for public contracts 
awarded under the Directives. However, when the contract is awarded directly, either by way of 
legal direct award or by way of illegal direct award, the assessment of cross-border interest is a 
relevant assessment for ensuring that trade and competition is not distorted.  
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PART II 
Award of contracts as a means to conferring State aid? 
 
In this part of the Thesis I will discuss how and when contracting authorities confer State aid 
when they award public contracts. In this respect, the concept of advantage will be analysed in 
general under the State aid rules and also, with a specific emphasis on procurement situations. 
The assessment of whether advantage has been conferred is a crucial benchmark for the 
assessment of aid. In this respect, I will discuss whether the conduct of a tender procedure is 
sufficient to rule out the presence of aid.  
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Chapter 6 
6. In search of the constituents of market price  
After analysing the constituent elements of Article 107(1) TFEU that relates to conditions which 
‘distort or threaten to distort competition’; 545 measures that ‘favour certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods’,546 and measures that ‘affect trade between Member States’547 in 
chapter 5, I now turn to the concept of advantage.  
The analyses previously made in chapters 2-5 of the Thesis all contribute to the conclusion that 
the awarding of public contracts is capable of fulfilling the requirements of Article 107(1) 
TFEU. Besides the cumulative criteria in Article 107(1) TFEU analysed in chapters 2-5, a 
measure must confer a benefit or advantage to the recipient in order to fall within the scope of 
Article 107(1) TFEU.  
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the concept of advantage under Article 107(1) TFEU. 
The prohibition against the granting of an advantage to the recipient undertaking cannot be 
derived directly from the wording of Article 107(1) TFEU. Rather, the notion of advantage is 
developed through the case law of the CJEU, which has dealt with the concept of advantage in 
numerous cases.
548
  
The case law chosen for analysis in this chapter relates to the overall research question of 
whether State aid is present when public procurement contracts are awarded. The cases analysed 
in this chapter are State aid cases and the chapter thus seeks to deduce the concept of advantage 
under State aid law. However, the cases are all related to situations that are relevant in a 
procurement context. The assessment of how advantage is conferred when public contracts are 
awarded is conducted in chapter 7.  
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6.1 The criterion of normal market conditions  
Any economic benefit which an undertaking could not have obtained under normal market 
conditions can amount to an advantage within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. In the 
assessment of whether the undertaking receives an advantage for the purpose of Article 107(1) 
TFEU, it is therefore decisive whether the State support has been received under circumstances 
corresponding to normal market conditions.
549
  
The criterion of whether a measure corresponds to normal market conditions originates from the 
principle of equal treatment between private and public undertakings which follows from Article 
345 TFEU.
550
 Article 345 TFEU reads as follows: 
“The Treaties shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of 
property ownership” 
Article 345 TFEU presupposes equality between public and private operators, and the point of 
departure is thus that it is possible for a Member State to invest in commercial operations 
without infringing Article 107(1) TFEU if the Member State in question seeks to earn a normal 
market return for the investment.
551
  
The decisive assessment of whether an economic benefit occurs is the competitive position 
between competitors in the Internal Market. This was held by the CJEU for the first time in Italy 
v Commission,
552
 where the CJEU held that:
553
 
“[…] it should be observed that, in the application of article 92 ( 1 ) [now 107(1)], the point of 
departure must necessarily be the competitive position existing within the Common Market 
[Internal Market] before the adoption of the measure in issue.” 
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Capital placed by the State is not necessarily regarded as State aid for the purpose of Article 
197(1) TFEU; In Italy v Commission (ENI-Lanerossi),
554
 the CJEU had to consider whether 
State support to an undertaking was contrary to the principle of equal treatment between public 
and private undertakings.  
This case concerned aid to undertakings in the textile and clothing sector. Prior to the case 
before the CJEU, the Commission had held in a Decision
555
 that injections of capital to an 
undertaking (in this case ENI-Lanerossi) constituted aid within Article 107(1) TFEU.
556
 The 
Italian Republic brought an action for annulment following the Decision. In 1962, the State-
owned company ENI took over Lanerossi, who had suffered losses in the years up to the 
takeover, and created the undertaking ENI-Lanerossi consisting of several subsidiaries.
557
 ENI 
continuously suffered losses after the takeover, and this led the Commission to express doubts 
as to whether aid could continue to be paid to ENI through Lanerossi “without interfering with 
the orderly function of the common market [Internal Market]”.558 The Italian Government 
argued before the CJEU that aid was not present, as ENI “must operate on the basis of its own 
resources, obtained from cash flow and from the national and foreign capital markets, without 
drawing on the capital funds allocated to it by the State”.559 The Italian Government further 
argued that the Decision from the Commission was contrary to the principle of equal treatment 
between public and private undertakings. According to the Italian Government, it was quite 
normal to find transfers of funds between companies in order to make up losses suffered by one 
of the members of the group.
560
  
This led the CJEU to state that:
 561
  
“it follows from that principle of equal treatment that capital placed by the State, directly or 
indirectly, at the disposal of an undertaking in circumstances which correspond to normal 
market conditions cannot be regarded as State aid.”  
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It follows that capital placed by the State, directly or indirectly, at the disposal of an 
undertaking, in circumstances which correspond to normal market conditions cannot be 
regarded as State aid.
562
 
The assessment of normal market conditions entails a comparison with market terms. In 
Belgium v Commission (Gasunie),
563
 the CJEU held that a tariff on gas, which was made 
available to large industrial users of gas, could be explained by market terms.  
The case concerned an application by the French Government for annulment of a Commission 
Decision
564
 stating that a preferential tariff system introduced by a Dutch gas supply company 
(Gasunie), which was controlled by the State, did not constitute State aid. The case is relevant 
for the research question asked in this Thesis, as it explains the reasons behind when a measure 
can be explained by market terms. 
The measure in question was a new tariff (tariff F), introduced by Gasunie to certain 
undertakings, corresponding to the tariff available to large industrial customers less a variable 
rebate. The tariff was made available to very large industrial users provided that they met certain 
requirements such as the quantity of gas consumed.
565
 Prior to the application for annulment in 
the present case, the Commission had on two occasions
566
 found that the measure in question 
did not constitute State aid. The first Decision by the Commission was appealed by several 
French nitrate fertilizer producers (Compagnie française de l' azote (Cofaz) SA, Société CdF 
Chimie azote et fertilisants SA and Société chimique de la Grande Paroisse SA (Cofaz et al.)) in 
a case,
567
 in which the CJEU annulled the first Commission Decision on the grounds that the 
Commission had committed a manifest error in its assessment of the facts in the case.
568
 The 
Commission subsequently re-examined the compatibility of tariff F and, once again, found that 
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the tariff was compatible with the Internal Market.
569
 The present case reached the Court as an 
application for annulment of the second Commission Decision.  
In its second Decision, the Commission explained that the background for introducing the 
reduced tariff was to “resist competition on the nitrate fertilizer market from ammonia produced 
in other countries, notably non-Community countries” and found that the introduction of the 
tariff was actually to prevent ammonia-producing factories from shutting down with the result 
that ammonia would then have to be purchased outside the Union. However, the Commission 
found that there is a distinction between applying a measure as an ordinary economic agent and 
using it to confer a financial advantage on certain undertakings by forgoing the profit which it 
would normally realise.
570
 The Commission found that Gasunie behaved according to 
commercial behaviour, judged on the grounds that it could be considered standard practice for 
an undertaking to grant a price reduction in cases where it is deemed financially sound if it is 
commercially necessary, and thus held that “there is no evidence that, in supplying gas at tariff 
'F' to the Dutch nitrate fertilizer producers, Gasunie behaved any differently than a private 
undertaking under the relevant market conditions.”571 
The CJEU agreed with the above conclusions by the Commission in its second Decision by 
stating that the Commission was correct in finding that the application of tariff F was a normal 
and financially sound commercial policy.
572
 Further, the CJEU concluded that tariff F should be 
considered a measure which was necessary in order to withstand competition on the ammonia 
market.
573
  
In conclusion, it is possible to introduce a measure to the extent that it can be justified by 
financial reasons, e.g. the need to withstand competition on the market in question.   
6.1.1 The benchmark for assessment of normal market conditions: payment of market 
price 
The assessment of whether a measure accords to normal market conditions essentially concerns 
the question of whether market price has been paid.  
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In GEMO,
574
the CJEU had to consider a request for a preliminary ruling from a national 
appellate court in Lyon, France (Administrative Court of Lyon). The question arose in a case 
between the French Ministry for Economic Affairs, Finance and Industry and GEMO seeking an 
annulment of a judgment delivered by the Administrative Court of Dijon granting GEMO SA (a 
supermarket which markets meat and meat-based products) a refund of the tax on meat 
purchases paid between 1 January 1997 and 31 August 1998.
575
 The case concerned a French 
law establishing a public service for the collection and disposal of animal carcasses and 
slaughterhouse waste unfit for human and animal consumption. The contract for the 
performance of the service was awarded after a tender procedure. The service was mainly 
financed by way of a tax imposed on meat retailing supermarkets.
576
 According to national 
legislation (Law No. 96-1139), GEMO was liable to pay the above-mentioned tax.  
The case before the Administrative Court of Dijon was an appeal against a decision from the 
French tax authorities refusing to reimburse GEMO for the tax sums paid. In the appeal, the 
Administrative Court of Dijon held that the arrangements established under Law No. 96-1139, 
consisting of remuneration for services relating to carcass disposal, constituted State aid and 
thereby confirmed the decision from the French tax authorities. Following the decision from the 
Administrative Court of Dijon, the French Ministry for Economic Affairs, Finance and Industry 
appealed the decision to the Administrative Court of Lyon who initially found that the 
arrangements under Law No. 96-1139, consisting of remuneration for services relating to 
carcass disposal did not constitute State aid. However, the Administrative Court of Lyon was in 
doubt as to whether the remuneration for services relating to carcass disposal was liable to 
relieve a sector from a burden which it would normally have to bear, and on this ground, it 
referred a request for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU.
577
 
The CJEU formulated the question referred by the French court as follows:
578
 
“In the light of the referring judgment, the question should be understood as asking essentially 
whether Article 92(1) [now 107(1)] of the Treaty must be interpreted as meaning that a system 
such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which provides farmers and slaughterhouses with 
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the free collection and disposal of animal carcasses and slaughterhouse waste, must be 
considered to be State aid.” 
The CJEU began by observing that the measure in question was set up under national law to 
ensure that the collection and disposal of animal carcasses and slaughterhouse waste found unfit 
for consumption was a mandatory service free of charge to users of the service. It further noted 
that the service was obligatory for the users.
579
 
Relating the question referred by the French court, the CJEU reiterated its previous findings that 
“the notion of aid can thus encompass not only positive benefits such as subsidies, loans or 
direct investment in the capital of enterprises, but also interventions which, in various forms, 
mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which 
therefore, without being subsidies in the strict sense of the word, are of the same character and 
have the same effect”580, and then emphasised that:581  
“given that, in this case, the service for the collection and disposal of animal carcasses and 
slaughterhouse waste is provided free of charge, it must be ascertained whether that benefit 
may be considered to relieve undertakings of an expense which should properly be covered by 
their budget.” 
On this question, the CJEU argued that the undertakings concerned were responsible for the 
activities relating to the disposal of the animal waste.
582
  
Therefore, the costs arising from handling the disposal of the waste should be considered 
inherent in the economic activities of the undertakings concerned.
583
 On these grounds, the State 
intervention should be considered to relieve the undertakings concerned from financial burdens 
with the result that an economic advantage was granted.
584
 Accordingly, the CJEU found that 
the measure in question constituted State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.  
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Thus, the above case shows that State aid may be granted under Article 107(1) TFEU in 
situations where the State decides to relieve the undertaking in question from economic burdens 
and thereby confer an economic advantage.  
In a procurement context, this distinction is important. It shows that the charges which are 
normally incumbent on the private part, e.g. the economic operator, cannot be transferred to the 
contracting authority as this might constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) 
TFEU.  
In his opinion
585
 on the GEMO case, AG Jacobs made some interesting comments regarding the 
link between the concepts of normal market conditions and normal market price. According to 
the AG:
586
 
“[…] where for example the State purchases goods or services from an undertaking, there will 
be aid only if and to the extent that the price paid exceeds the market price.”  
This statement corresponds to the argument made by AG Fennely in his opinion
587
 on a previous 
case, namely the case of France v Commission,
588
 where he noted that when it has to be decided 
whether or not aid is granted through public resources, the negotiation between the parties that 
has led to the agreement should be assessed as a whole. Further, the AG stated that the relevant 
benchmark when deciding whether aid has been granted when public authorities purchase goods 
and services from the market is whether market price is paid. According to AG Fennely:
589
 
“It is, of course, the case that public authorities may enter into many kinds of bargains with 
undertakings without giving rise to a grant of State aid, provided that they act as would a 
normal economic agent. At its simplest, public authorities may purchase goods and services from 
undertakings, including those which are provided to the public on those authorities' behalf. The 
purchasing authorities must, of course, pay the market price.” 
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This statement from AG Fennely implies that public authorities are free to negotiate with 
undertakings when they purchase goods and services, but the decisive benchmark, for assessing 
whether State aid is granted, is whether the market price has been paid.
590
  
 
6.1.2 Preliminary findings 
To assess whether an undertaking receives an advantage for the purpose of Article 107(1) 
TFEU, it is necessary to establish whether the State support has been received in circumstances 
corresponding to normal market conditions. State support which does not correspond to normal 
market conditions may result in the conferral of an economic benefit and thus amount to State 
aid according to Article 107(1) TFEU. The point of departure for this assessment is the 
competitive position between competitors in the Internal Market. 
 
The cases chosen for analysis demonstrate that the assessment of whether an economic benefit 
occurs shows that State support might not violate Article 107(1) TFEU, if the measure is 
justified based on economic reasons, e.g. the need to withstand competition on the market in 
question.   
The assessment of whether a measure corresponds to normal market conditions essentially 
concerns the question of whether market price has been paid. The payment of market price in 
turn concerns whether the undertaking in question has been relieved from expenses which 
should be covered by their budget. Hence, State aid might be granted according to Article 
107(1) TFEU in situations where the State decides to relieve the undertaking in question from 
financial burdens and thereby confer an economic benefit on it.  
The above implies that a concept of ‘avoided costs’ has to be considered when assessing 
whether market price has been paid. The following section will analyse this concept in more 
detail.  
6.2 The concepts of ‘avoided costs’  
As held above, the payment of market price is a decisive factor for the assessment of whether a 
transaction is in accordance with normal market conditions. Building on this conclusion, the 
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following section will deduce the presumptions for the payment of market price under State aid 
law and discuss them in a procurement context.  
In a procurement context, it is relevant to discuss which obligations are incumbent on the 
contracting authority with regard to respecting the concept of avoided costs under State aid law. 
This question essentially concerns what costs the contracting authority can undertake without 
infringing the concept of avoided costs. As no case law exists to help clarify this question, the 
discussion below will instead be based on theoretical assumptions derived from the chosen State 
aid cases.  
  
6.2.1 A broad definition of ‘aid’: relief of economic burdens 
Any State measure which has the effect of granting economic benefits to an undertaking and 
improving its financial position, falls under the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU.
591
  
Accordingly, in order to determine whether a State measure constitutes aid, it is necessary to 
establish whether the recipient undertaking receives an economic benefit.
592
 When assessing 
whether a benefit has been granted to the recipient, an effects-based approach
593
 applies. This 
means that the relevant criteria when assessing whether a measure falls within the scope of 
Article 107(1) TFEU is the effect of the measure, as opposed to the form
594
; the legal nature or 
aim
595
; or whether the measure is compulsory or voluntary in nature
596
.  
The notion of advantage as defined in the case law from the CJEU covers not only granting of 
positive economic benefits, but also the relief from economic burdens in a broader sense: This 
was held in Steenkolenmijnen
597
 where the CJEU for the first time also defined the terms 
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‘subsidy’ and ‘aid’, which are concepts that are not expressly defined in the Treaty. The CJEU 
gave the following definition of the terms ‘subsidy’ and ‘aid’:598 
“A subsidy is normally defined as a payment in cash or in kind made in support of an 
undertaking other than the payment by the purchaser or consumer for the goods or services 
which it produces. An aid is a very similar concept, which, however, places emphasis on its 
purpose and seems especially devised for a particular objective which cannot normally be 
achieved without outside help. The concept of aid is nevertheless wider than that of a subsidy 
because it embraces not only positive benefits, such as subsidies themselves, but also 
interventions which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the 
budget of an undertaking and which, without, therefore, being subsidies in the strict meaning of 
the word, are similar in character and have the same effect.”599  
The statement above from the CJEU shows that the definition of ‘aid’ is broad in scope as it 
covers both positive benefits as well as measures which relieve the recipient from charges that 
are normally included in the budget of an undertaking. Furthermore, the concept of aid entails 
situations where the measure in question has the effect of mitigating the charges that are 
normally included in the budget of an undertaking.  
In the case of Steenkolenmijnen, the CJEU had to determine whether a bonus granted to miners 
amounted to State aid. The case concerned the award of a bonus to miners, which was financed 
by the German Federal Government. The Federal Minister for Economic Affairs explained that 
the miners’ bonus was necessary to ensure measures that could “forestall serious fluctuations in 
the labour force in the mines, and to make a career in mining once more attractive for young 
men”600. The Minister further emphasised that the existing capacity in the coal industry could 
not be fully used due to the shortage of miners, which consequently led to lower productivity in 
the sector. Therefore, the Minister argued that the output of the German coal industry could be 
considerably enhanced, as the bonus would attract more workers which in turn would result in 
greater productivity.
601
 The CJEU replied that under the circumstances as described by the 
German Federal Government, the bonus to miners financed from public funds would in fact 
amount to an artificial reduction in accountable production costs, which would place the coal 
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industry in a privileged competitive position compared to undertakings in the coal industry in 
other countries, who have to bear all their production costs themselves.
602
  
Although the CJEU did not directly state this, the statement implies that such a privileged 
competitive position amounted to an advantage for the undertakings concerned. 
The case of Steenkolenmijnen serves to show that the concept of advantage inherent in Article 
107(1) TFEU includes direct payments as well as charges from which the undertakings are 
relieved due to measures introduced by the State. The findings of the CJEU in Steenkolenmijnen 
are still referred to as a valid definition for the concept of ‘aid’.  
In another early case on the concept of the relieve of charges, namely the case of Italy v 
Commission,
603
 the CJEU found that charges which normally burden the budget of an 
undertaking amount to State aid if they are “intended partially to exempt undertakings from the 
financial charges arising from the normal application of the general system of compulsory 
contributions imposed by law”.604  
 
Accordingly, the point of departure is that measures which exempt undertakings from the 
charges arising from the normal application of the general system are capable of conferring an 
advantage on the recipient.  
 
More than a decade later, the CJEU delivered a judgment
605
 which revealed that preserving 
market forces is an aim that must be taken into consideration when assessing whether the 
measure in question is relieving the undertaking from charges. The case serves to show that the 
broader aim of preserving a competitive market was an overlying goal of the prohibition of 
relieving undertakings from charges they would normally have to bear.
606
 
 
The case concerned an assessment of the financial assistance from the French authorities to a 
French producer of textiles, clothing and paper products in the form of capital contributions, 
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loans at reduced rates of interest and reductions in social security charges.
607
 The case reached 
the Court as a request for annulment of a Commission Decision
608
 stating that the measures 
granted by the French authorities constituted aid.
609
 Furthermore, the Commission found that the 
measure improved the financial position of the recipient and reduced other costs, which implied 
a competitive advantage over other manufacturers who had completed or intended to complete 
similar actions as the ones imposed to the French producer by the State, at their own expense.
610
  
 
The CJEU supported the findings of the Commission by stating that the measures enabled the 
recipient to “avoid having to bear costs which would normally have had to be met out of the 
undertaking' s own financial resources, and thereby prevented market forces from having their 
normal effect”.611 
 
This case could imply that as long as market forces are preserved, the room for manoeuvre is 
broad for the contracting authority in order to impose measures which mitigate the tenderers 
from charges they would normally have to bear. However, the case could also imply that if the 
contracting authority imposes measures which relieve the tenderers of charges they would 
normally have to bear, distortion of market forces are presumed. The latter situation would 
imply that relieve of charges is never permitted.  
One of the first explicit references to Steenkolenmijnen as analysed above was made in Banco 
Exterior de España,
612
 where a Spanish tribunal had made a reference for a preliminary ruling 
regarding the legality of a tax exemption to a public undertaking. In assessing whether the tax 
exemption could fall within the prohibition in Article 107(1) TFEU, the CJEU connected its 
finding in Steenkolenmijnen, as cited above, that the concept of ‘aid’ should be understood in a 
broad sense with the fact that the aim of Article 107(1) TFEU is to prevent the trade between 
Member States from being affected by advantages granted by public authorities.
613
 Thus, the 
broad notion of ‘aid’ should be seen in connection with the broader aim of preventing trade from 
being affected. 
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In a procurement context, the judgments from the CJEU in Steenkolenmijnen and Banco 
Exterior de España are important as the background for the broad notion of ‘aid’ implies that 
State aid rules influences the charges from which the contracting authority can relieve the 
tenderers. 
The concept of ‘relieve of charges’, which can be derived from Steenkolenmijnen, is interesting 
as situations might arise where the contracting authority upholds charges which would normally 
accrue to the undertakings, and thereby relieve them from charges they would normally have to 
bear, resulting in the conferral of an advantage on the undertaking in question.
614
  
6.2.2 Unconditional State support? The concept of ‘gratuitous advantage’ 
The concept of advantage entails an integrated requirement of gratuitousness. In Steinike & 
Weinlig,
615
 the CJEU formulated the concept of gratuitous advantage for the first time.
616
  
 
The concept of gratuitous advantage implies that the aid in question is conferred to the recipient 
in the sense that an undertaking receives a benefit it would not normally have enjoyed from its 
own commercial endeavours.
617
 The term gratuitous indicates that the advantage conferred on 
the recipient is given unconditionally i.e., with nothing in return.  
 
According to Khan and Borchardt:
618
  
 
“As the word is generally understood, ‘aid’ implies that a donor confers a benefit without any 
obligation or expectation of receiving something in return, which in turn implies that if State 
resources are conferred on an undertaking as one side of a bilateral agreement, with the 
undertaking obliged to provide something of equivalent value in return, the State’s action does 
not amount to ‘aid’.”619  
 
In this respect, if the term ‘gratuitous’ should be taken literally, it would imply that any 
procurement situation where the public authority does receive something in return would fall 
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outside the scope of an advantage. This situation could possibly lead to the legal consequence 
that public contracts awarded under the concession Directive fall outside the concept of 
advantage, and hence never under the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU. However, as will be 
elaborated below, the concept of gratuitousness under State aid law does not necessarily imply 
that any procurement situation where the public authority receives something in return falls 
outside the scope of the concept of advantage. The following section will first account for the 
concept of pecuniary interests under procurement law and then analyse the concept of gratuitous 
advantage under State aid law, before turning to whether the concept of pecuniary interest falls 
outside the scope of the State aid rules.  
 
6.2.2.1 The concept of pecuniary interest under procurement law 
Under procurement law, a contract must be of a pecuniary nature to fall within the scope of the 
procurement Directive. In Article 2(1)(5) of the public procurement Directive, ‘public contracts’ 
are defined as:
620
 
 
“Contracts for pecuniary interest concluded in writing between one or more economic operators 
and one or more contracting authorities and having as their object the execution of works, the 
supply of products or the provision of services.” 
 
Thus only contracts for pecuniary interest fall under the scope of the procurement Directive. 
 
In Ordine
621
, the CJEU held that:
622
  
 
“It must be pointed out that the pecuniary nature of the contract relates to the consideration due 
from the public authority concerned in return for the execution of the works which are the object 
of the contract referred to in Article 1(a) of the Directive and which will be at the disposal of the 
public authority.” 
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The concept of pecuniary interest under procurement law thus entails a requirement of exchange 
with something in return for the purchase made. This state of law would be in conflict with the 
requirement of ‘gratuitousness’ under State aid law, as implied above. 
 
6.2.2.2 The concept of ‘gratuitous advantage’ under State aid law 
The concept of gratuitous advantage indicates that the advantage conferred on the recipient is 
given unconditionally, i.e. with nothing in return. 
In the case of France v Commission (Kimberly Clark),
623
 the CJEU determined whether 
measures demanding an additional effort for the undertaking in exchange for the State support 
can be considered aid. In other words, whether the additional costs incurred by the undertaking 
would ‘neutralise’ the prohibition of mitigating the charges, which is normally borne by 
undertakings, and thereby no longer fall inside the scope of ‘gratuitous’.  
The case concerned an action for annulment of a Commission Decision
624
 brought by the French 
Republic. In the contested Decision, the Commission held that a measure consisting of an 
agreement under which the French authorities (FNE) undertook to fund part of the costs of a 
social plan adopted by a French company (Kimberly Clark) was State aid in the sense of Article 
107(1) TFEU.
625
 The social plan consisted of a number of measures which partly related to 
actions of redeployment for workers who had lost their jobs as well as training-leave 
agreements.
626
  
 
The French authorities made several claims supporting their view that the agreements did not 
constitute aid. First, the French authorities argued that the agreements had a purely social 
objective and that they were measures of a general nature.
627,628
 Second, the French authorities 
emphasised the fact that the social plan was compulsory. Thus, in the view of the French 
authorities, the State support did not mitigate the charges borne by undertakings “since their 
implementation does not help undertakings to meet their legal obligations and calls for 
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additional efforts on their part over and above the cost to them of strictly complying with the 
requirements of the ordinary law”.629  
 
The French authorities thereby argued that the State support was only used to finance charges 
that related to additional costs, which arose out of the measure imposed on the undertaking, and 
not voluntary costs by the undertaking. 
 
The Commission argued that the fact that the State support covered expenses incurred by the 
beneficiary by choice was not sufficient to exclude the possibility that it constituted aid in so far 
as “since [Kimberly Clark] was required to bear, in addition to compulsory expenses in the 
strict sense (severance payments, and so on), the additional costs of implementing the social 
plan (under the supervision of the court), the FNE assistance covered a variable proportion of a 
body of costs which were, to an indeterminate extent, compulsory; it could therefore cover 
compulsory costs.”630  
 
The CJEU never replied directly to the claim from the Commission that the State support 
mitigated charges which the undertaking would normally have to bear. Instead, the CJEU 
reiterated its finding in Banco Exterior de España by stating that:
 631 
 
“it must [ … ] be observed that the concept of aid encompasses advantages granted by public 
authorities which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the 
budget of an undertaking”.  
 
The CJEU found that due to its size, Kimberly Clark was under an obligation to draw up a social 
plan, and that the plan included several aspects of involvement from FNE in regard to both 
employees who were not laid off and employees who were laid off.
632
 Further, the CJEU 
emphasised that it could be concluded that the initial number of intended lay-offs was reduced 
due to the State support. Consequently, according to the CJEU, the Commission was correct in 
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assessing that Kimberly Clark had received State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) 
TFEU.
633
  
 
It must thus be concluded that the state of law derived from Banco Exterior de España was not 
fully confirmed in France v Commission (Kimberly Clark.). 
 
However, in his opinion to France v Commission (Kimberly Clark), AG Jacobs gives some 
guidance on the matter as he emphasises the fact that the legal obligation of a measure is not 
decisive. Rather, according to AG Jacobs, it should be assessed whether the charges that are 
normally borne by an undertaking are mitigated. AG Jacobs argues that if an agreement is 
entirely optional, it must be assumed that the undertaking will somehow draw benefit from it, 
which in return suggests that aid is granted.
 634
 As expressed by AG Jacobs:
635
  
“It is perhaps worth noting that the fact that contributions under FNE agreements may be 
conditional on specified steps to be taken by the undertakings concerned does not preclude their 
being aid. Although in defining State aid the Court has used the term 'gratuitous advantage', that 
reflects the wording of the question referred by the national court in the case in question. The 
Court has since accepted as falling within the scope of the Treaty provisions on State aid 
financial assistance to a restructuring involving commitments by the undertaking to take specific 
steps (in that case, conversion to a specific type of production).”636 
 
This statement from the AG implies that the optional character of a measure, and thereby 
additional charges put on the undertaking, is no guaranty that aid is not granted. Although the 
CJEU does not state this directly, it could be argued that this State of law can be derived from 
France v Commission (Kimberly Clark).  
 
In another France v Commission case,
637
 the CJEU delivered a judgment that is relevant in a 
procurement context for several reasons. As will be elaborated below, first, it can be derived 
from this case that the question of whether a measure confers an advantage must be assessed on 
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an individual basis, i.e. for each measure imposed by the State. Accordingly, a scheme cannot be 
‘neutralised’ by the fact that it also entails measures which do not confer an advantage. Second, 
the case shows that no distinction should be made between measures which are extended from 
regulation and measures which are the result of free negotiation between the parties.  
 
In the case, the CJEU had to consider an action for annulment regarding a Decision from the 
Commission
638
 stating that a State measure on the degressive reduction of an employer’s social 
security contributions to the undertakings in the textile, clothing, leather and footwear industries 
amounted to State aid.  
 
The case concerned a French law which authorised the French State to grant the mentioned 
sectors a reduction in social security contributions in addition to the general measure of a 
reduction applicable to all sectors of the economy.
639
 The French Government argued that the 
reduction of social security contributions was only allowed in exchange for the undertakings 
taking actions in favour of the employees if the form of collective agreements regarding 
employment terms and the reorganisation and reduction of working time.
640
 According to the 
French Government, the effects of the measure of reduction of social security contributions were 
thus financially neutral for the recipient undertakings
641
, something which the Commission 
found could not be proven.
642
 Furthermore, the French Government argued that the collective 
agreements could not be regarded as charges normally included in the budgets of the 
undertakings concerned, as the agreements were optional.
643
The Commission argued that the 
financial reductions facilitated the establishment of economic reforms as the collective 
agreements resulted in gains in competitiveness,
644
 and the measure of reduction of social 
security contributions thus conferred an economic benefit on the recipients by placing the 
recipients in a more favourable position than their competitors.
645
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The CJEU replied to these arguments by first referring to its previous ruling in Italy v 
Commission,
646
 where it had found that “a partial reduction of social charges devolving upon 
undertakings of a particular industrial sector constitutes aid within the meaning of Article 92(1) 
[now 107(1)] of the Treaty if that measure is intended partially to exempt those undertakings 
from the financial charges arising from the normal application of the general social security 
system, without there being any justification for this exemption on the basis of the nature or 
general scheme of this system”647 and thus found that the measure of reduction of social security 
contributions falls within the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU.
648
 
 
The CJEU then went on to discuss the argument put forward by the French Government that the 
collective agreements were financially and economically neutral for the recipient undertakings. 
The CJEU stated that:
 649
 
 
“It should be recalled that the costs for undertakings, to which the French Government draws 
attention, arise from collective agreements, concluded between employers and trade unions, 
which undertakings are bound to observe, either because they have acceded to those 
agreements or because those agreements have been extended by regulation. Such costs are 
included, by their nature, in the budgets of undertakings”  
 
On this ground, the CJEU concluded that:
650
  
 
“Agreements concluded by both sides of industry form a whole and cannot be evaluated by 
taking account, out of context, of only some of their positive or negative aspects for one or other 
party […]” 
 
Accordingly, the fact that the accuracy of the final costs of the collective agreements was 
impossible to evaluate
651
 did not exclude such agreements from being categorised as aid within 
the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
652
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This case illustrates that it is irrelevant for the assessment of advantage whether the recipient is 
in a position to affect the presence of State aid, i.e. whether, as in this specific case, the State 
measure on the degressive reduction of an employer’s social security contributions is 
compulsory for the undertaking in that it could not avoid or refuse it, since only the effect of the 
measure should be taken into account.  
 
The conclusions from the CJEU regarding the financial and economic neutrality are important in 
a procurement perspective for two reasons. First, a measure must be evaluated separately as 
opposed to as a whole. This means that it is not possible for the State/contracting authority to 
‘neutralise’ a measure which confers an advantage by the fact that the scheme also entails 
measures which do not confer an advantage. Rather, the assessment of advantage must be taken 
in isolation for each measure in question. This conclusion implies that in situations where the 
measure imposed confers an advantage, in a specific case, State aid is likely to occur under 
Article 107(1) TFEU.   
 
Second, the CJEU emphasised that not only agreements which are extended from regulation, i.e. 
as a consequence of regulation, are capable of mitigating the charges which an undertaking 
would normally have to bear, but agreements to which undertakings have acceded can also fall 
within the scope of measures which relieve an undertaking from charges it would normally have 
to bear. With this, the CJEU accepts that agreements which are entered into as a result of party 
autonomy can have the effect of relieving an undertaking from charges, or put in other words – 
not only measures which obliges undertakings through legislation can have the effect of 
transferring an advantage to the recipient. In a procurement context, this could be of relevance 
as this widens the scope for the potential application of State aid rules to the award of public 
contracts.  
 
6.2.2.3. Does the concept of pecuniary interest under procurement law fall outside the scope of 
State aid rules? 
According to the above, an advantage should not be assessed according to whether the tenderer 
could have avoided the measure conferring an advantage. A situation like the one described 
above occurs if the measure conferring an advantage arises in relation to elements in the tender 
procedure that are to be considered constant, i.e. they are not possible to change. An example of 
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this situation is the selection and award criteria in the tender procedure which cannot be 
changed.
653
  
 
It thus makes no difference for the assessment of an advantage whether the State receives 
something in return for the State support, for instance if the undertaking makes certain 
commitments in return for conditions it has to fulfil.
 
In this respect, it can be concluded that the 
concepts of ‘gratuitousness’ under State aid law does not imply that any procurement situation 
where the public authority does receive something in return falls outside the scope of an 
advantage.  
 
6.3 Conclusions 
The analysis above has shown that the concept of advantage within Article 107(1) TFEU is 
broad in scope as it entails direct transfers of State support as well as charges relieved from the 
undertakings. Furthermore, the concept of advantage entails a benchmark against ‘normal 
market conditions’ which is a concept that is developed by the CJEU to assess whether State 
support can escape the prohibition in Article 107(1) TFEU on the grounds that the support 
equals market terms. The benchmark for assessment of normal market conditions is whether 
market price has been paid.  
The case law from the CJEU seem to imply that when State intervention is not given according 
to market conditions, market price is not paid, and hence an advantage is conferred within 
Article 107(1) TFEU. Therefore, according to AG Jacobs in GEMO and AG Fennely in France 
v commission, in cases where the State purchases goods and services, there will be aid only if 
the price paid exceeds the market price. On this basis, chapter 7 will analyse when  the price 
paid exceeds market price in a procurement context.  
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Chapter 7 
7. When does the award of public contracts constitute State aid? 
The procurement Directives do not include specific rules to prevent public contracts from 
involving State aid. This does not mean, however, that the contracting authorities are exempt 
from acting in order to prevent an economic benefit from being granted when public contracts 
are awarded. The State aid rules are addressed to Member States, and as the concept of 
contracting authority coincides with the concept of State under the State aid rules,
654
 the 
contracting authorities have an obligation, by way of the State aid rules, to prevent 
(procurement) measures which confer an advantage to the recipient.  
This chapter will analyse the notion of advantage in relation to the award of public contracts and 
discuss how and when an advantage occurs when public contracts are awarded. So far, the CJ 
has not delivered any cases which directly concern the question of whether the award of a public 
contract constitutes State aid within the framework of Article 107(1) TFEU. The GC has dealt 
with this question a few times, and the Commission has delivered Decisions on this question 
several times. For the purpose of discussing how and when an advantage is conferred on the 
economic operator when public contracts are awarded, cases have been chosen for analysis in 
which the award of a contract has been made following a tender procedure, or in which a tender 
procedure should arguably have been held. The cases chosen for analysis thus represent the 
analytical framework of the Thesis. 
As has been accounted for in chapter 2 of this Thesis, State aid law and public procurement law 
share the common aim of preventing distortions of competition in the Internal Market.
655
 
However, the means to achieving this common goal are different for the two areas of law; the 
State aid rules are aimed at preventing undertakings from receiving an undue advantage which 
can be used to strengthen their position on the market vis-à-vis competitors, whereas the 
procurement rules aim at opening the market for public contracts by ensuring that undertakings 
compete for public contracts in a transparent and equal manner.  
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The prohibition against conferring an advantage under State aid law is satisfied by adhering to 
the concept of normal market conditions. However, it can be discussed whether the State aid 
rules prohibiting an advantage being conferred coincides with the procedural rules in the 
procurement Directives. 
The question of whether an advantage occurs when public contracts are awarded has been 
debated rather intensely
656
 in academic literature. In this respect, it has been stated that when a 
public procurement procedure has been held, no advantage is conferred on the economic 
operator because, in principle, the economic operator would have been able to win the same 
contract on the private market.
657
  
It could thus be argued that under the procurement regime, if the competitive selection adheres 
to the procurement rules, normal market conditions are presumed. Put in other words, it could be 
argued that as long as the procedural rules in the procurement directives are adhered to, 
compliance with State aid rules can be presumed. However, as it will be elaborated in the 
following sections, such a presumption cannot be confirmed in a case law analysis.  
First, section 7.1 analyses to which extent an advantage occurs following an illegal direct award 
of public contracts Then, section 7.2 discusses the notion of advantage in relation to the award 
of contracts following the negotiated procedure. Section 7.3 also discusses award following the 
negotiated procedure, however, as it will be elaborated, whether advantage is conferred 
following awards by the negotiated procedure depends on the specific circumstances to the 
award procedure. Finally, section 7.4 analyses the notion of advantage in relation to two 
situations of award, namely legal direct award and award by concession. Section 7.5 compiles 
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the conclusions made in the previous sections. Finally, section 7.6 contains a conclusion to the 
analysis.  
7.1 BAI 
The BAI judgments
658
 had their beginning in 1992, when the Commission received several 
complaints regarding a Spanish aid scheme which concerned support for a new freight and 
passenger ferry service between Bilbao, Spain, and Portsmouth, UK.
659
 Arguably, the case 
illustrates a situation of illegal direct award, since the purchase concerned a value above 
threshold.
660
 
 
7.1.1 Background of the case  
The case concerned a purchase of travel vouchers made by the Basque authorities. The purchase 
of travel vouchers was predetermined for a period of three years with an agreed price, which 
was to be paid even for journeys that were not made.
661
 The Ferry service agreement consisted 
of an agreement in the form of a declaration of intent between Ferries Golfo de Vizcaya SA 
(hereafter abbreviated FGV), a company created by Vapores Suardiaz of Spain, and P&O 
European Ferries (hereafter P&O Ferries) of the United Kingdom. The agreement was entered 
into by FGV and the District Council of Bizkaia and Department of Trade and Tourism of the 
Basque Government (together referred to as the State users). The agreement consisted of a 
predetermined number of vouchers, which were sold to the State users. The vouchers were used 
to low-income groups and others under a defined social and cultural policy. The voucher 
recipients could exchange the vouchers for tickets to use the FGV in off-peak seasons. In the 
contract, the State users imposed a number of conditions for FGV in order to maintain full 
service throughout the year, except for three weeks where service was carried out on the ferries.  
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7.1.2. Award of contract  
The agreement in question was concluded directly between the Basque government and the 
private company FGV. Thus, no call for tender was published prior to the conclusion of the 
agreement. It is uncertain whether the purchase should have been made following a tender 
procedure, and this question is not discussed by the Commission or the CJEU. However, it is 
discussed, whether commercial risks have been eliminated for the private part with respect to 
renegotiation of the contract.
662
 Since the purchase concerned a value above threshold, the case 
is used as an example of illegal direct award for the purpose of this Thesis.  
7.1.3 Commission Decision  
The Commission suspected that elements of State aid might be provided to FGV as a result of 
the agreement, and as a consequence, they initiated procedures under Article 93(2) [now 
108(3)].  
The Commission especially considered the following aspects an indication of possible aid:
663
 
I) the State users' commitment to purchase a set number of vouchers over a three-year 
period, rather than on the basis of objectively established needs, 
II) the payment to be made for vouchers, which was higher than the advertised brochure 
price, 
III) the commitment to pay for vouchers even if travel did not take place or the vessel was 
diverted, and 
IV) the arrangement that the State users would: 
- receive a pay-back if FGV made a profit, or 
- absorb certain commercial losses if FGV suffered a deficit during the first three 
years of operation of the new service. 
Following the Commissions initiation of procedures, the agreement between the parties was 
suspended and, subsequently, a new agreement, which entailed modifications, was entered into. 
In the new agreement, the parties made the following modifications in order to meet the 
concerns of the Commission: 
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I) information has been provided on the number of vouchers to be purchased, based on 
estimated take-up of the offer by defined low income groups and those covered by social 
and cultural programmes, including school groups and young people and the elderly. 
This takes into account experience of other similar social programmes. In addition, 
those evacuated to the United Kingdom during the Spanish Civil War have shown a keen 
interest to return to visit their places of temporary exile, 
 
II) the payment to be made for vouchers, when the system comes into operation, will be 
lower than the advertised brochure price for the period concerned ; this reflects the 
normal market practice of volume discounts for large users of commercial services, the 
remaining elements of the original agreement which caused concern have all been 
deleted from the revised agreement. 
In response to the modifications of the initial agreement, the Commission found that the new 
agreement did not constitute State aid.
664
 The decision was based on the Commission’s 
assessment of the commercial results of the FGV. The Commission emphasised that FGV was 
able to establish its business without any benefit from the State, and that the new agreement 
seemed to “reflect a normal commercial relationship with arm's length pricing for the services 
provided”.665 
Accordingly, the Commission based its conclusion on two elements: First, that the number of 
purchased vouchers was genuine, as it was based on a real need, and second, that the payment 
for the vouchers reflected standard market practice for volume discounts.  
In this respect, according to the Commission, the advantage conferred on the recipient consisted 
of the aspects that concerned i) that the agreed price was higher than the commercial tariff, ii) 
that the vouchers had to be paid for even for journeys which were not made or were diverted to 
other ports, iii) that the agreement included an undertaking to absorb all losses during the first 
three years of operation of the new service, and iv) that the element of commercial risk was 
eliminated for Ferries Golfo de Vizcaya. 
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7.1.4 Findings of the General Court  
Following the Commission’s Decision, a French Company (Bretagne Angleterre Irlande (BAI)) 
made an application for annulment of the Decision before the GC.
666
 
BAI held, in essence, that the Commission had misapplied Article 107 (1) TFEU in its Decision 
since “[the Commission] did not attempt to ascertain whether the massive purchases of travel 
vouchers by the Spanish authorities strengthened the market position of Ferries Golfo de 
Vizcaya as compared with that of its competitors”.667   
The applicant, BAI, was a company that operated a shipping line between the ports of Plymouth, 
UK, and Santander, Spain. BAI held that the service offered by FGV competed directly with the 
service provided by BAI, and therefore it was likely to cause serious damage to their business.
668
   
BAI made four main arguments to support its application for annulment of the Decision
669
 of 
which the second, third and fourth essentially concerned the alleged infringement of Article 
107(1) TFEU.
670
 The CJEU regrouped the second, third, and fourth plea as it found that they all 
related to the question of infringement of Article 107(1) TFEU.
671
  
The GC started by emphasising that:
672
 
“in determining whether an agreement whereby a public authority undertakes to purchase 
certain services from a specific undertaking for a number of years falls within the scope of 
Article 92(1)[now Article 107(1)] of the Treaty, it must be borne in mind that the aim of Article 
92 [now Article 107(1)] is to prevent trade between Member States from being affected by 
advantages given by the public authorities which, in various forms, distort or threaten to distort 
competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods […] It follows 
that a State measure in favour of an undertaking, which takes the form of an agreement to 
purchase travel vouchers cannot be excluded in principle from the concept of State aid in the 
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sense contemplated in Article 92 [now 107] of the Treaty, merely because the parties undertake 
reciprocal commitments.”673   
After concluding that the State aid rules apply to public authorities when they purchase, the GC 
commenced to discuss whether the aid elements had been excluded from the new agreement, as 
held by the Commission.
674
  
In doing so, the GC found that not all aid elements were deleted from the new agreement 
between the parties:
675
 
“[…] certain elements, such as the payment by the authorities of a unit price for the vouchers 
higher than the published commercial price and the variation in the total subsidy depending on 
the company's positive or negative operating results, have been deleted from the text of the 1995 
agreement. However, as the applicant pointed out, the new agreement still provides for the 
purchase of a predetermined number of travel vouchers for several years and, in spite of the 
reduction in the reference unit price, it gives Ferries Golfo de Vizcaya an overall income which 
is not only equivalent, but even slightly higher than that stipulated in the original 
agreement.”676 
Subsequently, the revision of this point in the agreement was, according to the GC, not 
sufficient for them to conclude that the agreement represented a normal commercial 
transaction.
677
 Thus, since the effects on competition and trade between Member States were the 
same under the new agreement, the GC concluded that the Commission's conclusion that the 
new agreement did not constitute State aid could not be upheld.
678
 
Regarding the reduced unit price, the GC held that this had been reduced as stated by the 
Commission. However, the new agreement still provided for the purchase of a predetermined 
number of travel vouchers which amounted to an overall income for Ferries Golfo de Vizcaya 
which was slightly higher than under the initial agreement
679
 because the number of vouchers 
was increased from 26,000 to 45,500 in the new agreement.
680
 Contrary to what the Commission 
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had concluded, the GC did not find that the increase in travel vouchers was determined 
according to actual needs felt by the authorities.
681
 Consequently, the GC concluded that the 
advantage conferred on the recipient was not eliminated under the new agreement; that the 
agreement affected competition between Member States; and that the financial position of the 
recipient was strengthened in relation to its competitors.
682
  
On these ground, the GC concluded that the Commission’s assessment of the new agreement 
was incorrect as the agreement did in fact constitute aid.
683
  
The Commission reopened the Decision and extended the initial Decision by including the new 
agreement in their assessment. The Commission agreed with the GC that the measure was not 
“a normal and commercial transaction, but was designed to maintain at its original level the 
aid contained in the first Agreement [..]”684 The Decision was confirmed by the GC.685 The 
judgment of the GC was appealed, but the CJEU refused to rule on the substance by referring to 
res judicata.
686
  
7.1.5 Comments  
With this case, for the first time, the GC concluded that purchasing activities by public 
authorities fall within the scope of the State aid rules.
687
 However, the statement from the GC 
does not imply whether State aid rules apply when a tender procedure has been conducted. 
Rather, the statement from the GC should arguably be interpreted to mean that purchasing 
activities in general, with regard to both award under the procurement directives and (legal and 
illegal) direct  award, fall under the scope of the State aid rules.  
In this respect, it should be emphasised that the GC did not take the opportunity to state directly 
whether a tender procedure should have been conducted. The GC was given this opportunity in 
paragraph 63 of the judgment where it was held by (an intervener to) the Commission that: 
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“if the applicant had offered a ferry service from the port of Bilbao, the intervener could have 
competed with it for the sale of vouchers to the provincial authorities. However, its ferry service 
is based on the port of Santander in another region.”688 
This argument indicates that if a competition for the contract had been held, BAI would not have 
succeeded in winning, as it did not provide ferry services from the port of Bilbao.  
Unfortunately, the GC did not respond to this argument which could have been an opportunity 
to clarify further aspects of the relationship between the State aid rules and the procurement 
rules. However, the following comments can be made to argument against the above. 
First, according to procurement law, artificial restrictions to competition are not allowed.
689
 This 
means that a contracting authority cannot necessarily restrict an interested economic operator 
with the argument that it does not provide the service in question at the time of the call for 
tender.
690
 In this respect, it must be emphasised that it is up to the economic operators to decide 
whether they want to participate in the competition for the contract.  
Furthermore, the procurement Directives entail an obligation for the contracting authorities to 
create sufficient competition for the public contracts.
691
 This means that there is an obligation 
for the contracting authorities to ensure that competition for the contract is not prevented e.g. by 
restricting interested parties from participating in the competition for the contract.   
Another aspect of the case that should be discussed is the assessment of whether market price 
has been obtained. In this respect, it should be noted that market price was actually not the 
benchmark for assessment of whether the purchase represented a normal market transaction.
692
 
As held by the GC:
693
 
“The file produced before the Court does not support the conclusion that the number of travel 
vouchers specified in the 1995 agreement was determined by an increase in the actual needs 
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felt by the authorities, which are claimed to have required the purchase of a total of 46 500 
vouchers to be used on the Bilbao-Portsmouth route in the period 1995-1998, whereas originally 
there was only a need for a total of 26 000 vouchers for 1993-1996. Furthermore, the advantage 
capable of strengthening the competitive position of Ferries Golfo de Vizcaya is not eliminated 
merely because the recipient undertaking is required to supply a greater quantity of transport 
services in return for a relatively unchanged financial benefit. […]”694 
Accordingly, it can be deduced from this case that the assessment of whether normal market 
conditions are achieved is whether a genuine need exists. Arguably, BAI shows that market 
price is not the only parameter in the assessment of whether a measure represents normal market 
conditions. This conclusion in interesting as it may widen the obligations that the contracting 
authorities must fulfil in order not to breach State aid rules when they award public contracts.  
 
 
7.2 London Underground:   
The question of whether an advantage is conferred on the winning tenderer has been dealt with 
by the Commission in several Decisions.
695
 
One of the most comprehensive Decisions from the Commission in this area is a Decision from 
2002 concerning the case of the London Underground Public Private Partnership.
696
 This 
Decision from the Commission gives important guidance on the Commission’s view on when 
State aid is present when public contracts are awarded under the procurement Directives.
697
  
7.2.1 Background of the case  
The Decision concerned the assessment of whether certain arrangements to modernise the 
London Underground by way of a Public Private Partnership (PPP) scheme (hereafter the PPP 
scheme) were compatible with the Internal Market and the rules on State aid. In a letter dated 12 
April 2002, the Government of the United Kingdom notified the Commission of certain 
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arrangements to modernise the London Underground.
698
 Prior to the notification from the 
British Government, a body called Transport for London (TfL), which was under the political 
control of the elected Greater London Authority (GLA), had submitted a complaint to the 
Commission claiming that the PPP scheme infringed the EU rules on State aid. Following 
several exchanges of information between the British authorities and the Commission, it was 
finally decided in a Decision dated 2 October 2002 that no State aid was involved in the PPP 
scheme.  
According to the Commission’s Decision, the objective of the PPP scheme was to develop a 
better Underground in London through an efficient public sector. The scheme was set up in the 
following way: the London Underground was divided into an operating company (London 
Underground Limited (LUL)) responsible for delivering services to the public, and three 
infrastructure consortia (Infracos) providing services under contract to the London 
Underground.
699
 Each Infraco was responsible for a set of three groups of underground lines 
(point 9), and each Infraco was obliged to perform certain services in relation to modernisation 
of the undergrounds assets – i.e. modernisations of the rolling stock, tracks, signals, stations and 
escalators – and infrastructure during a 30-year period.700 
The suppliers of the work and services related to the underground lines were chosen pursuant to 
a procurement process under the Utilities Directive 93/38, using the negotiated procedure. The 
30-year contracts were subject to periodic reviews after 7½, 15 and 22½ years.
701
 
The Infracos chosen to perform the agreed works and services were created in a transitory phase 
as entities within the public sector.
702
 After the transitory phase expired, the Infracos would 
transfer to the private sector by way of private infrastructure companies.
703
 Prior to the transfer 
to the private sector, each Infraco would “aim at managing its business so as to meet the 
performance requirements of the Service Contracts and, to the extent practicable, at acting in 
accordance with the other terms of those Contracts” (known as “Shadow Running”).704  
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7.2.2 Award of contract  
The winning tenderers were selected in accordance with a negotiated procedure that ran between 
March 1999 under the Utilities Directive 93/38, when a Periodic Indicative Notice (PIN) was 
published in the OJEC, and April 2002, when the final contracts were adopted.
705
  
During the negotiations with the preferred bidders, several post-selection modifications were 
made to the initial documents. The changes related to refinements concerning various aspects of 
obligations for the parties, including changes in the timing and sequencing of the work, and in 
the amount of work to be done; changes to the performance regime and the methods of 
performance measurement; changes in risk allocation; and changes in the provision of the 
service contracts concerning the funding of the Infraco’s obligations following a periodic 
review.
706
   
7.2.3 Commission Decision  
In the assessment of the existence of State aid, the Commission started by identifying which 
compensation measures of the PPP scheme could be problematic in relation to the rules on State 
aid. According to the Commission, these were: the infrastructure service charge (ISC); payments 
to be underpinned by a publicly owned company in favour of Infracos; non-legally binding 
comfort letters; possible additional compensation for extra work; the avoidance of certain 
charges, etc.).
707
 
First, the Commission concluded that the measures in question related to State resources,
708
 and 
that those measures were imputable to the State.
709
 Then, the Commission proceeded to discuss 
whether each measure in question had taken place at undervalue, or if market price was paid. 
The commission explained that “if these arrangements would take place at an undervalue, for 
whatever reason, the Member State would forego the market price, i.e. resources which would 
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normally accrue to and should accrue to the Member State would be foregone, and the 
measures would in that eventuality constitute State aid.”710  
This statement from the Commission implies that in assessing whether aid has been granted, it 
needs to be assessed whether market price has been paid for the contract, including whether the 
recipient undertaking has been relieved from charges it would normally have to bear.
711
   
The Commission then stated that in the assessment of whether the PPP scheme entailed State 
aid, the crucial assessment was whether the arrangements were concluded after the observance 
of an open,
712
 transparent and non-discriminatory procedure,
713
 as the conduct of such a 
procedure would lead to the outcome of market price being paid. If this was the case, there was 
an assumption that, in principle, no State aid is involved.  
Regarding the evaluation of whether an open, transparent and non-discriminatory procedure had 
been conducted, the Commission first stated that the conduct of the procedure according to the 
negotiated procedure under the Utilities Directive 93/38 was reasonable as the value of the 
service elements was greater than the value of the works or supply elements, and it was hence 
reasonable to categorise them as service contracts in accordance with the Utilities Directive.
714
 
Second, the Commission concluded that the call for competition by way of the PIN Notice and 
the OJEC Notice was sufficient for the purposes of an open tendering process.
715
 Third, the 
Commission concluded that the evaluation of the offers on the basis of the most financially 
advantageous tender was fair to all bidders and applied in a consistent way with an appropriate 
methodology, and that the bidders selected therefore represented best value for money.
716
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The Commission then proceeded to evaluate whether the modifications to the contract terms 
after the selection of the preferred bidders caused discrimination or unequal treatment.
717
 The 
Commission held that the flexibility inherent in the negotiated procedure must entail a 
mechanism which provides for ongoing testing (for example to ensure that performance criteria 
remain appropriate and provide necessary incentives) or external factors (such as inflation).
718
 In 
this conclusion, the Commission emphasised that in the present case, the possibility of changes 
to the contract was known to all tenderers in advance, and they further note that the introduction 
of changes was operated in an objective way. Thus, according to the Commission, in the present 
case, the number of modifications introduced did not cause discrimination.  
Finally, the Commission emphasised that the post-selection changes derived from affordability 
constraints, shadow running, the development of an improved understanding of London 
Underground's own requirements, the passing of time and changes in circumstances.
719
  
Furthermore, the Commission found that the post-selection changes were not sufficiently 
substantial, individually or collectively, to be likely to have attracted prospective tenderers who 
did not consider tendering following publication of the original OJEC Notices
720
 , and that the 
changes would not have changed the outcome of the tendering procedure.
721
 Thus, the 
Commission found that “it is compatible with Community legislation for contract details to be 
modified after the selection of preferred bidders without automatically vitiating the presumption 
that the final price is a market price.”722  
On these grounds, the Commission concluded that the tendering process conducted by London 
Underground was open, transparent and non-discriminatory, and that market price was obtained, 
and no State aid was present.
723
  
7.2.4 Comments  
When the Decision from the Commission is analysed, several comments can be made. Below, 
the relevant benchmarks for assessment of whether State aid is granted will be discussed and 
analysed in section 7.2.4.1. Then, it will be discussed how post-selection modifications to the 
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contract are assessed by the Commission in section 7.2.4.2. It is submitted that the 
Commission’s assessment of post-selection modifications can be perceived as erroneous, as the 
assessment is only based on public procurement law. However, as it will be elaborated below, 
when post-selection modifications are analysed from a State aid perspective, it changes the 
outcome of the conclusion. ' 
The first thing which must be emphasised is that the Commission’s assessment of whether 
market price had been obtained was made pursuant to an analysis of whether an open, 
transparent and non-discriminatory tender procedure had been conducted. Correspondingly, 
according to the Commission, market price can be obtained in a procurement context if certain 
requirements in the tender procedure have been met, i.e. if the tender procedure is open, 
transparent and non-discriminatory. It follows that the Commission applied establishment of 
market price to assess whether the award of a contract under the procurement Directives was in 
breach of State aid law. This conclusion from the Commission corresponds to the findings in 
chapter 6, in which it was concluded that the relevant benchmark for advantage is whether the 
measure in question amounts to normal market conditions by obtaining market price.    
Then, in the case of London Underground, the award of the contracts to the selected Infracos 
was made pursuant to a negotiated procedure with prior notification. The Commission explicitly 
emphasised that the prior notification in the OJEC was, in this specific case, sufficient to meet 
the requirements of an open procedure.
724
 This finding coincides with the guidelines from the 
Commission in the Notice on the notion of State aid, in which the Commission states that the 
use of the negotiated procedure without publication of a contract notice will not necessarily be 
sufficient to establish a market price.
725
 The Commission Notice on the notion of State aid will 
be introduced an discussed in the following section.  
7.2.4.1 A competitive, transparent, non-discriminatory and unconditional tender procedure: 
requirements for direct establishment with market conditions  
The requirement of a competitive, transparent, non-discriminatory and unconditional tender 
procedure for the establishment of market price is discussed by the Commission in the Notice on 
the notion of State aid, as referred to in Article 107(1) TFEU of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (hereinafter referred to as the Notice on the notion of State aid or the 
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Notice).
726
 In the Notice, the Commission suggests the conduct of a competitive, transparent, 
non-discriminatory and unconditional tender procedure as one possible (direct) way of 
complying with market conditions and thereby achieving market price. The constituent elements 
for each of the requirements of the tender procedure, i.e. that the tender procedure is 
competitive, transparent, non-discriminatory and unconditional, are elaborated by the 
Commission in the Notice.  
Accordingly, in order for the tender to be competitive, the contracting authority should allow all 
interested and qualified bidders to participate in the process.
727
 Furthermore, the requirement of 
transparency entails that all interested tenderers are equally and duly informed at each stage of 
the tender procedure.
728
 Furthermore, the Commission mentions access to information, sufficient 
time, clarity regarding the selection and award criteria and that the tender is sufficiently well-
publicised as crucial elements of a transparent procedure. Finally, the Commission explains that, 
in its view, non-discriminatory treatment of all bidders as well as objective selection and award 
criteria specified in advance are indispensable conditions for ensuring that the transaction is in 
line with market conditions.
729
  
The Commission does not elaborate on the requirements for an unconditional tender procedure. 
However, some guidance might be found in the Commission Communication on State aid 
elements in sales of land and buildings where the Commission explains that:
730
 
“An offer is ‘unconditional’ when any buyer, irrespective of whether or not he runs a business or 
of the nature of his business, is generally free to acquire the land and buildings and to use it for 
his own purposes, Restrictions may be imposed for the prevention of public nuisance, for reasons 
of environmental protection or to avoid purely speculative bids. Urban and regional planning 
restrictions imposed on the owner pursuant to domestic law on the use of the land and buildings 
do not affect the unconditional nature of an offer.” 
                                                          
726
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With regards to the requirements for the tender procedure for the establishment of market price, 
the Commission explains that:
731
 
“when public bodies buy assets, goods and services, any specific conditions attached to the 
tender should be non-discriminatory and closely and objectively related to the subject matter 
and to the specific economic objective of the contract. They should allow for the most 
economically advantageous offer to match the value of the market. The criteria therefore should 
be defined in such a way as to allow for an effectively competitive tendering procedure which 
leaves the successful bidder with a normal return, not more. In practice, this implies the use of 
tenders which put significant weight on the ‘price’ component of the bid or which are otherwise 
likely to achieve a competitive outcome (e.g. certain reverse tenders with sufficiently clear-cut 
award criteria)” 
This statement from the Commission reveals that in order for a measure to fall outside the scope 
of the State aid rules, the benchmark for assessment is whether the market value has been met, 
and further whether there has been genuine competition for the contract. In the view of the 
Commission, this aim cannot be achieved by way of the negotiated procedure without 
publication of a contract notice or in situations where only one bid is submitted, as this will not 
be sufficient to ensure a market price, unless either:
732
 
(i) there are particularly strong safeguards in the design of the procedure ensuring 
genuine and effective competition and it is not apparent that only one operator is 
realistically able to submit a credible bid or,  
 
(ii) the public authorities verify through additional means that the outcome corresponds to 
the market price.   
The Commission does not give any specific guidance on or specifications for how or when the 
above situations can be deemed to occur. However, the following comments can be made. 
First, one possible method to ensure market price by means of safeguards in the design of the 
procedure could be to conduct a preliminary market consultation, as described in article 40 of 
the public procurement Directive:  
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“before launching a procurement procedure, contracting authorities may conduct market 
consultations with a view to preparing the procurement and informing economic operators of 
their procurement plans and requirements. For this purpose, contracting authorities may for 
example seek or accept advice from independent experts or authorities or from market 
participants. That advice may be used in the planning and conduct of the procurement 
procedure, provided that such advice does not have the effect of distorting competition and does 
not result in a violation of the principles of non-discrimination and transparency.” 
The conduct of a preliminary market consultation can be used by the contracting authorities 
prior to the formal publication of the procedure as a method to consult with interested economic 
operators and make sure that a market for the product or service exists, or to ensure that the 
specifications and terms in the procedure are appropriate.
733
 In this respect, preliminary market 
consultations could be used to ensure the safeguards as prescribed by the Commission in the 
Notice on the notion of State aid provided that the consultation is conducted in a manner that 
does not conflict with the requirements of transparency and non-discrimination.  
Second, the Commission mentions, as an alternative way of ensuring market price, verifications 
through additional means. The term additional means is not specified by the Commission, but 
this formulation implies that the contracting authority is free to choose whatever method it finds 
appropriate to ensure market price. It must be presumed, however, that this method complies 
with the requirements of transparency and non-discrimination, as described above.   
The analyses above show that, according to the Commission, the benchmark for assessment of 
whether advantage has been conferred is fulfilled through obtaining market price. As 
emphasised by the Commission in the Notice on the notion of State aid, market price is ensured 
by way of a competitive, transparent, non-discriminatory and unconditional tender procedure. 
The Commission emphasises that ensuring genuine competition for the contract is a decisive 
element in the establishment of market price. This aim can be achieved either by conducting a 
competitive, transparent, non-discriminatory and unconditional tender procedure, which in 
return can be achieved through the negotiated procedure with prior notification of a contract 
notice, or, if other procedures such as the negotiated procedure without publication of a contract 
notice are used, by i) ensuring strong safeguards in the design of the procedure or ii) through 
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additional means. In relation to the former, it is submitted that a possible method to fulfil this 
requirement is by conducting a preliminary market consultation cf. Article 40 of the public 
procurement Directive. As regards the latter, this entails a rather free choice for the contracting 
authority, provided that the requirements of transparency and non-discrimination are fulfilled.  
7.2.4.2 Assessment of post-selection modifications in a State aid perspective: How does 
application of State aid law change the outcome of the assessment of post-selection 
modifications?  
In its Decision on London Underground, the Commission discusses whether post-selection 
modifications resulted in substantive changes which would have attracted prospective tenderers 
and changed the outcome of the tendering procedure, i.e. which would have changed the 
outcome of the award decision. The Commission found that for London Underground, that was 
not the case. Although it is not directly expressed, the Commission relies on case law derived 
from procurement law in the assessment of whether post-selection modifications are 
allowed.
734
The requirements for a new tender following post-selection modifications to the 
contract under procurement law is discussed in section 7.2.4.2.1 below. Then, an analysis of 
post-selection modifications in a State aid perspective is made in section 7.2.4.2.2. 
7.2.4.2.1 When do modifications to the contract require a new tender under the procurement 
rules? 
In Article 89 of the Utilities Directive from 2014, the situations in which modifications to the 
contract leads to a new procurement procedure are expressly stated. Article 89 is extensive, as it 
provides an exhaustive list of circumstances under which a new tender is or is not required. 
Thus, Article 89(1) reads “Contracts and framework agreements may be modified without a new 
procurement procedure in accordance with this Directive in any of the following cases”. Article 
89 of the utilities Directive resembles Article 72 of the public procurement Directive. For this 
reason, the following analysis also applies to contracts awarded under the public procurement 
Directive.   
Subsections 1-5 of Article 89 relate both to situations where there is no requirement for a new 
tender, and to situations that do require a new tender. Thus, sub-paragraphs 1-2 list situations 
where there is no need for a new tender (Article 89(1)) and situations, where there is no need for 
a new tender provided that the value of the modifications is below certain thresholds (Article 89 
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(2)).In contrast, Article 89(4) lists situations where modifications are considered to be 
substantial and therefore a new tender is required, and finally, Article 89(5) specifies that a new 
tender is required for modifications others than those specifically listed in subsections 1-2. 
The necessity of clarifying the conditions under which modifications to a contract during its 
performance require a new procurement procedure is explained in the preamble to the Utilities 
Directive:
735
  
“It is necessary to clarify the conditions under which modifications to a contract during its 
performance require a new procurement procedure, taking into account the relevant case law of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union. A new procurement procedure is required in case of 
material changes to the initial contract, in particular to the scope and content of the mutual 
rights and obligations of the parties, including the distribution of intellectual property rights. 
Such changes demonstrate the parties’ intention to renegotiate essential terms or conditions of 
that contract. This is the case in particular if the amended conditions would have had an 
influence on the outcome of the procedure, had they been part of the initial procedure. 
Modifications to the contract resulting in a minor change of the contract value up to a certain 
value should always be possible without the need to carry out a new procurement procedure. To 
this effect and in order to ensure legal certainty, this Directive should provide for de minimis 
thresholds, below which a new procurement procedure is not necessary. Modifications to the 
contract above those thresholds should be possible without the need to carry out a new 
procurement procedure to the extent they comply with the relevant conditions laid down in this 
Directive.” 
In the preamble, it is explained that it is necessary to clarify the conditions leading to the 
requirement of a new tender, taking the case law of the CJEU into account. Further, it is 
explained that material changes to the contract that demonstrate the parties’ intention to 
renegotiate essential terms or conditions, and which therefore would have an influence on the 
outcome of the procedure, will lead to a new tender. The formulation in the preamble to the 
Utilities Directive should be understood as a codification of Pressetext
736
, as analysed 
immediately below.   
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In Pressetext, which is perceived as the leading judgment in relation to when contract changes 
constitute a new contract, the CJEU formulated three cumulative criteria which lead to the 
requirement for a new tender.
737
 The case of Pressetext concerned the assessment of changes 
after award of the contract:
738
 
i) An amendment to a public contract during its currency may be regarded as being material 
when it introduces conditions which, had they been part of the initial award procedure, 
would have allowed for the admission of tenderers other than those initially admitted or 
would have allowed for the acceptance of a tender other than the one initially accepted.  
 
ii) Likewise, an amendment to the initial contract may be regarded as being material when it 
extends the scope of the contract considerably to encompass services not initially covered. 
[..] 
 
iii) An amendment may also be regarded as being material when it changes the economic 
balance of the contract in favour of the contractor in a manner which was not provided for 
in the terms of the initial contract.
 739
 
The first condition above refers to situations, where the modification of the contract would have 
given additional tenderers the possibility to participate in the competition for the contract, or 
where the modifications might change the outcome of the award. This situation was explicitly 
considered by the Commission in London Underground, in which case the Commission held 
that the post-selection changes were not so substantial, individually or collectively, as to be 
likely to have attracted other prospective tenderers.
740
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The second condition, as formulated by the CJEU in Pressetext, concerns situations where the 
amendments extend the scope of the contract and add additional measures – something which 
was also discussed by the Commission in London Underground.
741
  
The third condition as mentioned by the CJEU in Pressetext relates to an overall assessment of 
whether there has been a change in the economic balance of the contract. Arrowsmith describes 
this situation in the following way:
742
 
“this third situation [..] constituting a material change means, most obviously, that the price 
cannot be increased without the addition of corresponding obligations.”  
It follows that an increase in the value of the contract constitutes a requirement for a new tender 
in situations as the ones describes above. It could be argued that this constitutes a so-called 
‘change in award’ test. 
However, the scope of changes in relation to the negotiated procedure seems, on the basis of the 
findings in London Underground, to entail a more flexible approach to changes than what was 
seen in Pressetext. Correspondingly, according to the Commission, possible changes to the 
contract had been notified in advance to all tenderers, and therefore, the changes could not be 
considered discriminatory.
743
 The argument behind such a flexible approach seems to be that the 
complexity of the concluded contracts generally leaves more room for changes under the 
negotiated procedure.
744
  
It follows from the above that in the case of London Underground, the Commission relied on 
sources of law from procurement law in the assessment of whether post-selection modifications 
amounted to State aid.  
It can be submitted, however, that State aid case law can be relevant in the assessment of the 
impact of post-selection modifications. In the following, an assessment of post-selection 
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modifications will therefore be made in the light of the ‘avoided costs’ test as developed in 
chapter 6.
745
  
7.2.4.2.2 Can post-selection modifications relieve an undertaking from charges it would 
normally have to bear? 
In chapter 6, it was concluded that measures which relieve an undertaking from charges it would 
normally have to bear can amount to State aid.
746
 In relation to the conclusion above, it can be 
discussed, whether post-selection modifications can amount to charges which an undertaking 
would normally have to bear, and whether this would change the outcome of the conclusion. In 
other words, it should be discussed whether the application of the ‘avoided costs’ test747 under 
State aid law would lead to a different outcome than the ‘change in award’748 test, as applied 
under procurement law.  
First, it must be pointed out that the scope of post-selection changes which is generally 
applicable under procurement law is rather narrow, as both Article 89 of the utilities Directive 
and Article 72 of the public procurement Directive list explicit situations which either lead to a 
requirement for a new tender or not. In relation to the case of London Underground, it must be 
noted, however, that the scope for changes in the contract ex-post is broader, because the award 
was made pursuant to the negotiated procedure with prior notification, and further, that the 
changes were made pursuant to a complex contract. If the post-selection changes to the contract 
in London Underground are assessed in relation to the ‘avoided costs’ test as described in 
chapter 6, the following comments can be made.  
 
The assessment of post-selection modifications under State aid law relates to the question of 
whether an advantage has been conferred and, more specifically, whether the recipient has been 
relieved of charges which it would normally have to bear.
749
  
 
First, it must be pointed out that no distinction should be made between measures which are 
extended from regulation and measures which are the result of free negotiation between the 
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parties.
750
 Accordingly, post-selection modifications could in theory confer an advantage under 
Article 107(1) TFEU. Second, it should be emphasised that the definition of ‘aid’ is broad in 
scope as it entails measures which mitigate the charges which are normally included in the 
budget of an undertaking.
751
 Also, if the State refrains from revenue, the measure is capable of 
falling within the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU.
752
 Finally, it should be emphasised that it 
makes no difference whether the State receives something in return for the State support, for 
instance if the undertaking makes certain commitments in return for conditions it has to fulfil.
 753
   
In London Underground, the Commission made a financial assessment of the changes in the 
contracts introduced after the selection of preferred bidders.
754
 These financial assessments will 
in the following constitute the benchmark for discussion.  
In examining the post-selection changes introduced in the contracts, the Commission made an 
assessment of each of the imposed measures. With regards to changes introduced for measures 
relating to removal of the cap on bonus payments for availability, snagging items and train 
declaration, the Commission concluded the following:
755
 
“[…] the most reasonable analysis is that the volume of work within individual sections of the 
contract increased after the selection of preferred bidders, but the unit price of the work in 
question did not change significantly, and there are therefore no grounds for believing that 
there has been an increase in the rate of compensation” 
With regards to changes introduced for measures relating to increased allowance for minor 
works; introduction of the concept of intermediate works; new penalties for engineering works 
that overrun into service hours; grace periods before the application of certain penalties; changes 
to the treatment of safety and law change costs; requests for changes of customer information; 
train ambience targets for individual lines; changes in liabilities; changes related to the PFI 
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contracts; changes in the arrangements for periodic review and contract termination; and 
comfort letters, the Commission concluded the following:
756
 
“[…] any change in the value of the contract for the preferred bidders is marginal in scale in 
relation to the overall value of the contract”757 
Finally, for measures relating to graffiti clearing; temporary speed restrictions; change in how 
train ambience is measured; limits on London Underground’s use of contractual remedies; 
capability penalties for factors outside Infracos’ control; insurance; increased protection for 
contractors against the possibility of their strategic purchasing decisions being judged non-
economic and efficient; new system of penalties for too-slow fault rectification; and changes to 
the agreed rate of return, the Commission found that the measures should be assessed as 
measures to create outcomes intended in the original contract documents.
758
 
Subsequently, according to the Commission, “none of these changes can reasonably be 
considered as materially improving the value of the contracts for the preferred bidders relative 
to how the contracts stood at the point where preferred bidders were selected”759 and hence, the 
post-selection changes represent market price.  
The assessment of whether post-selection changes still represent market price is made pursuant 
to three arguments from the Commission. The first argument relies on the assumption that, even 
though there was an increase in the volume of work, the unit price did not change and hence, 
market price was paid. The second argument is that the change in value is marginal in scale in 
relation to the overall value of the contract. The third argument relates to established case law 
from the CJEU in Pressetext, as discussed above, and finds that the measures do not change the 
outcomes intended in the original contract. 
I find that the argumentation from the Commission could be perceived as erroneous for two 
reasons.  
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First, as has been laid out by the GC,
760
 the relevant assessment under State aid law is not 
whether the unit price is maintained. Rather, the crucial assessment is whether the overall 
income resembles the one stipulated in the original agreement.
761
  
Second, it is established in case law that even measures of small value are capable of falling 
within the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU. This means that, under State aid law, the relevant 
assessment is whether an advantage has been conferred by relieving the undertaking in question 
from charges it would normally have to bear as opposed to the economic value of the measure. 
In this respect, the following should be noted: As held above, it is explained in the preamble to 
the Utilities Directive, that only material changes can result in the requirement for a new tender. 
Accordingly, modifications which only result in minor changes will therefore not require a new 
tender. Under procurement law, minor changes to the contract imply that the value of the 
modification is small. However, as has been concluded in chapter 6, the value of the measure is 
not decisive for the assessment of aid. Thus, measures that represent a moderate value are 
capable of breaching Article 107(1) TFEU.  
Therefore, it can be concluded that, on this point, inconsistency exists between State aid law and 
public procurement law. Where the procurement Directives hold that modifications to the 
contract resulting in a minor change of the contract value do not lead to the conduct of a new 
tender, State aid law oppositely finds that the value of the measure in question is not relevant for 
the assessment of the existence of aid. In other words, the two areas of law do not coincide on 
this point.   
This means that situations may arise, where the presence of State aid does not lead to the 
requirement of a new tender. In my opinion, these situations are inappropriate, as they may be 
likely to lead to conferral of disguised State aid, which in its nature is problematic.  
In conclusion, the argumentation from the Commission relies on arguments which cannot be 
considered adequate to conclude whether market price is obtained. In a State aid perspective, the 
relevant assessment is whether the winning tenderer has been relieved from charges which it 
would normally have to bear, and thus whether an advantage has been conferred. In this respect, 
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the value of the changes, or whether the unit price is maintained, is irrelevant in a State aid 
perspective.  
7.3 SNCM 
In a recent case, namely the case of SNCM
762
, the GC considered whether the award of a public 
contract constituted State aid within Article 107(1) TFEU. To my knowledge, this is the first 
case decided by the CJEU concerning alleged State aid on the basis of award of a public contract 
under the public procurement Directive. The case concerned, among other things, the 
classification of State aid as compensation for a public service and ultimately, whether the 
classification of the measure as a service of general economic interest (SGEI)
763
 was correct.
764
 
The case is illustrative for the research question asked in this Thesis since the public service 
operator was chosen pursuant to a tender procedure which ultimately led to the award of a 
public service delegation for maritime transport services between mainland France and 
Corsica.
765
 One particularly interesting aspect of the case is that the Commission and the GC 
finds that the service in question does not concern a SGEI, but nevertheless continues to 
consider whether a tender procedure should have been conducted. As will be elaborated below, 
this could imply that a link between procurement law and State aid law is established by the 
CJEU for other services than SGEIs. However, it is argued that the alleged link between public 
procurement law and State aid law is not established in this case.    
 
7.3.1 Background of the case 
The background to the dispute was a complaint to the Commission from a French shipping 
company (Corsica Ferries) alleging the conferral of State aid to two shipping companies (SNCM 
and CMN) as a result of the award of a public contract. The contract in question was a public 
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service delegation contract (PSDC) relating to maritime services to be provided in Corsica. The 
services to be provided concerned a permanent ‘passenger and freight’ service to be provided 
throughout the year on all the routes concerned (‘the basic service’) and an additional 
‘passenger’ service to be provided during peak periods on the Marseilles-Ajaccio, Marseilles-
Bastia and Marseilles-Propriano routes (‘the additional service’).766 
 
7.3.2 Award of contract  
On 30 December 2006, a notice of call for tenders was published in the Official Journal of the 
European Union, as well as in two local newspapers on 4 January 2007. The call for tender 
concerned a public service delegation (PSD) for maritime services from the port of Marseilles to 
several Corsican ports.
767
 On 9 February 2007, two bids were submitted: a joint bid by SNCM 
and CMN and a bid by Corsica Ferries.
768
 A prior call for tenders was published on 27 May 
2006, but this call was annulled on 15 December 2006.
769
  
Following several negotiation phases, the SNCM-CMN group was awarded the PSD for the 
ferry service between the port of Marseilles and the Corsican ports in the period from 1 July 
2007 to 31 December 2013.
770
  
The decision to award the contract to the SNCM-CMN group was based in particular on the 
grounds that:
771
  
“[…] the SNCM-CMN group’s bid meets the requirements and criteria of the specific 
regulations of the call for tenders and the tender specifications for each of the five routes and, 
second, that Corsica Ferries is not able to set a firm and final date on which it would be able to 
operate the next [PSD] and, in this respect, the conditions which it sets out, relating to matters 
falling outside the [PSD]’s content, cannot be taken into consideration.” 
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7.3.3 Commission Decision  
Following the award of the contract to the SNCM-CMN group, the Commission received a 
complaint from Corsica Ferries concerning alleged State aid. The Commission decided to open 
formal investigations which ultimately led to a Decision
772
 (the contested decision).  
 
In order to determine whether the compensation granted to SNCM and CMN constituted State 
aid and, in particular, conferred a selective advantage to the SNCM-CMN group, the 
Commission examined whether the cumulative criteria laid down by the CJ in Altmark
773
were 
satisfied, and in particular whether the first and fourth criteria were satisfied.
774
  
In Altmark, the CJ formulated a number of criteria
775
 which must be fulfilled when determining 
whether the compensation for delivery of a public service obligation (PSO) amounts to State 
aid.
776
 According to the CJ, the criteria which must be fulfilled in order for compensation for the 
delivery of PSOs not to amount to State aid are: the PSO must be clearly defined; the calculation 
of the compensation must be laid down in advance in an objective and transparent manner’, and 
no overcompensation may occur.
777
 In the fourth criterion of the test, the CJ stated that if the 
choice of the provider of the PSO is not made pursuant to a public procurement procedure,
778
 the 
public authority is obliged to make a benchmarking exercise to make sure that no State aid is 
granted. The fourth criteria in Altmark was formulated as follows:
779
  
“[…] where the undertaking which is to discharge public service obligations, in a specific case, 
is not chosen pursuant to a public procurement procedure which would allow for the selection 
of the tenderer capable of providing those services at the least cost to the community, the level of 
compensation needed must be determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs which a 
typical undertaking, well run and adequately provided with means of transport so as to be able 
to meet the necessary public service requirements, would have incurred in discharging those 
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obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging the 
obligations.”780 
  
In its Decision in the case of SNCM, the Commission first considered whether the service in 
question amounted to a real public service need. The Commission found
781
 that the classification 
of the service in question as a public service did not correspond to a real public service and 
consequently, according to the Commission, France had made a manifest error of assessment in 
classifying the service in question as an SGEI. Thereby, the first Altmark criterion was not 
fulfilled according to the Commission.  
 
Additionally, the Commission considered whether the compensation provided to the SNCM-
CMN group fulfilled the fourth Altmark criteria,
 782
 and essentially whether the selection of the 
SNCM-CMN group represented the selection of the tenderer capable of providing the services at 
the least cost to the community.
783
 The Commission found that the fourth Altmark criterion was 
not fulfilled on the basis of a number of factors:
784
  
 
–        the PSD was awarded following a negotiated procedure after publication of a notice of 
call for tenders, which procedure confers broad discretion on the contracting authority and 
may restrict the participation of the operators concerned;  
 
–        the only bid competing with that of the two concession holders, namely that of Corsica 
Ferries, was not assessed on the basis of its own merits (award criteria) but on the basis of a 
single selection criterion, namely the tenderer’s ability to commence operations on 1 July 2007; 
 
–       the procedure thus did not allow the CTB to compare several bids in order to select the 
most economically advantageous one; 
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–        the fact that two bids were actually submitted was not sufficient to guarantee effective 
competition, inasmuch as the competing bid from Corsica Ferries, which gave 12 November 
2007 as a start date for operations, was not able to provide a credible alternative; 
 
–        the multiple sets of legal proceedings brought in the present case is not evidence in favour 
of the effectiveness of competition in the procurement procedure for the PSDC; 
 
–        the SNCM-CMN group had a significant competitive advantage as the incumbent 
operator that already had vessels adapted to the requirements of the PSDC’s tender 
specifications;  
 
–        the very short time set between the date of awarding the PSD (ultimately awarded on 7 
June 2007) and the date of commencement of services (1 July 2007) was likely to constitute a 
significant barrier to entry for new entrants; 
 
–        combined with the technical requirements related to the specific conditions of the ports 
involved, the condition concerning the age of the fleet and the unit capacities required by the 
PSDC’s tender specifications, this very short time frame was likely to limit participation in the 
call for tenders; 
 
–        the existence of numerous clauses providing for meetings associated with the freedom 
given to the CTB to decide upon exemptions to rules may also have helped to dissuade tenderers 
from taking part in the call for tenders by raising doubts about some technical and economic 
parameters that were critical to the preparation of a bid.
785
 
Accordingly, the terms of the tender procedure failed to enable a candidate to be selected who 
was capable of providing the services in question at the least cost to the community.
786
 
Furthermore, the Commission held that the French authorities had failed to demonstrate that the 
compensation had been calculated by reference to a comparable undertaking, and thereby the 
measure also failed to fulfil the second limb of the fourth Altmark criteria.
787
  
 
Consequently, according to the Commission, the fourth Altmark criterion was not satisfied 
either.
788
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7.3.4 Findings of the General Court  
The GC agreed with the Commission in its assessment that the service in question did not 
constitute an SGEI and thus that the first Altmark criterion was not fulfilled.
789
  
 
In relation to the question of whether the fourth Altmark criterion had been fulfilled, the GC first 
held:
790
 
 
“It is clear from a set of consistent indicia that the tendering procedure conducted in the 
present case clearly did not result in effective and open competition sufficient to make it 
possible to select the candidate capable of providing the maritime transport services at the least 
cost to the community.”791 
 
Accordingly, the GC found that the tender procedure did not result in effective and open 
competition and consequently, the GC agreed that the Commission was correct in finding that 
the chosen candidate was not capable of providing the services in question at the least cost to the 
community.  
 
The GC especially based the conclusion above on the following three arguments. Firstly, the GC 
emphasised that the award of contract pursuant to a negotiated procedure with publication can 
satisfy the fourth Altmark criterion only in exceptional cases as the negotiated procedure confers 
a broad discretion on the contracting authority and may restrict the participation of interested 
operators.
792
 Secondly, only two bids were submitted following the call for tenders.
793
 Although 
the GC did not state so directly, this statement could be analysed to mean that since only two 
bids were submitted, the call for tenders did not create sufficient competition for the contract. 
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Thirdly, and in extension of the second argument, the GC found that a series of factors
794
 had 
discouraged or even prevented potential candidates from participating in the call for tenders.
795
  
   
Therefore, the GC held that the Commission was correct in concluding that the fourth Altmark 
criterion was not fulfilled in the case.
796
  
 
7.3.5 Comments 
SNCM is an important case in relation to the research question asked in this Thesis. First, it 
confirms the link between public procurement law and State aid law by assessing whether the 
fourth Altmark criterion has been satisfied in a situation where the service provider has been 
chosen pursuant to a tender procedure.  
 
Furthermore, the case shows that several circumstances might not fulfil the fourth criterion in 
Altmark. In this respect, what can be deduced from this case is that the negotiated procedure 
with prior publication is not sufficient to fulfil Altmark if sufficient competition has not been 
created, e.g. because only two bids is submitted or if factors exist which have prevented or 
discouraged potential candidates from participating. However, the Altmark case did not address 
the question whether and if so to which extend State aid can occur in procurement situations 
where the service does not concern a SGEI. This means, that there is great uncertainty when it 
comes to the question of when the award of public contracts constitute State aid. In this respect, 
the case of SNCM might establish a link between State aid rules and procurement rules for other 
services than SGEIs. Arguably, the fact that the Commission and the GC continued to assess the 
fourth Altmark criterion is spite of the fact that they concluded that the service in question was 
not an SGEI, could imply that the fourth Altmark criterion applies to non-SGEIs. However, it 
must be emphasised that such an interpretation would be a great extension of the boundaries 
between state aid law and procurement law. Therefore it could be argued that if the GC made 
such an extension, it would do so in more clear terms, i.e. by emphasising the established 
connection between the two areas of law. on this ground, I do not find that the case of SNCM 
can be considered to establish a link between State aid law and procurement law for non-SGEIs 
in situations where the award of contract is made pursuant to a tender procedure.  
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However, the above does not mean that the case of SNCM does not provide any guidance at all. 
In this respect, it must be emphasised that the Commission sets out clear guidance concerning 
when the award of the contract constitutes State aid. As held above, the GC confirms the 
conclusions from the Commission, including the factors that gave rise to the conclusion that the 
fourth Altmark criterion was not fulfilled. Thus, it could be argued that the following factors can 
give rise to State aid, in situations where the award of contract is made pursuant to a negotiated 
tender procedure: 
 
- The number of bidders must ensure effective competition for the contract – two bids 
are not sufficient to ensure effective competition 
 
- The occurrence of a significant competitive advantage prior to the tender procedure  
can amount to State aid– the winning tenderer already had vessels which lived up to 
the requirements from the contracting authority 
 
 
- Factors which can dissuade tenderers from taking part in the call for tenders - Short 
deadlines and the existence of numerous clauses 
 
  
7.4 Greek airports 
In a recent Decision, the Commission considered whether the award of a public concession 
contract amounted to State aid.
797
 The case is used to illustrate how the Commissions assesses 
whether an advantage has been conferred on the winning tenderer when the award concerns 
legal direct award. As will be elaborated below, this case also illustrates how advantage is 
conferred regarding award of public contracts under the Concession Directive.   
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7.4.1 Background of the case  
On 3 October 2016, the Greek authorities, for reasons of legal certainty, notified the 
Commission of two service concession contracts in accordance with Article 108(3) TFEU. The 
contracts granted the concession for the upgrade, maintenance, management and operation of 
seven regional airports located in Greece. The concession was grouped in two clusters, namely 
Cluster A encompassing the Cretan, Continental Greece and Ionian Sea regional airports, and 
Cluster B encompassing the Aegean regional airports (Rodos, Kos, Santorini, Mikonos, Mitilini, 
Samos and Skiathos).
798
  
 
7.4.2 Award of contract 
On 3 April 2013, the Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund (HRADF) launched a tender 
process for the award of concessions for the upgrade, maintenance, management and operation 
of 14 regional airports grouped in two clusters.
799
 The concession was awarded on 25 November 
2015 for both clusters to a consortium (Fraport AG-Slentel Ltd consortium) for a period of 40 
years with a possible extension once for a period of up to 10 years upon the mutual agreement of 
the parties and provided that the extension does not give rise to any issues under the State aid 
rules.
800
 
Since the contract was awarded at a time when the contract fell outside the scope of the 
concession Directive, the Greek authorities explained that the contract was instead awarded 
directly in accordance with the communication
801
 to contract awards not or not fully subject to 
the provisions of the public procurement directives. The Greek authorities further explained to 
the Commission that the HRADF had complied with the general principles of the Treaty 
throughout the process, since the contract was likely to generate cross-border interest.
802
  
The invitation to submit tenders was advertised on 3 April 2013 in several newspapers.
803
 In 
response to the invitation, HRADF received 11 expressions of interests of which seven were 
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found compliant with the requirements for participating in phase 2. 
804
 Three final bids were 
received on 10 October 2014.
805
 
7.4.3 Commission Decision 
In assessing whether the concession agreements conferred an advantage on the concessionaire, 
the Commission reiterated its previous statement from the Notice on the notion of State aid
806
 by 
emphasising that:
807
 
 
“The Commission considers that, if the sale and purchase of assets, goods and services are 
carried out following a competitive, transparent, non-discriminatory and unconditional tender 
procedure, it can be presumed that those transactions are in line with market conditions […]. 
This also applies to other comparable transactions, such as the award of concessions for the 
operation of commercial assets, and therefore applies to the award of the concessions subject to 
the present decision.”808  
Accordingly, the Commission found that the requirements for a competitive, transparent, non-
discriminatory and unconditional tender procedure also apply to concession contracts, and thus also 
to the award of the concessions subject to the present decision. 
The Commission went on to state that a tender procedure is considered competitive, transparent, 
non-discriminatory and unconditional if the following conditions are fulfilled:809 
i. all interested and qualified bidders are allowed to participate in the process. 
ii. the procedure is transparent to allow all interested tenderers to be equally and duly informed 
at each stage of the tender procedure. Information is accessible and sufficient time is given for 
interested tenderers, the selection and award criteria are clear and the tender is sufficiently 
well-publicised, so that all potential bidders can take note of it. 
iii. non-discriminatory treatment of all bidders at all stages of the procedure and the selection 
and award criteria are objective and specified in advance of the process. 
                                                          
804
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iv. the tender is unconditional, for example a potential buyer should not be required to assume 
special obligations for the benefit of the public authorities or in the general public interest, 
which a private seller would not have demanded - other than those arising from general 
domestic law or a decision of the planning authorities. 
Then, the Commission concluded that phase 1 of the tender procedure was transparent
810
 and 
non-discriminatory.
811
 Furthermore, the Commission found that phase 2 of the procedure did not 
restrict the scope of eligible bidders and that it was not discriminatory.
812
 
The Commission also emphasised that the interested bidders were given sufficient time to 
provide the required documentation and subsequently, “the Eligible Investors had therefore 
ample time to understand the Tender Process and the Concession Agreements, and to prepare 
fully-considered submissions.”813 Thus, the Commission therefore concluded that the bidders 
were given enough time and information was accessible.
814
  
On these grounds, the Commission concluded that the tender to award the concessions was 
competitive, transparent, non-discriminatory and unconditional.
815
  
Regarding the price of the bids, the Commission concluded that the Greek authorities awarded 
the concession to the highest bidder.
816
  
7.4.4 Comments  
This Decision confirms the Commission's approach regarding assessment of whether an 
advantage has been granted as laid down in Notice on the notion of State aid and as seen in the 
Decision regarding London Underground, as analysed above.  
Thus, a tender procedure which is competitive, transparent, non-discriminatory and 
unconditional and which awards the contract to the highest bidder escapes the remit of Article 
107(1) TFEU. 
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Furthermore, the Decision establishes a link between competitive, transparent, non-
discriminatory and unconditional tender procedures in the Notice on the notion of State aid and 
concession contracts. With this, it can be concluded that the same requirements exists for public 
contracts awarded under the concession Directive as for public contracts awarded under the 
public procurement Directive.  
In this case, the Greek authorities emphasised the fact that the contract had been awarded in 
respect of the general principles in the Treaty. The following comments can be made in this 
respect.  
 
7.4.4.1. How does the concept of advantage relate to the general principles of non-
discrimination and transparency applicable under procurement law?   
In situations where the contracting authority awards contracts to undertakings directly, i.e. 
without the conduct of a tender procedure, either because the award is below threshold or 
because the subject matter of the contract is not covered by the procurement Directives, 
procurement rules do not apply. This does not mean, however, that the award can be made 
without respecting the Treaty. The CJEU has stated on numerous occasions that the general 
principles of the Treaty apply to the contracting authorities is situations where the procurement 
directives do not apply.
817
  
In this regard, the rules of the Treaty have implications for the contracting authority in two 
respects. First, in a procurement context, the CJEU has held that the general principles flowing 
from the Treaty oblige the contracting authorities to act in a transparent and non-discriminatory 
way when they award public contracts. This implies that although the contract is outside the 
scope of the procurement rules, the contracting authority is not entirely free to choose how the 
contract is awarded. Second, as established in chapter 2, the State aid rules affect contracting 
authorities by way of the prohibition in Article 107(1) TFEU. This means that contracts awarded 
outside the scope of the procurement rules do not escape the prohibition laid down in Article 
107(1) TFEU either.  
                                                          
817
 For an analysis of the application of the general principles in the Treaty under procurement law, see chapter 2, 
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The Commission has published an Interpretative Communication
818
 in which it gives guidance 
on how the Member States should apply the basic principles deriving from the case law from the 
CJEU when contracts are awarded directly. In the Communication, the Commission emphasises 
that when the contracting authority awards contracts directly to an undertaking, it must assess 
whether the contract in question is relevant to the Internal Market and if it is, the contracting 
authority has to award the contract “in conformity with the basic standards derived from 
Community [Union] law”.819 According to the Commission, this assessment entails a number of 
factors which must be taken into account, including, advertising, contract award and judicial 
protection.  
Since the direct award of contracts falls outside the scope of the rocurement Directives, no 
specific requirements exist regarding how the contracting authority should advertise the 
contract. However, the requirements of advertising should ensure that the obligation of 
transparency is met. In this respect, the Commission emphasises that the contracting authorities 
are responsible for choosing the most appropriate medium for advertising their contracts.
820
 
According to the Commission, the choice should be “guided by an assessment of the relevance 
of the contract to the Internal Market, in particular in view of its subject-matter and value and 
of the customary practices in the relevant sector.”821 
The Commission emphasises that contacting a number of potential tenderers would not be 
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of transparency, since such an approach is selective and 
cannot prevent discrimination against potential tenderers from other Member States and in 
particular new entrants to the market.
822
 Likewise, what is referred to as ‘passive’ publicity in 
the form of omission of active advertising is, according to the Commission, capable of 
breaching the requirements of transparency.
823
  
Furthermore, the content of the advertisement should include essential details of the contract to 
be awarded as well as the award method. Also, the advertisement should include “as much 
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information as an undertaking from another Member State will reasonably need to make a 
decision on whether to express its interest in obtaining the contract.”824   
In this respect, publication of a sufficiently accessible advertisement prior to the award of the 
contract should be seen as a means to ensuring that the obligation of transparency is met. Also, 
sufficient advertisement prior to the award will ensure that the contract award is opened up to 
competition.  
Specific situations might arise where the contracting authority is forced to award the contract 
without prior advertisement. Such situations include situations of extreme urgency due to 
unforeseeable events or contracts which can only be executed by one particular economic 
operator, i.e. for technical or artistic reasons. Such situations are cf. 32 of the procurement 
Directive suitable for award without prior publication of a contract notice. According to the 
Commission, the derogations in Article 32 of the procurement Directive may be applied to the 
award of contracts not covered by the directives, and hence contracts may be awarded directly in 
situations described in article 32.
825
  
The above shows that the contracting authorities are obliged by a transparency requirement 
when they award contracts outside the scope of the procurement Directives. Furthermore, it 
should be discussed how the notion of advantage relates to the requirement of transparency.  
The analysis in chapter 6 showed that the concept of advantage entails an obligation for the 
State – and thereby the contracting authorities – to ensure that market forces are preserved. Also, 
the contracting authority has an obligation, by way of the State aid rules, to ensure that the 
undertaking in question is not relieved from charges it would normally have to bear. It must be 
assumed that the obligations flowing from the State aid rules are applicable to the contracting 
authorities regardless of whether the purchase is made following a tender procedure or as a 
consequence of direct award of contract. Consequently, the contracting authority is obliged to 
ensure that market forces are preserved and that the undertakings are not relieved from charged 
they would normally have to bear.  
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In Coname
826
, the CJEU held that the direct award of a contract could possibly amount to a 
difference in treatment, and thereby indirect discrimination, for interested undertakings in other 
Member States. In that respect, the requirement of transparency should ensure that interested 
parties have access to appropriate information regarding the contract and thus have the 
opportunity to express interest in the contract. Although this was not stated directly by the CJEU 
in Coname, it must be assumed that ensuring transparency when public contracts are awarded 
directly could help to make sure that market forces are preserved, since transparency could 
ensure that interested parties in other Member States can express interest in the contract with the 
result of opening up the market for the contract.  
On the basis of the above, it can thus be concluded that an obligation exists for the contracting 
authorities to respect the general principles of the Treaty when they award public contracts 
outside the scope of the procurement Directives. Therefore, the Greek authorities were correct in 
taking the general principles of the Treaty into consideration when the contract was awarded.  
 
7.5 Award of public contracts: establishment of market price as benchmark for 
assessment of market price? 
The above has shown that the decisive benchmark for assessing whether an advantage has been 
conferred and thus, whether the award of a public contract represents a normal market 
transaction relies on the specific circumstances of the contract. The conclusions made above can 
be summarised as follows: 
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Table I: Illustration of how advantage occurs under the identified award situations 
  Case/Decision Benchmark for 
assessment of 
advantage  
Satisfies the State aid 
rules? 
Satisfies the 
procurement rules?  
Award by public 
tender (negotiated 
procedure) 
London 
Underground 
- competitive, 
transparent, non-
discriminatory and 
unconditional tender 
procedure 
- sufficient 
competition for the 
contract 
Yes,  
(post-selection 
modifications) 
Yes 
(Adherence to 
procedural rules) 
Award by 
concession  
Greek airports - competitive, 
transparent, non-
discriminatory and 
unconditional tender 
procedure 
- highest bidder  
Yes Yes 
Legal direct award Greek airports - competitive, 
transparent, non-
discriminatory and 
unconditional tender 
procedure 
- highest bidder 
Yes 
(Assumption of 
breach) 
Yes, if  
adherence to general 
principles in the 
Treaty 
Illegal direct award  BAI - Genuine need  
- Can market price be 
obtained? 
No 
(No genuine need) 
No 
(Breach of 
procedural rules and 
general principles)  
 
In the case of London Underground, where the contract had been awarded following a 
negotiated tender procedure, the Commission concluded that the award did not confer an 
advantage on the winning tenderer since the award represented a competitive, transparent, non-
discriminatory and unconditional tender procedure. Furthermore, the fact that there had been 
sufficient competition for the contract was a determining factor for the result that no advantage 
was conferred.  
In the Greek airports case, the GC found that the award did not confer an advantage since it was 
competitive, transparent, non-discriminatory and unconditional. Furthermore, the Commission 
found that the Greek authorities had adhered to the general principles of the Treaty, and the 
measure thus did not constitute State aid. As argued above, this conclusion both applies for legal 
direct awards and for awards under the concession Directive. 
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BAI was arguably a case of illegal direct award. The benchmark for assessment in this case was 
not market price, but rather whether the purchase represented a genuine need for the authority. 
The reasons behind this conclusion from the GC will be further analysed in chapter 8 of this 
Thesis. For the purpose of this chapter, suffice it to conclude that in this case, whether or not 
market price had been obtained was not the decisive benchmark for the outcome. 
Accordingly, market price is established through different means according to which procedure 
is analysed. However, it has to be emphasised that since the CJ has not yet taken the opportunity 
to rule on the question of whether State aid occurs when public contracts are awarded, the 
conclusions made in this chapter does not necessarily represent the final conclusion to this 
question. In other words, it remains to be seen whether the CJ will confirm the conclusions 
made above.    
 
7.6 Conclusions  
The presence of advantage in relation to a public contract awarded following a tender procedure 
under the procurement Directives relates, in essence, to the question of whether the tender 
procedure, including the terms of the contract, reflects normal market conditions, and hence 
whether market price is obtained. 
This chapter has analysed selected cases that represent legal and illegal direct award of public 
contracts, award by negotiated procedure and award of public contracts by concessions. As has 
been accounted for above, the question of whether the award of a contract under the 
procurement Directive amounts to State aid is unsolved in the case law from the CJ. Therefore, 
the analysis of this question has relied on judgments from the GC as well as Commission 
Decisions.  
The analysis has shown that the benchmark for obtaining market price when public contracts are 
awarded is not unambiguous. Hence, it is necessary to take the concrete circumstances of the 
case into consideration when it is decided whether the award confers an advantage on the 
winning tenderer.  
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The Commission has given comprehensive guidance on its view. Subsequently, according to the 
Commission, the conduct of a competitive, transparent, non-discriminatory and unconditional 
tender procedure entails that market conditions are fulfilled and market price is paid.  
From the Decision in London Underground, it can be derived that the Commission finds that the 
negotiated procedure with prior notification adheres to the requirement of competitive, 
transparent, non-discriminatory and unconditional tender procedure in so far as the call for 
competition, as well as the evaluation of the offers on the basis of the most economically 
advantageous tender, was fair to all bidders and applied in a consistent way with an appropriate 
methodology, and hence the procedures were sufficient for the purposes of an open tendering 
process. However, the analysis in section 7.2.4 shows that this conclusion could, in my opinion, 
be jeopardised, if State aid case law is taken into consideration. Accordingly, the assessment of 
whether market price is obtained differs when the assessment is made on the basis of the 
‘avoided costs’ test, as accounted for in chapter 6, as opposed to the ‘change in award’ test, as 
applied by the Commission in the case of London Underground.   
In the Greek airports case, the alleged advantage was also evaluated on the basis of whether the 
award was made pursuant to a competitive, transparent, non-discriminatory and unconditional 
tender procedure. Furthermore, adherence to the general principles in the Treaty was a 
contributing factor to the conclusion that no State aid was granted to the recipient. 
In an analysis of the cases from the GC, it is uncertain whether the conduct of a competitive, 
transparent, non-discriminatory and unconditional tender procedure necessarily satisfies the 
requirements in Article 107(1) TFEU. The cases chosen for analysis do not provide a clear 
answer to this question. In BAI, the GC did not use market price as the benchmark for evaluation 
of whether the award represented normal market conditions. Rather, the decisive benchmark 
was whether a genuine need existed for the purchase.  
In SNCM, the GC had to decide whether the award of a contract following a tender procedure 
could be classified as a SGEI. The case is interesting since it establishes a possible link between 
procurement law and State aid law for services that do not relate to SGEIs. Thus, the GC found 
that the service in question did not constitute a SGEI, but nevertheless assessed whether the 
fourth Altmark criterion was fulfilled – something which was unnecessary since the criteria set 
out in Altmark are cumulative. In this respect, it was discussed whether the fact that the GC 
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proceeded to consider the fourth Altmark criterion could be seen as an indication that the GC 
established a link between SGEIs and other services awarded under the procurement Directives. 
It was held that such a connection could not be established, and thus no connection between 
Altmark and services relating to non-SGEIs awarded under the procurement directives can be 
said to occur. However, it was concluded that the case gave important guidance regarding which 
factors could amount in State aid, including: The number of participants in the competition for 
the contract; the occurrence of a competitive advantage for the contract and factors which could 
dissuade interested tenderers from participating in the call for tenders, including short deadlines 
and numerous clauses.  
In conclusion, this chapter has shown that the benchmark for assessment of whether State aid is 
granted when public contracts are awarded relies on the assessment of a number of indicators 
which are indicative for whether market price has been obtained.  
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PART III 
The Market Economy Purchaser Principle (MEPP) as a possible benchmark for 
the assessment of advantage 
 
This part discusses the applicability and application of the Market Economy Investor Principle 
(MEIP) to contracting authorities. The MEIP is used as a test to assess whether the actions of the 
State amounts to State aid. Under the MEIP, the actions of the State are compared to those of 
private operators in order to assess whether the private operator would have behaved as the State 
did. If the actions of the State cannot be compared to those of the private operator, State aid 
occurs. In this respect it will be discussed whether award of public contracts are comparable to a 
private operator. Furthermore, the MEPP will be introduced and discussed in order to assess the 
constituent elements of the test. This is done in order to discuss whether the MEPP provides a 
sufficient safeguard for the assessment of advantage when public contracts are awarded.    
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Chapter 8 
8. The benchmark for the assessment of advantage for purchasing activities: 
Introduction to the Market Economy Purchaser Principle (MEPP)  
This chapter analyses the benchmark for assessment of whether a transaction from the State 
involves an advantage for the recipient. As will be elaborated on below, it is not clear from the 
case law whether the benchmark applied to measures of State intervention in the form of 
investments (the Market Economy Investor Principle, hereafter MEIP) is applicable to 
contracting authorities when they purchase. On this basis, this chapter seeks to analyse how the 
assessment of advantage is conducted in relation to the award of public contracts.  
Section 8.1 introduces the test used to assess whether public market participation confers an 
advantage on the recipient (the MEIP) and discusses the constituent elements of the principle. 
Then, section 8.2 discusses whether the MEIP is applicable to contracting authorities when it 
purchases from the market. It is submitted that the MEIP is not applicable to purchasing 
activities and thus not applicable to the awarding of public contracts. Finally, section 8.3 
introduces an alternative test for assessment of whether an advantage has been conferred when 
public contracts are awarded. Section 8.3 also analyses how this test has been used by the CJEU. 
8.1 The Market Economy Investor Principle and other tests for market 
participation 
This section briefly introduces the Market Economy Investor Principle (MEIP), without going 
into too much detail with the concept. As the aim of the Thesis is to analyse in which situations 
the awarding of public contracts constitute State aid within Article 107(1) TFEU, this section 
will briefly discuss the MEIP in general before turning to analyse whether the MEIP is 
applicable to contracting authorities in section 8.2.  
The MEIP is used as a possible benchmark for assessment of whether a transaction from the 
State involves an advantage for the recipient. In this respect, the MEIP is used as a test to assess 
whether the State has granted an economic advantage to an undertaking by not acting like a 
market economy operator. Thus, the decisive benchmark for the MEIP is whether the State has 
acted as a market economy operator would have acted in a similar situation. The reasoning 
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behind this comparison is that if the behaviour of the State can be compared to that of similar 
private economic operators operating under normal market conditions, then the economic 
transactions, carried out by the State, do not confer an advantage on the recipient.  
The MEIP could be seen as a kind of ‘derogation’ from State aid rules, insofar as the MEIP 
allows Member States to provide State support without being subject to State aid control: if the 
transaction fulfils the MEIP, it is outside the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU. However, as held 
by Cyndecka, this aim is too narrow to comprise the concept of the MEIP:
827
 
“the MEIP aims to address the fact that the state acts both as a public authority and an 
entrepreneur. This ‘dual image of Janus’ results from Article 345 TFEU that encapsulates the 
principle of neutrality and equality of undertakings. They may thus freely decide on the size of 
the public and private sectors, set up, run and own public undertaking, privatize or nationalize 
them. Moreover, the Commission can neither favour nor discriminate public entrepreneurs 
because of their legal status. Yet, the principle of equality of public and private undertakings 
subject the former to competition law, thus also the State aid rules.”828   
As held above, the criterion of whether a transaction corresponds to normal market conditions 
originates from the principle of equal treatment between private and public undertakings 
provided in Article 345 TFEU:
829
 
 “the Treaties shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of 
property ownership.” 
According to Article 345, TFEU neutrality exists with regard to national property law, and 
hence, state owned or controlled undertakings must be treated equally with private undertakings. 
The development of the MEIP has taken place in the context of the neutral position of the Treaty 
with regard to State ownership.
830
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The MEIP is often criticised for being inadequate or impracticable. As stated by Hancher:
831
 
“the major limitation to the test is that the state will inevitably be in a different position from any 
hypothetical private investor” 
One of the main criticisms of the MEIP is that it is difficult to compare the State to a private 
undertaking when it invests, because the State is in possession of different and more extensive 
resources than a private undertaking, e.g. in relation to the funds at its disposal.
832
 This argument 
could imply that the State can never be compared to a private undertaking and thus, the MEIP is, 
by definition, inapplicable. However, there might be dangers in taking the comparison too far. 
As held by Khan and Borchardt:
833
  
“Clearly, in assessing any given situation, the position of the putative private investor has to be 
considered in relation to the same transaction, under the same conditions as that entered into by 
the State […]. Less obvious however is the extent to which the putative private investor may be 
attributed with characteristics the actual State investor possesses by reason of being the State. 
The danger in carrying the parallel too far is that because the State is not subject to the 
constraints that inhibit the real private investor, the test may cease to be realistic.”834  
However, an alternative benchmark has not been developed, possibly because such an 
alternative is difficult to find.  
The MEIP relates to situations in which the State makes a public investment in an undertaking. 
In this respect, investments, which a market operator would not have carried out under normal 
market economy conditions, amount to an advantage within Article 107(1) TFEU. The Meura
835
 
and Boch II
836
 cases are known as the first cases in which the CJEU approved the MEIP.
837,838
 In 
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Meura and Boch II, the MEIP was considered by the CJEU in two situations where the State had 
invested in unprofitable undertakings. In Meura, the CJEU held that:
839
  
“an appropriate way of establishing whether such a measure is a state aid is to apply the 
criterion which was mentioned in the commission ' s decision […], of determining to what extent 
the undertaking would be able to obtain the sums in question on the private capital markets . In 
the case of an undertaking whose capital is held by the public authorities , the test is , in 
particular , whether in similar circumstances a private shareholder , having regard to the 
foreseeability of obtaining a return and leaving aside all social , regional-policy and sectoral 
considerations , would have subscribed the capital in question .” 
Neither in Meura nor in Boch II did the CJEU find that the State fulfilled the requirements of the 
MEIP, i.e. behaved like a private market operator acting in similar circumstances under normal 
market conditions.
840
  
The CJEU has expanded the MEIP to other areas of State participation and has developed 
modified tests in other areas where the State is involved in market activities, including situations 
where the State acts as creditor;
841
 seller;
842
 guarantor;
843
 reinsurer;
844
 lender;
845
 borrower;
846
 
vendor;
847
 and supplier.
848,849 
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8.2 How does the MEIP apply to the State?  
As held above, the aim underlining the applicability of the MEIP is to treat private and State 
owned or controlled undertakings in an equal manner. However, this point of departure comes 
with one important precaution, namely that the equal treatment of private and State owned or 
controlled undertakings only applies insofar as the State acts as an operator on the market.
850
  
It has been held by the CJEU that a distinction should be made between the State acting by 
‘exercising public power’851 and the State acting ‘in the capacity as a public authority’.852  
In Commission v Italy
853
  the CJEU emphasised that the State can act either by exercising public 
powers or by carrying on economic activities of industrial or commercial nature by offering 
goods and services on the market:
854
 
“[…] the state may act either by exercising public powers or by carrying on economic 
activities of an industrial or commercial nature by offering goods and services on the market. 
In order to make such a distinction, it is therefore necessary, in each case, to consider the 
activities exercised by the state and to determine the category to which those activities 
belong.”855   
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Accordingly, it is necessary to distinguish between the different roles of the State and to assess, 
on a case-to-case basis, which category the activity belongs to. 
In EDF
856
 the CJ had to assess the State’s dual role in relation to a State-owned electricity 
company (EDF). The facts giving rise to the case was a Decision
857
 from the Commission which 
concluded that a capital injection following a reconstruction of EDF’s accounts amounted to 
State aid.  
In its Decision, the Commission argued that the MEIP was not applicable as a benchmark for 
assessment of aid, since the aid measure in question concerned a tax measure and consequently 
it was an exercise of public authority.
858
 The Commission supported its argument on the fact 
that the measure was adopted by law, and thus, according to the Commission, it was an exercise 
of public powers by the French State. Following the Commission Decision, EDF brought an 
action for annulment before the GC
859
.   
The GC disagreed with the Commission and held that the measure should not be regarded as an 
exercise of public powers but rather that it was an accounting measure with tax implications.
860
 
Accordingly, the GC found that the measure in question concerned an activity which could be 
compared to activities normally performed by private operators. Consequently, the GC found 
that the Commission was obliged to apply the MEIP in the case.
861
 However, the conclusion 
from the GC did not concern whether the MEIP was actually fulfilled in the case, but merely 
regarded the fact that the MEIP was applicable to the case. The GC emphasised that the fact that 
the alleged aid measure was adopted by law was not a sufficient reason to allow the 
Commission to refuse to compare the measure to that of a private operator:
862
 
“[…] the mere fact that the claim held by the French State against that undertaking is fiscal in 
nature and the sole fact that the French State used legislation do not allow the Commission to 
refuse to ascertain whether, in similar circumstances, a private investor could have been 
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persuaded to inject the same amount of capital and, therefore, whether the capital was provided 
by the State in circumstances corresponding to normal market conditions.”863 
 The Commission appealed the case and brought an action for annulment before the CJ. 
In its judgment, the CJ discussed the applicability of the MEIP and emphasised that:
864
 
“[…] the roles of the State as shareholder of an undertaking, on the one hand, and of the State 
acting as a public authority, on the other, must be distinguished […] 
The applicability of the private investor test ultimately depends, therefore, on the Member State 
concerned having conferred, in its capacity as shareholder and not in its capacity as public 
authority, an economic advantage on an undertaking belonging to it.”865 
Accordingly, the applicability of the MEIP depends on whether the State in its capacity as 
shareholder (which was the specific ambit of the case) had conferred an advantage on the 
undertaking. 
Regarding the applicability of the MEIP in the specific case, the CJ held:
866
 
“As regards the question whether the applicability of the private investor test could be ruled 
out in the present case simply because the means employed by the French State were fiscal, it 
should be recalled that, under Article 87(1) EC [now 107(1) TFEU], any aid granted through 
State resources — in any form whatsoever — which, in terms of its effects, distorts or threatens 
to distort competition is incompatible with the common market in so far as it affects trade 
between Member States […]”867 
In this respect, the MEIP is not an exception that applies where the Member States request it. 
Rather:
868
 
“[…] where it is applicable, that test is among the factors which the Commission is required to 
take into account for the purposes of establishing the existence of such aid.”869 
                                                          
863
 Emphasis added.  
864
 European Commission v Électricité de France (EDF), C-124/10 P, EU:C:2012:318, paras 80-81. 
865
 Emphasis added. 
866
 European Commission v Électricité de France (EDF), C-124/10 P, para 88. 
867
 Emphasis added.  
868
 European Commission v Électricité de France (EDF), C-124/10 P, para 103. 
235 
 
When analysing the conclusion from the CJ, the following comments can be made.
 870
  Firstly, 
the case could be analysed to mean that the CJ is expanding the scope of applicability of the 
MEIP to entail situations in which the State exercises public powers. Furthermore, the case 
could be interpreted to blurry the boundaries of the MEIP by including the test to situations of 
fiscal matters. However, the message from the CJ in EDF could also be interpreted to entail that 
the MEIP is not expanded. Thus, EDF should merely be seen as a reinsurance of the fact that a 
State measure should be assessed according to its effects rather than its form. Accordingly, the 
conclusion from the CJ leads to the legal outcome that State aid rules cannot be circumvented by 
the fact that a measure is disguised as a legislative act, if it, in fact, can be compared to an 
activity performed by a private operator. 
In the cases cited above, the State acted as shareholder or investor. However, for the purpose of 
the research question asked in this Thesis, it is relevant to discuss how the MEIP applies to 
contracting authorities. This will be done in the following.  
8.2.1 Applicability of the MEIP to contracting authorities  
When public contracts are awarded, the contracting authority purchases goods or services. When 
the State makes a purchase, which is the situation considered in this Thesis, the partaking in 
commercial activities is arguably different than from situations where the State invests, sells, or 
gives credit etc. Therefore, it is relevant to analyse whether the MEIP applies to contracting 
authorities when they purchase goods or services.  
The assessment of whether aid is granted when the contracting authority purchases goods or 
services is not whether the transaction represents an undervalue, as i.e. is the case where the 
State sells assets or land. Rather, the assessment depends on whether the State has paid too 
much for the goods or services and, thus, whether the transaction represents an overvalue. 
Accordingly, in situations where the State awards public contracts for the purchase of goods or 
services, market price equals a situation where the contracting authority has not paid an 
excessive price.  
This Thesis analyses when the award of public contracts constitutes State aid within Article 
107(1) TFEU. Therefore, the following focuses on situations where contracting authorities 
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award public contracts for the purchase of goods and services within the scope of the 
procurement directives. Hence, the assessment of aid, as discussed below, relates to contracting 
authorities within the procurement directives.  
One of the prerequisites of the applicability of the MEIP and its subtypes is that the State acts 
equivalent to a normal economic operator, e.g. through public ownership or shareholdings in 
commercial undertakings etc. The same situation applies for the contracting authority, which 
means that the MEIP only applies to contracting authorities insofar as it can be compared to a 
normal economic operator. 
Hence, the applicability of the MEIP to contracting authorities relates, in essence, to the 
question of whether the contracting authorities act in the capacity of a public authority or in the 
capacity of an economic operator when they award public contracts. This question has been 
considered by the CJEU in several cases, which have implications for the applicability of the 
MEIP to contracting authorities.
871
  
In this regard, it has to be discussed whether the MEIP is applicable to situations in which the 
State makes a purchase or whether a different benchmark exists. In this connection, the question 
arises whether the contracting authorities are always limited to performing non-economic 
activities, when they perform obligations under the procurement directives. Or put in other 
words; whether the contracting authority only acts in the capacity of public authority when they 
award public contracts.  
8.2.2.1 FENIN 
The first case chosen for analysis is FENIN
872
. This case is relevant for the research question 
asked in this Thesis, as it deals with the possible dual role of the contracting authority when a 
purchase is made. Thus, in this case, the CJEU was asked to decide whether a public body could 
be considered an undertaking and hence fall within the scope of the competition rules in the 
Treaty. 
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Essentially, the case concerns whether the purchasing activity of the contracting authorities is, in 
itself, an economic activity. FENIN has been discussed widely in academic literature,
873
 and 
with good reason. As will be elaborated on below, the implications of the case are far-reaching 
and the conclusions reached by the CJEU are, to some extent, questionable.  
The background of the case was the assertion of FENIN (a trade association operating in the 
medical goods and equipment sector) that SNS (26 public bodies which run the national health 
system in Spain) had breached competition law, and more specifically Article 102 TFEU,
874
 by 
neglecting to pay their debt to the members of FENIN. According to FENIN, this was to be 
considered an abuse of SNS’ dominant position under Article 102 TFEU.   
The case arose before the CJ as an appeal against a judgment from the GC
875
, which held that 
the Commission was correct in concluding
876
 that the bodies managing the SNS were not acting 
as undertakings when they purchased medical goods and equipment from the members of 
FENIN.  
In the case under appeal, the GC emphasised that the definition of undertaking under EU 
competition law “covers any entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the legal 
status of that entity and the way in which it is financed”.877 However, the GC emphasised that 
the nature of the purchasing activity should be determined according to whether or not the 
subsequent use of the purchased goods amounts to an economic activity:
878
  
“[…] it is the activity consisting in offering goods and services on a given market that is the 
characteristic feature of an economic, not the business of purchasing, as such. Thus, as the 
Commission has argued, it would be incorrect, when determining the nature of that subsequent 
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activity, to dissociate the activity of purchasing goods from the subsequent use to which they 
are put. The nature of the purchasing activity must therefore be determined according to 
whether or not the subsequent use of the purchased goods amounts to an economic activity.  
Consequently, an organisation which purchases goods ─ even in great quantity ─ not for the 
purpose of offering goods and services as part of an economic activity, but in order to use them 
in the context of a different activity, such as one of a purely social nature, does not act as an 
undertaking simply because it is a purchaser in a given market. Whilst an entity may wield very 
considerable economic power, even giving rise to a monopsony, it nevertheless remains the case 
that, if the activity for which that entity purchases goods is not an economic activity, it is not 
acting as an undertaking for the purposes of Community competition law and is therefore not 
subject to the prohibitions laid down in Articles 81(1) EC [now 101(1) TFEU] and 82 EC [now 
102 TFEU].”879 
In FENIN, the SNS purchased medical goods and equipment to be used in the public health care 
sector and this led the GC to conclude that the subsequent use of the procured goods was of a 
purely social nature, and could therefore not be considered economic.
880
  
FENIN subsequently appealed the judgment from the GC. The CJ confirmed the conclusions 
from the GC and emphasised that the GC was correct in concluding that the activity of 
purchasing goods and services cannot automatically be dissociated from the subsequent use to 
which they are put.
881
 Subsequently, the CJ dismissed the appeal and confirmed the conclusions 
of the GC.
882
   
FENIN has been confirmed in Selex
883
, where the CJEU held that the development of technical 
standards was not considered an economic activity.
884
 
8.2.2.1.1 Comments  
Arguably, the legal consequence of FENIN is that all purchasing activity is excluded from the 
definition of economic activity, and therefore, the concept of undertaking. The decisive element 
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in the assessment of whether or not the activity performed is economic in nature is whether the 
subsequent use can be considered an economic activity. Thus, if the subsequent use of the 
purchased goods or services is connected to the role of public authority, the activity cannot be 
considered economic in nature. Neither the GC nor the CJ discussed when the subsequent use of 
the goods or services should be considered economic in nature
885
 and therefore this question is 
unresolved in the case law. In this respect, it must be assumed that in order to fall within the 
concept of exercise of public powers, the subsequent use of the purchase must be for a public 
purpose.   
However, it has to be emphasised that no requirement exists under procurement law as to 
whether the purchases made should be used for a public purpose. This might have an effect on 
the conclusions made above, as will be elaborated on in the following 
8.2.2.2.2 Purchases not made for a public purpose 
The conclusion drawn from the above is that purchasing activities cannot be dissociated from 
the subsequent use a priori. Hence, if the subsequent use of the purchase is made for a public 
purpose, then the purchase is not considered an economic activity within the competition rules. 
However, as will be discussed below, no requirement exists under procurement law that the 
purchase made must be used for a public purpose. In this respect, it should be discussed how 
this affects the conclusions from FENIN.  
No requirement exists under public procurement law as to whether the purchase made by the 
contracting authority is used for a public purpose. This can be seen from Article 1 (2) of the 
public procurement Directive: 
“Procurement within the meaning of this Directive is the acquisition by means of a public 
contract of works, supplies or services by one or more contracting authorities from economic 
operators chosen by those contracting authorities, whether or not the works, supplies or 
services are intended for a public purpose.”886 
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The chosen phrasing in Article 1 (2) of the public procurement Directive should probably be 
seen as an attempt to widen the scope of application of the directive to cover a wide range of 
contracts.
887
  
However, the formulation in Article 1 (2) of the public procurement Directive can arguably have 
the effect of blurring the conclusions derived from FENIN. In this respect, it could be argued 
that if there is no requirement under the procurement directives that the purchases made are for a 
public purpose, it cannot automatically be presumed that one specific purpose lies behind the 
purchase. This is important for the assessment of economic activity: in FENIN it was held that 
the subsequent use should determine whether the activity is economic in nature. Hence, if no 
public purpose lies behind the purchasing activity; the activity is economic in nature.  
Consequently, it could be argued that unless the contracting authority can demonstrate the 
public purpose of the purchase, it can be presumed that the purchase is not made for a public 
purpose. On these grounds, it could be argued that where no explicit public purpose is accounted 
for, the purchase can be dissociated from the subsequent use. Thereby, the purchase can be 
deemed to be an economic activity.   
The conclusion as to whether or not the contracting authorities perform non-economic activities, 
when they purchase goods or services, has implications for the applicability of the MEIP. As 
held above, the MEIP is only applicable to situations in which the State acts in accordance with 
a normal market operator. Consequently, the MEIP is not applicable as a benchmark for 
assessment of advantage in situations where the purchase made by the contracting authority 
cannot be dissociated from the subsequent use. To my knowledge, there are no examples of 
cases where the purchased goods or services have been dissociated from the subsequent use. 
However, as will be discussed below, the implications of FENIN need to be assessed in a wider 
perspective, taking other judgments into account. This could change the legal consequences that 
this case brought with it. The following will discuss a recent case from the GC which arguably 
has implications on the conclusions made above.  
8.2.2.3 TenderNed 
In a recent case concerning the launch of an e-procurement platform, TenderNed
888
, the GC had 
to consider another aspect of the question whether contracting authorities act in the capacity of 
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public powers when they award public contracts. The question before the GC concerned 
whether obligations flowing from the procurement directives were to be considered economic in 
nature and thus falling within the scope of the competition rules in the Treaty.  
Even though the subject matter of TenderNed initially seems equivalent to what the CJEU had 
already stated in FENIN, TenderNed possibly has implications for the assessment of whether 
contracting authorities act as public authorities when they award public contracts. As will be 
elaborated on below, the conclusions to be drawn from TenderNed are not clear-cut and this 
means that several possible legal consequences can be derived from the case. Firstly, section 8.3 
will discuss the possibility that TenderNed is an attempt to correct the implications derived from 
FENIN. Secondly, the possibility that TenderNed could be seen as a confirmation of FENIN will 
be discussed. But first, this section will discuss and analyse the case.  
The case of TenderNed concerned whether or not the financing provided by the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands for the creation and introduction of the electronic procurement (e-procurement) 
platform TenderNed constituted unlawful State aid. TenderNed was a platform providing a 
number of functionalities, made available to contracting authorities free of charge. The platform 
included:
889
  
- a publication module, which can be used for the publication of tender notices as well as 
associated tender documents (‘the publication module’); 
 
-  a tendering (submission) module, offering functionalities such as the exchange of questions and 
answers, and the uploading and downloading of tenders and bids. That module also includes a 
‘virtual company’ section in which economic operators can introduce and manage their data 
(‘the submission module’) 
 
 
- an e-guide, which supports interested parties in using TenderNed (‘the e-guide’). 
On the 6
th
 of April 2012, four companies, which offered various services relating to e-
procurement, lodged a complaint to the Commission seeking a declaration that the financing of 
the e-procurement platform constituted unlawful aid. In a preliminary letter, the Commission 
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found that the measure in question did not involve State aid a priori.
890
 Following the 
preliminary letter, the complainants requested the Commission for a formal Decision. 
In its Decision,
891
 the Commission argued, in essence, that the financing of TenderNed was 
related to the contracting authorities’ activities in relation to their fulfilment of their obligations 
under the procurement directives. TenderNed’s activities derived entirely from the need to 
support the public procurement activities of the contracting authorities and the obligations of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands under the procurement directives’.892 The Commission concluded 
that “since contracting authorities acted in their capacity as public authorities when complying 
with the statutory obligations laid down by the Procurement Law, TenderNed should be 
regarded, by extension, as acting in a similar capacity, providing those authorities with the 
means to ensure that those obligations are complied with.”893  
 Since TenderNed’s activities fell under the capacity of public authorities, no economic activity 
was carried out and, thusly, the funding of the platform did not constitute State aid within the 
meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
894
 
Following the Commission’s Decision, the applicants brought an action before the GC, seeking 
annulment of the Decision.  
The applicants held that the Decision was an infringement of Article 107(1) TFEU on the 
grounds that the Commission made a manifest error of assessment and an error of law by 
finding that the services provided by TenderNed could be regarded as non-economic services of 
general interest.
895
  
The CJ emphasised that according to settled case law, any activity consisting in offering goods 
and services on a given market is an economic activity,
896
 whereas the exercise of public powers 
are not of an economic nature. Thus, competition rules do not apply.
897 
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It follows that a contracting authority may be regarded as an undertaking performing economic 
activities for only a part of its activities.
898
  
The CJ then emphasised that the assessment of whether or not TenderNed was performing an 
economic activity could not be made for each activity in isolation. Rather, “the functionalities 
offered by TenderNed must therefore be understood as being linked to each other and forming 
different facets of the same activity”.899 Accordingly, the CJ examined whether TenderNed’s 
activities as a whole were connected with the exercise of public powers.  
The CJ then held that when contracting authorities initiate a tender procedure and comply with 
the procurement rules, they are acting as public authorities.
900
 Furthermore, the CJ emphasised 
that TenderNed were providing its services free of charge, which, according to the CJ, was a 
“relevant, albeit not sufficient, factor for the purpose of determining whether or not an activity 
is of an economic nature”.901  
These arguments led the CJ to conclude that the activities of TenderNed were closely linked to 
the activity of public procurement by contracting authorities and are therefore connected to the 
exercise of public powers.
902
 
The CJ emphasised that:
903
 
 “according to the procurement directives, the Member States are required to ensure that an 
adequate system is in place on their territory so as to guarantee that public procurement is 
carried out electronically, but they are free to choose the means of achieving that objective […]” 
8.2.2.3.1 Comments  
The TenderNed case touches on an important aspect of the different roles which the contracting 
authority fulfils when it awards public contracts. The case shows that the contracting authority 
carries out non-economic activities when they comply with their obligations under the 
procurement directives. Accordingly, this case shows that the activities of a contracting 
authority connected to the fulfilment of obligations under the procurement directives are to be 
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considered as activities connected with the exercise of public powers. In the present case, the 
requirements of the directives were connected to an obligation for the Member States of 
ensuring that public procurement is carried out electronically. Thus, arguably, this case shows 
that general obligations flowing from the procurement directives should be considered as the 
exercising public powers with the result that competition rules do not apply to such activities. 
8.2.3 Preliminary findings  
The conclusions from FENIN and TenderNed show that the activities performed by the 
contracting authorities are not considered economic in nature. Ergo, the MEIP is not applicable 
to situations where the contracting authority awards public contracts. 
This conclusion has great implications, as it prevents the MEIP to be used as a benchmark for 
deciding whether State support, in the form of public contracts, confers an advantage on the 
recipient.  
The following will analyse and discuss how the implications of the cases discussed above 
should be understood. In this respect, it is argued that FENIN and TenderNed could be seen as 
forming part of a doctrine, which is intended to separate purchasing activities from the non-
economic activities performed by contracting authorities.   
8.3. The doctrine of separability 
As stated above, FENIN was confirmed in Selex, where the CJEU held that the activities 
performed by Eurocontrol were not considered an economic activity.
904
 Thus, when reading the 
cases of FENIN, Selex and TenderNed, it could be concluded that purchasing activities 
performed by contracting authorities are always non-economic in nature. However, the 
following will present and discuss a possible alternative to this conclusion, namely that the cases 
of FENIN, Selex and TenderNed could be seen as an emerging doctrine that allows for some of 
the contracting authorities’ activities to be considered economic in nature.   
The case of Selex reveals some interesting arguments made by the GC, which have implications 
for the assessment of economic activity. Consequently, the case of Selex will be discussed below 
with an emphasis on how the GC argued the case.  
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In Selex, the CJEU had to consider whether Eurocontrol was in breach of Articles 102 and 106 
TFEU. The European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol) is an 
international organisation working in the field of safe air navigation. The question in the case 
was whether or not Eurocontrol could be considered an undertaking, performing economic 
activities and thus falling under the competition rules.  
An interesting aspect of the Selex judgment was the conclusion made by the GC that some of the 
activities of Eurocontrol were economic activities. The GC held that the activity of assisting 
national administrations with technical advice in the process of preparing tendering procedures 
could be separated from Eurocontrol’s non-economic activities905: 
“first of all, it should be pointed out that the activity of assisting the national administrations is 
separable from Eurocontrol’s tasks of air space management and development of air safety. 
Although the assistance may serve the public interest by maintaining and improving the safety of 
air navigation, that relationship is only a very indirect one, since the assistance provided by 
Eurocontrol only covers technical specifications in the implementation of tendering procedures 
for ATM equipment and therefore only impacts on the safety of air navigation by means of those 
tendering procedures. Such an indirect relationship does not imply that there is a necessary 
link between the two activities. In that respect, the Court recalls that Eurocontrol only offers 
assistance in that field on the request of the national administrations. The activity of assistance 
is therefore in no way an activity which is essential or even indispensable to ensuring the 
safety of air navigation.”906 
Accordingly, the GC held that the activities related to assistance of technical advice were 
economic in nature, as they only represented an indirect relation to the activities constituted by 
the exercise of public powers.   
The conclusion from the GC is interesting, as it implies that a distinction can be made between 
the activities performed by a contracting authority (State body). However, this finding was not 
upheld by the CJ, which found that the activities performed by Eurocontrol should be considered 
as a whole. Thusly, all of Eurocontrol’s activities constituted activities connected with public 
powers.
907
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In TenderNed, the GC argued that the activities of a contracting authority can be separated into 
individual activities. As held above, the GC concluded that the activity of ensuring that e-
procurement is actually carried out forms part of exercising  public powers.
908
 Consequently, the 
GC found that activities connected to obligations flowing from the procurement directives 
should be considered non-economic.  
TenderNed implies that a distinction should be made between purchasing activities and activities 
flowing from the procurement directives. In this respect, the conclusions from the GC could be 
interpreted to mean that the activities flowing from the procurement directives are linked to the 
performance of public authority. This could, in turn, be analysed to mean that activities, which 
are not performed as part of obligations flowing from the procurement directives, are not 
considered public authority tasks. This could imply that that GC is suggesting that other 
activities, such as purchasing activities, fall outside the scope of public authority. In this respect, 
TenderNed could be seen as building on the arguments from the GC in the case of Selex.   
Arguably, the cases of FENIN, Selex, and TenderNed are signs of an iterative process leading to 
the formation of a doctrine of separability. The ‘doctrine of separability’ implies that the 
activities of the contracting authority are either linked to purchasing activities or activities in 
relation to obligations flowing from the procurement directives. At its present stage, purchasing 
activities cannot be assessed for each activity in isolation, as was suggested by the GC in Selex. 
Rather, activities related to purchasing activities should be assessed together as a whole.  
8.3.3 The separability doctrine’s implications on the applicability of the MEIP to 
contracting authorities 
As stated above, the ‘doctrine of separability’ implies that a distinction needs to be made 
regarding the activities performed by contracting authorities when they award public contracts. 
Accordingly, a distinction needs to be made between activities in relation to purchasing (as was 
the legal consequence derived from FENIN) and activities in relation to the fulfilment of 
obligations under the procurement directives (as was the legal consequence derived from 
TenderNed).  
In this respect, one possible conclusion to the doctrine could be that the contracting authorities 
act in the capacity of public authority with regards to all aspects of the activities flowing from 
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the procurement rules, i.e. with regards to general obligations flowing from the directives as 
well as the purchasing activity. This line of reasoning implies that TenderNed should be 
regarded as a confirmation of FENIN.  
However, another possible conclusion needs to be discussed, namely the possibility that 
TenderNed should be seen as an attempt to diminish some of the legal consequences that FENIN 
brought with it. Under this scenario, TenderNed should be seen as an attempt to divide the 
activities of the contracting authorities, with the possible consequence that only activities in 
relation to the fulfilment of obligations under the procurement directives should be regarded as 
non-economic. This would imply that the purchasing activities could be seen as an economic 
activity. This interpretation would further take the different roles of the State, acting as either 
public authority or entrepreneur, into account.  
The conclusion to the question above has implications for the applicability of the MEIP. If 
TenderNed is an attempt to diminish the legal consequences of FENIN, it could imply that the 
MEIP is applicable to the purchase of goods and services, whereas activities in connection with 
obligations flowing from the procurement directives (such as facilitating the aim of electronic 
procurement which was the subject of TenderNed) are not considered  economic  Thus, they fall 
outside the scope of the MEIP.  
However, if TenderNed is seen as a confirmation of FENIN, the conclusion is that all of the 
activities of the contracting authority, when it awards public contracts, are to be considered as 
activities in connection to the exercise of public authority. Accordingly, this situation would 
imply that the MEIP is not applicable, when it has to be decided whether purchasing activities 
performed by contracting authorities constitute an advantage.  
In my opinion, the case of TenderNed shows that the GC is trying to modify or even limit the 
legal consequences of FENIN by concluding that activities related to obligations flowing from 
the procurement directives should be considered exercise of public powers. As stated above, this 
interpretation implies that TenderNed is seen as an attempt to divide the activities of the 
contracting authorities, with the possible consequence that only activities in relation to the 
fulfilment of obligations under the procurement directives should be regarded as non-economic.  
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However, it should be emphasised that the alleged ‘doctrine of separability’ has not (yet) been 
confirmed by the CJ. Thus, at the present stage, the cases of FENIN, Selex, and TenderNed lead 
to the result that the MEIP is inapplicable to all activities performed by contracting authorities 
under the procurement directives. In this respect, it is relevant to discuss which benchmark, if 
not the MEIP, ought to be used to assess whether an advantage is conferred when the 
contracting authorities perform purchasing activities. This will be done in the following.  
8.4 In search of the Market Economy Purchaser Principle (MEPP) 
As discussed above, it is not absolutely clear what the constituent elements of the test of 
advantage are with regard to contracting authorities when they purchase, or what this test 
includes. Therefore, this section will first analyse how the CJEU has assessed the concept of 
advantage in relation to contracting authorities. Secondly, the requirement of genuine needs, as 
laid down in T-14/96 BAI, will be discussed. Finally, a critique of the test applied by the CJEU 
will be raised. It has been held in academic literature
909
 that the private purchaser test has been 
laid down for the first time in T-14/96 BAI. The following will discuss and analyse the 
constituents of this test.  
8.4.1 The requirement of a genuine need 
In BAI
910
, the GC formulated a requirement of genuine need. The requirement was first set out 
in T-14/96 BAI, where the GC assessed whether the purchase of travel vouchers represented an 
actual need:
911
 
“The file produced before the Court does not support the conclusion that the number of travel 
vouchers specified in the 1995 agreement was determined by an increase in the actual needs felt 
by the authorities, which are claimed to have required the purchase of a total of 46 500 
vouchers to be used on the Bilbao-Portsmouth route in the period 1995-1998, whereas originally 
there was only a need for a total of 26 000 vouchers for 1993-1996. Furthermore, the 
advantage capable of strengthening the competitive position of Ferries Golfo de Vizcaya is not 
eliminated merely because the recipient undertaking is required to supply a greater quantity of 
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transport services in return for a relatively unchanged financial benefit. As the travel vouchers 
purchased by the Spanish authorities can be used only in the low season, the improved service 
supplied by the undertaking does not in principle entail significant additional costs for it and, 
consequently, the effects of the new agreement on competition and trade between Member States 
are the same as those which could be attributed to the 1992 agreement”912 
Thus, the requirement of actual needs was used to conclude whether an advantage had been 
conferred in the recipient. In this respect, according to the GC, the increase in vouchers should 
live up to an actual need felt by the authorities in order not to constitute an advantage. 
In P&O Ferries,
913
 the GC further refined the requirement of actual needs:
914
 
“it follows from the foregoing that the mere fact that a Member State purchases goods and 
services on market conditions is not sufficient for that transaction to constitute a commercial 
transaction concluded under conditions which a private investor would have accepted, or in 
other words a normal commercial transaction, if it turns out that the State did not have an 
actual need for those goods and services.”915 
The GC further emphasised that the requirements to demonstrate that the measure constitutes a 
normal commercial transaction are increased when the purchase has taken place without the 
conduct of a tender procedure:
916
 
“it is all the more necessary for a Member State to demonstrate that its purchase of goods or 
services constitutes a normal commercial transaction where, as in the present instance, 
selection of the operator has not been preceded by a sufficiently advertised open tender 
procedure. In accordance with the Commission's settled practice, the fact that such a tender 
procedure is conducted before a Member State makes a purchase is normally considered 
sufficient for the possibility that the Member State is seeking to grant an advantage to a given 
undertaking to be ruled out.”917 
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The requirement of a genuine need has been criticised in academic literature.
918
 It could be 
argued that the requirement of genuine needs places an excessive burden on the contracting 
authorities. Furthermore, as held by AG Tizzano in his opinion to P&O Ferries
919
 it can be 
difficult to verify objectively whether a genuine need exists. As emphasised by AG Tizzano:
920
  
“I accept of course that it is not always easy to verify objectively the need for the public 
authorities to purchase certain goods or services; it is also true, however, that when it is 
possible to do so, the absence of any such necessity is a clear indication that the purchase in 
question does not constitute a normal commercial transaction.“ 
However, AG Tizzano further explained that:
921
 
“in reality notification would be required only where the action taken, having regard to the 
specific circumstances, might result in economic benefits for the suppliers concerned which they 
could not have obtained from a private contracting party. In other words, the public authorities 
must consider, case by case, whether or not the contract is based on market conditions. But 
that assessment does not seem to me to be different from the one which they must make when, for 
example, deciding to make a capital investment in a company or to transfer to the private sector 
assets in public ownership.” 
This statement of AG Tizzano implies that the requirement of genuine needs is the benchmark 
of assessment of whether the purchase is based on market conditions.  
  
The CJEU never elaborated on what conditions need to be fulfilled in order to live up to the 
requirement of genuine needs. As held by AG Tizzano, the transaction as a whole must conform 
to the logic of the market
922
 which entails an obligation to account for “the terms, conditions, 
and other circumstances surrounding the purchase.”923 
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However, the GC emphasised in T- 116/01 and T-118/01 P&O Ferries what was considered not 
to be sufficient to establish genuine need, namely that:
924
  
“the mere fact that consideration has been supplied by an undertaking to a State body 
does not demonstrate, in itself, that the latter had an actual need for the services in 
question. Merely to argue that services were actually supplied by P&O Ferries to the 
Diputación is thus not sufficient to show an actual need on the part of the Diputación for 
the services in question.” 
Conclusively, according to the test of genuine need, the Member States need to prove that the 
terms and conditions as well as other circumstances surrounding the purchase live up to the 
logic of the market. However, it is not apparent what this requirement entails.  
8.4.2 What is a Market Economic Purchaser? The constituents of the Market Economy 
Purchaser Principle  
The above has discussed how the CJEU assessed the presence of advantage for the winning 
tenderer in the BAI case. This section will, on the basis of the above, discuss the content of the 
requirement of a genuine need and deduce the concept of the Market Economy Purchaser 
Principle (MEPP). The requirement of genuine need could be analysed in two different ways; 
both will be analysed below. Firstly, section 8.4.2.1 discusses the possibility that the MEPP 
consists of two conditions, which both have to be fulfilled in order for the MEPP to apply. 
Secondly, section 8.4.2.2 suggests that the MEPP, in effect, only relies on one condition.   
8.4.2.1 Two conditions for the fulfilment of the MEPP?  
Firstly, the concept of MEPP could be twofold when the States make a purchase. This line of 
reasoning would imply that in order for the contracting authority to comply with the MEPP and 
thus fall outside the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU, the measure should i) represent a normal 
commercial transaction and ii) represent a genuine need. This interpretation seems to be 
supported by Cyndecka who states that the private purchaser test relies on two conditions:
925
 
“The private purchaser test relies on two conditions. First, the state must pay a market price 
for goods or services it acquires. […] The second condition under the private purchaser test is 
more problematic. It is a requirement of an ‘actual’ or ‘genuine’ need for the goods or services 
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acquired by the state. Thus, the transaction may still constitute aid although the state paid the 
market price” 
The above seems to imply that under the MEPP, the assessment of whether market price is paid 
is separated from the assessment of an actual or genuine need felt by the contracting authority. 
This interpretation cannot be supported. As concluded in section 8.2.3 above, the legal 
consequences of FENIN and TenderNed imply that all activities performed by the contracting 
authority under the procurement directives fall under the scope of public authority. Thereby, the 
benchmark of purchases to represent a normal commercial transaction is not applicable when the 
contracting authority makes a purchase. This conclusion implies that if the content of the MEPP 
is two-fold, i.e,. i) represents a normal commercial transaction and ii) represent a genuine need 
MEPP is inapplicable to contracting authorities when they award public contracts.  
Accordingly, the deduction of a new benchmark is required.  
8.4.2.2 Genuine need as the only decisive benchmark 
The second interpretation implies that the only benchmark for assessment of advantage when 
contracting authorities award public contracts is whether a genuine need exists. This line of 
reasoning would imply that the requirement of a genuine need is sufficient to render purchasing 
activities outside the scope of the State aid rules (with respect to the private purchaser test). 
Thus, there is no benchmark against a private operator. The latter explanation could be sufficient 
to solve the situation derived from FENIN, as analysed above, where the CJEU held that 
purchasing activities are not considered economic activities and thereby a priori fall outside the 
scope of the MEIP.  
Consequently, the requirement under the MEPP is not whether the transaction is based on 
normal market conditions. Rather, the requirement of genuine needs is the benchmark of 
assessment of whether the purchase is based on market conditions.  
8.4.2.3 BAI as part of the doctrine of separability 
As stated above, the decisive element in the three cases of FENIN, Selex, and TenderNed seems 
to be whether the subsequent use of the purchased goods or services can be considered an 
economic activity. Furthermore, the BAI case implies that the requirement of a genuine need 
only applies to situations, where a market price cannot be established, i.e. where the contracting 
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authority awards public contracts by illegal direct award. This suggests that the requirement of a 
genuine need is used as the decisive benchmark for assessment of market price when public 
contracts are awarded directly (illegal). 
 In situations where a tender procedure has been conducted, market price is obtained if the 
requirements analysed in chapter 7 are fulfilled. In such situations, where the market price is 
obtained, there is no need for the contracting authority to prove that the purchase fulfills a 
genuine need.  
Accordingly, the BAI judgment could be considered to form a part of the doctrine of 
separability, insofar as the legal consequence of BAI entails that if there is a genuine need for the 
subsequent use of the purchased goods or services, the activity is not considered an economic 
activity, and thus, MEPP is not applicable. If, however, it is found that no genuine need exists 
for the purchased good or service, the activity is considered economic and, thus, MEPP applies.  
If the statement above is true, it can be concluded that the procedural rules in the procurement 
directives can be considered a safeguarding of the presumption that no advantage is conferred 
when a tender procedure has been conducted. Hence, a presumption for a genuine need exists. 
Thus, MEPP is satisfied a priori when a tender procedure has been conducted.   
Finally, it has to be emphasised that in BAI, the contract should arguably have been awarded 
following a tender procedure, and thus the award of contract in BAI is considered illegal. For 
this reason, the above only applies to situations of illegal direct award. To my knowledge, the 
CJEU has not considered this question in any situations where the award was made as a direct 
legal award of contract. However, the GC and the Commission has considered the applicability 
of the MEPP following an award of a concession contract. In this respect, the following will 
account for how the MEPP applies to situations where the award concerns a concession contract. 
8.4.3 Applicability of the MEPP to award by concession   
In a recent Decision
926
 the Commission had to consider whether the award of a concession for 
the prospection and exploration of polyhalite (potash) deposits in the area of Puck concerned 
State aid within Article 107(1) TFEU. On 25 February 2015, Darley Energy Poland Sp. z o.o. 
(hereafter DEP) submitted a complaint to the Commission alleging that Poland granted 
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incompatible State aid to an undertaking (KGHM). DEP  held that Poland granted incompatible 
State aid to KGHM by awarding KGHM a concession for the prospection and exploration of 
polyhalite (potash) deposits without conducting an open, transparent, non-discriminatory and 
unconditional tender to the detriment of DEP, who was refused that concession despite 
submitting a better offer.
927
  
Concerning the assessment of advantage the Commission emphasised that an economic 
transaction does not confer an advantage to the recipient if it is carried out in line with normal 
market conditions.
928
 Then, the Commission held that:
929
 
 
“[…] Compliance with normal market conditions is normally assessed on the basis of the 
"market economy operator" (MEO) test, whose purpose is to determine whether with regard to a 
certain transaction the State acted as a private operator in a similar situation. The MEO test is, 
however, not applicable in transactions where the State acts as a public authority rather than 
as an economic operator.”930 
This statement from the Commission shows that contracting authorities act by exercising public 
powers when they award concession contracts. Thus, the market economy operator test is not 
applicable to contracting authorities when they award concession contracts.  
The Commission continued to explain that, in the present case, the exploration and exploitation 
can be conducted only after obtaining the concession from the State and thus, the comparison to 
a market operator is not relevant since no market operator can be in a similar situation as the 
State in such situations:
931
  
“[…] the Commission notes that under Polish law deposits of potassium salt belong to the State 
and their exploration and exploitation can be conducted only after obtaining the concession from 
the State. No market operator can grant any such or similar concession, and, therefore, no 
market operator can be in a similar situation as the State. In addition, according to Polish law, 
when evaluating applications for the concession, the State must take into account public 
interest, security, environmental protection and rational management of mineral deposits […]. 
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These are legitimate considerations which are relevant for a public authority rather than for 
an economic operator that is ultimately concerned only with profit maximisation and which, 
furthermore, are not prone to any meaningful quantifiable economic analysis.  
More generally, the granting of concessions for exploration or exploitation of mineral deposits 
is, due to its regulatory nature, typically performed by the State in Member States of the Union 
and can be categorised as the exercise of public authority powers. In view of that, and contrary 
to the view of the Complainant, the Commission takes the view that in granting the concession 
for exploration, the State acted as a public authority and, consequently, the MEO test is not 
applicable.”932  
This conclusion seems to be supported by the GC in the case of SNCM
933
 where the GC held:
934
  
“As observed correctly by the Commission and Corsica Ferries, it is clear that the criterion of a 
private investor operating in a market economy is not applicable in a situation such as the one in 
the present case. Where a public authority presents itself as the organising and delegating 
authority of the public service, the applicability of that criterion is necessarily ruled out, since by 
definition it is acting as a public authority. Moreover, contrary to the view expressed by SNCM, nor 
can the French authorities’ conduct in the present case be equated with their procuring maritime 
transport services in exchange for the payment of a price. What is in fact at issue in this case is an 
agreement whereby a public authority entrusts economic operators with the management of a public 
service in return for financial compensation being paid to them. In such a situation, it is the four 
Altmark criteria which apply for the purpose of determining whether such compensation constitutes 
State aid and, in particular, confers a selective advantage.”935 
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The above can be illustrated in the following way: 
  Table II: Illustration of the benchmark for assessment of advantage 
 Benchmark for assessment of  
advantage? 
 
Award by public tender 
competitive, transparent non-
discriminatory and unconditional 
tender procedure – market price is 
presumed  
 
Award by concession  
 
Competitive, transparent non-
discriminatory and unconditional 
tender procedure – market price is 
presumed 
  
 
Legal direct award 
 
General principles of the Treaty 
 
Illegal direct award  
 
Actual and genuine need 
   
 
Accordingly, the MEPP is constituted of the test of genuine needs, which applies to situations 
where the purchasing activity has been completed either through direct award, i.e. without the 
conduct of a tender procedure. Furthermore, purchasing activities completed through the 
conduct of a tender procedure
936
 do not fall under the MEPP, as market price is assumed in these 
situations. 
 
                                                          
936
 See further chapter 7, section 7.2. 
257 
 
8.4.4 Preliminary findings  
Based on the above, it can be concluded that the MEPP, as applied by the CJEU, does not 
compare the contracting authority to a private purchaser. Rather, the MEPP constitutes a fictive 
benchmark of the necessity of the purchase, i.e. the requirement of a genuine need. Thus, the 
analysis above shows that where the contract has been awarded as an illegal direct award, the 
assessment of whether the award represents a normal market transaction relies on the assessment 
of whether the purchase represents a genuine need felt by the contracting authority.  
It is not exactly clear from the case law of the CJEU which conditions should be fulfilled in 
order to prove that a genuine need exists. However, as stated by AG Tizzano in T- 116/01 and 
T-118/01 P&O Ferries, the purchase must conform to the logic of the market. which entails an 
obligation to account for the terms, conditions, and other circumstances surrounding the 
purchase. 
 
8.4.5 A critique of the MEPP 
Following the conclusions above, a few critical remarks must be raised. 
Firstly, as has been discussed in literature,
937
 the MEPP could be criticised of limiting the 
Member States’ freedom to act as entrepreneur. However, the requirement of justifying large-
scale purchases, with the possible effect of distorting competition, seems to be justified in order 
to avoid disguised aid.  
Furthermore, arguably, the MEPP test is not a sufficient way of proving whether an advantage 
has been conferred. As has been accounted for above, according to the MEPP the only 
assessment of whether the award of contract constitutes a normal market transaction is whether 
the purchase represents an actual or genuine need. Arguably, this requirement is not a very 
strong safeguard to the assessment of whether an advantage has been conferred. As discussed in 
chapter 7 of this Thesis, the assessment of advantage relating to contracts awarded under the 
procurement Directive is much stronger. Thus, chapter 7 concluded that the assessment of 
advantage relies on a number of factors including, the number of participants in the competition 
for the contract and the occurrence of a competitive advantage for the contract and factors which 
could dissuade interested tenderers from participating in the call for tenders, including short 
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deadlines and numerous clauses. All this factors seem to be irrelevant when the award is made 
pursuant to an illegal direct award of contract.  
Furthermore, it is uncertain what the requirements of an actual or genuine need are. As held 
above, the contracting authority must prove that the terms and conditions, as well as other 
circumstances surrounding the purchase, live up to the logic of the market. However, it is not 
apparent what this requirement entails more specifically.  
Therefore, at the present stage, the possibility to confer disguised aid on the winning tenderer, 
when a procurement procedure has been conducted, exists. One possible way of dealing with 
this situation could be to apply/revise the doctrine of separability, as deduced above.   
 
8.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have assessed the applicability and the application of the MEIP concerning 
activities performed by contracting authorities under the procurement directives.  
The cases of FENIN, Selex, and TenderNed imply that the MEIP is not applicable to contracting 
authorities when they perform purchasing activities or activities related to the obligations 
flowing from the procurement directives. 
The emerging doctrine of separability suggests that this state of law could be changed in the 
future, as TenderNed could be an indication of willingness from the CJEU to separate the 
activities performed by the contracting authorities with the possible consequence that purchasing 
activities might - in the future - constitute economic activities. This reasoning implies that 
TenderNed is actually an attempt to correct FENIN, rather than a confirmation of this judgment.   
On the basis of the above, I have presented arguments to support the view that, in essence, the 
MEPP only relies on the condition of a genuine need, as opposed to both the condition of 
genuine need and the benchmark with a private purchaser. This argumentation supports the 
conclusion that MEPP is in fact applicable to contracting authorities, despite the present state of 
law derived from FENIN, Selex, and TenderNed, because the CJEU does not benchmark against 
a private operator.   
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It has been concluded that the application of MEPP is only valid in situations where a tender 
procedure has not been conducted.    
However, the MEPP has been criticised not taking into account that State aid issues might arise, 
even in situations where a tender procedure has been conducted. This argumentation is built on 
the conclusions in chapter 7 of this Thesis.  
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9. Conclusion 
 
This Thesis seeks to answer the research question: 
“When does the award of public contracts constitute State aid within Article 107(1) TFEU?” 
The research question is answered through a legal dogmatic analysis, and the research of the 
Thesis thereby contributes to an understanding of what law is.  
The Thesis sets out to investigate the interface between State aid law and public procurement 
law with an emphasis on analysing when the award of public contracts by contracting authorities 
constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. Article 107(1) TFEU prohibits 
any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which 
distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of 
certain goods, in so far as it affects trade between Member States. Award of public contracts is 
governed by procedural rules laid down in the public procurement Directives which lay out 
specific rules and procedures for the award of public contracts. Furthermore, public contracts 
can – under specific circumstances – be awarded directly without the conduct of a tender 
procedure. These situations are referred to as legal direct award of contract. A contract can be 
legally awarded without the conduct of a tender procedure, e.g. when the value of the contract is 
below the thresholds set out in the Directives. Finally, situations might occur where the award of 
a contract directly to an economic operator falls under the scope of the procurement Directives 
and thus should have happened through a tender procedure. Such situations are referred to as 
illegal direct award of contracts. This Thesis analyses the extent to which State aid rules apply in 
the abovementioned situations.  
The Thesis is divided into four parts which all contribute to answering the research question. 
9.1 Part I 
Part I concludes that State aid rules apply to contracting authorities when they award public 
contracts. Thus, in theory, contracting authorities are fully capable of transferring State aid to 
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economic operators when they award public contracts. This conclusion applies for all three 
award situations identified in chapter 1, namely award under the public procurement Directive, 
award under the concession Directive and legal and illegal direct award.  
The overall conclusion in part I is achieved by an analysis of the aims and objectives of the 
procurement rules and State aid rules as well as an analysis of the personal scope of the two sets 
of rules.  
It is found that public procurement rules and State aid rules share the common objective of 
supporting the Internal Market by increasing and protecting competition: The procurement rules 
support an Internal Market by preventing protectionist purchasing and ensuring equal treatment 
between economic operators through the removal of discrimination and barriers that prevent 
entry into the public procurement market, and they further seek to implement competitive 
procedures in order to ensure transparency. The State aid rules support an Internal Market by 
way of prohibiting the transfer of advantages to the recipient undertaking and thus avoiding 
distortion of competition between competitors in the Internal Market.  
The two sets of rules support this goal in different ways, but it is concluded that the different 
means are not mutually exclusive. 
Aside from the achievement of an Internal Market, it has been argued that both the procurement 
rules and the State aid rules seek to ensure competition. In this respect, the concept of 
competition in relation to procurement rules aims at increasing the number of (potential) 
tenderers. Accordingly, the concept of competition in relation to procurement rules aims at 
creating more competition for the public contracts. Under State aid law, the concept of 
competition relates to the protection of existing competition in the Internal Market. In this 
respect, the concept of competition under State aid law implies an obligation for the State to 
ensure that already existing competition is not distorted. Thus, the concept of competition in 
relation to State aid rules aims at preserving or protecting existing competition.  
Despite the fact that the two sets of rules seek to support competition in different ways, it is 
argued that these aims of increasing or preserving competition are not mutually exclusive.  
The analysis of the personal scope of the procurement rules and State aid rules shows that 
convergent fields of application exist between the two sets of rules. Thus, the concepts of 
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‘contracting authority’ under the procurement rules coincides with the concept of ‘State’ under 
the State aid rules. In this respect, the actions of a contracting authority are imputable to the 
State, which presupposes a close connection between the State and contracting authorities. 
Furthermore, the concept of ‘economic operator’ under the procurement rules coincides with the 
concept of ‘undertaking’ under the State aid rules. Consequently, economic operators are 
capable of receiving State aid as they fulfil the constituent element under Article 107(1) TFEU 
that relates to ‘transfer by the State or through State resources to undertakings’. This means that 
the requirement in Article 107(1) TFEU that the recipient of the aid is an ‘undertaking’ is also 
fulfilled.  
Convergent personal scopes of the procurement rules and State aid rules are not sufficient to 
conclude whether award of public contracts constitute State aid within Article 107(1) TFEU. For 
this reason, it is analysed whether the contracting authority is capable of fulfilling the 
constituent elements of Article 107(1) TFEU that relate to measures which ‘distort or threaten to 
distort competition’, measures which ‘favour certain undertakings or the production of certain 
goods’ and measures which ‘affect trade between Member States’. 
It is concluded that the obligations for the contracting authority to ensure that competition is not 
distorted are embedded in the public procurement Directives by way of an obligation for the 
contracting authority to ensure that competition is not artificially narrowed when public 
contracts are awarded.  
Then, a measure which favours certain undertakings or the production of certain goods relates in 
essence to the assessment of whether the measure in question is selective in nature. Arguably, 
the requirement of selectivity cannot be determined a priori, and thus it must be determined on a 
case-by-case basis whether the award of public contracts is selective. Since it is unsettled in the 
case law from the CJEU how the concept of selectivity applies to procurement measures, the 
principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination as embedded in the procurement rules are 
used to consider whether the award of public contracts is selective. It is argued that no 
selectivity occurs in relation to legal direct award of contracts in so far as the general principles 
of the Treaty are adhered to. However, it is found that the same conclusion does not apply for 
illegal direct award of contracts, especially in situations where the general principles of the 
Treaty are not adhered to.    
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Finally, the requirement of effect on trade is not relevant when the award of contract is made 
pursuant to a tender procedure under the procurement Directives as the Directives set out 
predefined thresholds to be applied when determining whether the award falls under the scope 
of the Directives. In this respect, it is argued that the thresholds set out in the procurement 
Directives aim at creating competition, and therefore, the requirement of cross-border interest 
becomes irrelevant for public contracts awarded under the Directives. However, when the 
contract is awarded directly, either by way of legal direct award or by way of illegal direct 
award, the assessment of cross-border interest is relevant to ensuring that trade and competition 
is not distorted.  
Accordingly, the contracting authority is in theory capable of fulfilling the requirement in 
Article 107(1) TFEU of aid being transferred by the State or through State resources.  
Part I of this Thesis thereby partly contributes to answering the research question by concluding 
that contracting authorities fall under the personal scope of the State aid rules and that they are 
thereby, a priori, capable of granting aid to tenderers when they award public contracts.  
9.2 Part II 
The analysis in part II comprises an assessment of when and how an advantage is conferred 
when contracting authorities award public contracts.  
It is concluded that the concept of advantage under State aid law entails a benchmark against 
‘normal market conditions’ which is a concept developed by the CJEU to assess whether State 
support can escape the prohibition in Article 107(1) TFEU on the grounds that the support 
equals market terms. The case law from the CJEU seem to imply that when State intervention is 
not given according to market conditions, market price is not paid, and hence an advantage is 
conferred within Article 107(1) TFEU.  
The presence of advantage in relation to a public contract awarded following a tender procedure 
under the procurement Directives relates, in essence, to the question of whether the tender 
procedure, including the terms of the contract, reflects normal market conditions, and hence 
whether market price is obtained. However, the benchmark for obtaining market price when 
public contracts are awarded is not unambiguous. Hence, it is necessary to take the concrete 
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circumstances of the case into consideration when it is decided whether the award confers an 
advantage on the winning tenderer.  
Since the question of whether the award of a contract under the procurement Directive amounts 
to State aid is unsolved in the case law from the CJ, it is necessary to rely on judgments from the 
GC as well as Commission Decisions.  
From the Decision in London Underground, it can be derived that the Commission finds that the 
negotiated procedure with prior notification adheres to the requirement of a competitive, 
transparent, non-discriminatory and unconditional tender procedure in so far as the call for 
competition, as well as the evaluation of the offers on the basis of the most financially 
advantageous tender, is fair to all bidders and applied in a consistent way with an appropriate 
methodology. 
However, this conclusion could, in my opinion, be jeopardised, if State aid case law is taken into 
consideration. Accordingly, the assessment of whether market price is obtained differs when the 
assessment is made on the basis of the ‘avoided costs’ test as accounted for in chapter 6, as 
opposed to on the basis of the ‘change in award’ test as applied by the Commission in the case 
of London Underground.  
Where the award has not been made pursuant to a tender procedure, i.e. by legal direct award, 
the alleged advantage is also evaluated on the basis of whether the award adheres to the general 
principles in the Treaty. This conclusion is drawn on the basis of analysis of the Greek airport 
case. 
Based on the analysis of the cases from the GC, it is uncertain whether the conduct of a 
competitive, transparent, non-discriminatory and unconditional tender procedure necessarily 
satisfies the requirements in Article 107(1) TFEU. The cases chosen for analysis do not provide 
a clear answer to this question. In BAI, the GC did not use market price as the benchmark for 
evaluation of whether the award represented normal market conditions. Rather, the decisive 
benchmark was whether a genuine need existed for the purchase.  
In SNCM, the GC had to decide whether the award of a contract following a tender procedure 
could be classified as a SGEI. The case was chosen for analysis since it establishes a possible 
link between procurement law and State aid law for services that do not relate to SGEIs. 
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However, it is held that such a connection cannot be established, and thus no connection 
between Altmark and services relating to non-SGEIs awarded under the procurement directives 
can be said to occur. However, it is concluded that the case provides important guidance 
regarding which factors could amount to State aid, including the number of participants in the 
competition for the contract, the occurrence of a competitive advantage for the contract, and 
factors which could dissuade interested tenderers from participating in the call for tenders, 
including short deadlines and numerous clauses.  
The analysis above is illustrated as follows: 
Table I: Illustration of how advantage occurs under the identified award situations 
  Case/Decision Benchmark for 
assessment of 
advantage  
Satisfies the State aid 
rules? 
Satisfies the 
procurement rules?  
Award by public 
tender (negotiated 
procedure) 
London 
Underground 
- competitive, 
transparent, non-
discriminatory and 
unconditional tender 
procedure 
- sufficient 
competition for the 
contract 
Yes,  
(post-selection 
modifications) 
Yes 
(Adherence to 
procedural rules) 
Award by 
concession  
Greek airports - competitive, 
transparent, non-
discriminatory and 
unconditional tender 
procedure 
- highest bidder  
Yes Yes 
Legal direct award Greek airports - competitive, 
transparent, non-
discriminatory and 
unconditional tender 
procedure 
- highest bidder 
Yes 
(Assumption of 
breach) 
Yes, if  
adherence to general 
principles in the 
Treaty 
Illegal direct award  BAI - Genuine need  
- Can market price be 
obtained? 
No 
(No genuine need) 
No 
(Breach of 
procedural rules and 
general principles)  
 
In conclusion, the benchmark for assessment of whether State aid is granted when public 
contracts are awarded relies on a number of factors which are indicative for whether market 
price has been obtained.  
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9.3 Part III 
The main conclusion in part III is that the test used for benchmarking against a normal market 
operator does not apply to situations where the contracting authority makes a purchase. This 
conclusion is made following an analysis of several cases from the CJEU which held that a 
contracting authority only acts in the capacity of public authority when it awards public 
contracts.  
On the basis of this conclusion it is discussed whether an emerging doctrine of separability can 
be detected from the case law of the CJEU. In this respect, two possible conclusions are 
discussed. The first analysis supports the conclusion that the benchmark against a normal market 
operator is not applicable to contracting authorities. The second analysis supports the view that 
the doctrine of separability shows emerging signs of separation of the activities performed by 
the contracting authorities. Thus, it is suggested that according to the doctrine, only activities in 
relation to the fulfilment of obligations under the procurement directives should be regarded as 
non-economic, and they thus fall outside the benchmarking test against a normal market 
operator. Accordingly, the doctrine of separability would imply that purchasing activities could 
in fact be compared to the activities of a normal market operator in the assessment of whether 
advantage has been granted. It is concluded that the ‘doctrine of separability’ has not (yet) been 
confirmed by the CJ and thus, at the present stage, purchasing activities performed by 
contracting authorities cannot be compared to the activities of a normal market operator.  
On the basis of the above, it is therefore discussed what relevant benchmark, if not the market 
operator test, should be applied in the assessment of whether the award of public contracts 
confers an advantage on the recipient. This analysis is made on the basis of the BAI case which 
is known to be the first case where the CJEU established the so-called Market Economy 
Purchaser Principle (MEPP). The BAI case concerned an illegal direct award of contract, and 
thus the analysis of the MEPP is applicable to contracts which are awarded directly without the 
conduct of a tender procedure, but where a tender procedure should have been conducted.  
The analysis of the BAI case shows that the benchmark of assessment of advantage under the 
MEPP only relies on one factor, namely whether the purchase made by the contracting authority 
represents an actual and genuine need. This approach is criticised for being insufficient to 
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proving whether an advantage has been conferred since such a requirement is not a very strong 
safeguard to the assessment of advantage. Furthermore, it is emphasised that the requirements of 
proving an actual or genuine need are very uncertain. Therefore, the possibility to confer 
disguised aid on the winning tenderer when a procurement procedure has been conducted 
following illegal direct award exists. In this respect it is emphasised that one possible way of 
dealing with this situation could be to apply the doctrine of separability since this would allow 
illegal direct award of a contract to be compared to a normal market operator.  
It is emphasised that the assessment of advantage is much more comprehensive and therefore 
stronger relating to contracts awarded under the procurement Directive, awards made under the 
concession Directive and legal direct awards. Accordingly, the assessment of advantage in such 
situations relies on a number of factors, including the number of participants in the competition 
for the contract and the occurrence of a competitive advantage for the contract, and factors 
which have the objective of concluding whether interested tenderers have been dissuaded from 
participating in the call for tenders, including short deadlines and numerous clauses. All these 
factors seems to be irrelevant when the award is made pursuant to an illegal direct award of 
contract.  
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